PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN R WALKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 208777
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 96-501393
STEVEN R. WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and White and Wilder, JJ.
KELLY, P.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Defendant claims error in sentencing consecutively for the manslaughter conviction and I
agree. The jury did not return two felony-firearm convictions, it returned only one. Conceivably,
the jury could have based the verdict on each of the three stated felonies: second-degree murder,
involuntary manslaughter and discharging a firearm, inasmuch as the jury was instructed that
defendant must have knowingly carried or possessed a firearm “at the time [he] committed one of
those three crimes, or all of those three crimes.”
Nevertheless, when more than one felony is committed in a single transaction, more than
one conviction for felony-firearm is permitted. People v Morton, 423 Mich 650, 656; 377 NW2d
798 (1985); People v Syakovich, 182 Mich App 85, 88; 452 NW2d 211 (1989). The proper
question is whether the defendant possessed a firearm at the time he committed each felony.
People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d 265 (2000).
In his appellate brief, defendant states the claim as follows:
Because the trial judge instructed the jury it could convict Mr. Walker of felonyfirearm if it found he possessed a firearm when he committed either intentional
discharge of a firearm or involuntary manslaughter, the trial judge did not have the
statutory authority to make the felony-firearm sentence consecutive to the
sentence imposed for the voluntary manslaughter conviction . . .
Perhaps it would be clearer to add to the stated claim the words: In addition to being
consecutive to the sentence imposed for the discharge of firearm. In any event, I agree with
defendant that it was error.
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The Judge clearly connected the firearm discharge to the felony-firearm conviction. It
was one of defendant’s contentions at trial that the victim, a disturbed person, put the gun to his
own head while it was in his own possession and pulled the trigger. The evidence that defendant
possessed a firearm during the commission of the discharge of a firearm crime was
overwhelming. I presume that the jury appropriately based its verdict on the fact that the
defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of the discharging of a firearm crime.
Since the defendant’s own attorney at trial expressed satisfaction with the jury instructions and
the appellate attorney for the defendant has expressly stated in his reply brief that he is not
seeking reversal of the felony-firearm conviction, the only relief to be fashioned is to order the
voluntary manslaughter conviction to run concurrently with both other convictions; both the
felony-firearm conviction and the sentence imposed for the intentional discharge conviction. The
prosecutor urges that the only relief we should grant is a remand for a new trial on the
applicability of the felony-firearm conviction to the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Since
the prosecutor has sought no relief either in the trial court or in this Court by way of a crossappeal, I do not believe that claim is preserved for appellate review.
On all other issues raised in this appeal, I agree with the majority. I do not think remand
is necessary. I would affirm.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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