EVELYN R THORNTON V A&P STORES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EVELYN R. THORNTON,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 208469
WCAC
LC No. 94-000257
A & P STORES,
Defendant-Appellee.
ON REMAND
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Fitzgerald and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is on remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Mudel v
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691; 614 NW2d 607 (2000). We have been further
instructed to consider plaintiff’s arguments in her motion to dismiss, which was filed in the
Supreme Court after defendant filed its application for leave to appeal. See 463 Mich 939
(2000).
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff began working for defendant on November 11, 1975, stocking shelves. This job
required plaintiff to lift fifty or more pounds and to bend and reach items on shelves. After six
years, plaintiff became a cashier, which also required plaintiff to lift grocery bags of up to twenty
pounds to place them in the shopping cart. In approximately 1987, plaintiff began having
difficulty with asthma, although it did not seem to affect her job duties. In March or April of
1991, however, plaintiff began experiencing pain in her chest while she was on the job. Plaintiff
stated that the repetitive movements of her job brought on the pain, but that the pain subsided
when she was not working. In July 1991, plaintiff sought treatment for the chest pain, and was
prescribed medication for the pain.
Plaintiff continued to work until March 22, 1992, but stopped working because the pain
in her chest became too severe and no longer subsided when she stopped working after her shift.
She remained off work until June 8, 1992, when she attempted to return to work, but was able to
work only two hours until “shooting pains” in her chest prevented her from completing her shift.
Plaintiff has not been able to work since June 8, 1992.
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Plaintiff’s petition for worker’s compensation benefits was filed on June 22, 1992,
alleging injury dates of July 2, 1991, March 2, 1992, and June 13, 1992. She alleged a disability
to her chest and ribs as the result of constant and repetitive lifting, and that she was exposed to
allergens that contributed significantly to her asthma.
Proceedings were held before the magistrate on November 23, 1993. Three physicians
testified by way of deposition. Leonard Schreier, M.D., a board certified internist and allergist,
first treated plaintiff on July 28, 1987, for bronchial asthma. In 1989, he diagnosed plaintiff with
costochondritis, an inflammation of the area where the bone and cartilage part of the rib come
together near the sternum. Dr. Schreier testified that plaintiff’s pain was aggravated by deep
breathing, such as when she lifted grocery bags. He concluded that plaintiff’s work aggravated
the costochondritis and prevented plaintiff from performing her job. Dr. Schreier did not believe
that plaintiff would be able to return to her job as a cashier, and his prognosis was that she would
have recurrent problems with her chest wall.
Timothy Laing, M.D., a board certified rheumatologist, saw plaintiff on June 2, 1993, and
until December 1993. Dr. Laing also diagnosed plaintiff as having costochondritis and testified
that there had been no significant changes in her condition or her symptoms between June and
December 1993. Dr. Laing stated that plaintiff’s job might contribute to or aggravate plaintiff’s
condition in that the extensive use of her upper extremities with repetitive action, particularly
lifting and moving heavy weights, could make the pain of the costochondritis to be worse. Dr.
Laing testified that plaintiff’s job would aggravate her condition. He also testified that plaintiff
would be unable to perform her duties as a cashier without experiencing a considerable degree of
pain and that she would be disabled from other jobs that similarly required extensive and
repetitive use of the upper extremities. Dr. Laing’s prognosis was that plaintiff would eventually
recover.
Steven Gross, D.O., board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation, examined
plaintiff on Febraury 25, 1993. He agreed that plaintiff has costochondritis, although he did not
believe that there was any direct causal relationship between plaintiff’s work activities and the
costochondritis. Dr. Gross did state that plaintiff’s employment activities could have
exaggerated her discomfort.
The magistrate, in a decision mailed on April 14, 1994, accepted the testimony of Dr.
Schreier and Dr. Laing over that of Dr. Gross. The magistrate was not convinced that plaintiff
had proven that her employment caused her costochondritis by a preponderance of the evidence,
but did find that plaintiff’s condition was aggravated by the repetitive lifting and bending
required in her job. The magistrate also found, based on Dr. Schreier’s testimony, that plaintiff’s
condition prevented her from returning to work or to any other type of work requiring lifting or
repetitive motion involving the upper chest wall and that plaintiff was totally disabled and
entitled to an open award of benefits, with an average weekly wage of $326.01.
Defendant appealed to the WCAC, which issued its decision on July 5, 1996. The
WCAC found that there was no substantial evidence to support the grant of an open award of
benefits. The WCAC concluded that plaintiff’s inability to return to work was due to her nonwork related costochondritis, not due to any continuing aggravation of her costochondritis caused
by her “long since ended work activities.” The WCAC stated that plaintiff was entitled to
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benefits for a closed period, which it determined must be closed as of October 26, 1992, when
Dr. Schreier noted an abatement in plaintiff’s symptomology. The WCAC also concluded that
plaintiff’s average weekly wage had been miscalculated because the magistrate erred in including
holiday and vacation pay as discontinued fringe benefits. The WCAC reduced plaintiff’s average
weekly wage to $309.09.
Plaintiff initially filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court, which was denied
in an order dated January 10, 1997. Plaintiff then sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court,
which remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted on December 23,
1997. In an unpublished opinion issued on September 7, 1999, we reversed the order of the
WCAC and reinstated the magistrate’s decision. Defendant then sought leave to appeal in the
Supreme Court. Defendant later moved for peremptory reversal and plaintiff moved to dismiss
the application for leave to appeal on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court, in an order
dated December 27, 2000, remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Mudel. The Court
denied the motions for peremptory reversal and to dismiss, but directed this Court to consider
plaintiff’s arguments in her motion to dismiss.
II. RES JUDICATA
In her motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues that defendant’s application for leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff explains that during
the pendency of these appeals, defendant filed three petitions to stop benefits.1 The petition to
stop with which we are concerned was filed by defendant on May 16, 1996, and the hearing date
was April 19, 2000. The magistrate’s opinion is signed on June 14, 2000. The magistrate denied
defendant’s petition to stop benefits based on consideration of the depositions of Dr. Schreier and
Adel El-Magrabi, M.D., board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation. Dr. El-Magrabi
examined plaintiff on April 2, 1996, on behalf of defendant. He agreed that plaintiff has
costochondritis and asthma, but believed that plaintiff had recovered from any work-related
aggravation of her costochondritis. Dr. Schreier, on the other hand, testified that there was no
change in plaintiff’s costochondritis condition from 1990 to the present. He testified that the
costochondritis was definitely related to plaintiff’s employment and that plaintiff remains
disabled from her job. The magistrate accepted the testimony of Dr. Schreier, who has treated
plaintiff for many years. Consequently, the magistrate found that “defendant has failed to
establish that the plaintiff’s condition has improved or changed to the extent that she no longer
suffers from a work related disability.”
“Res judicata bars a subsequent action between the same parties when the evidence or
essential facts are identical.” Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 586; 597 NW2d 82 (1999). A second
action is barred when: (1) the first action was decided on the merits, (2) the matter contested in
the second action was or could have been resolved in the first action, and (3) both actions involve
1
The dates of the petitions to stop are not clear. According to plaintiff, the first petition to stop
was denied by the magistrate, appealed to the WCAC, and remanded to the magistrate. The
second petition to stop was denied by the magistrate and not appealed. The third petition to stop
was pending before a magistrate. Plaintiff contends that the second petition to stop is the final
decision that precludes the position taken by defendant on appeal.
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the same parties or their privies. Id. The question whether res judicata bars a subsequent action
is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co,
460 Mich 372, 379; 596 NW2d 153 (1999).
The gist of plaintiff’s argument is that because the magistrate found in June 2000 that
defendant failed to establish that plaintiff’s condition has changed to the extent that she no longer
suffers from a work-related disability, defendant is barred from taking the position that plaintiff’s
work-related disability ended in October 1992. First, res judicata applies to quasi-judicial
administrative decisions. Wayne Co v Detroit, 233 Mich App 275, 277; 590 NW2d 619 (1998).
More specifically, as stated by our Supreme Court:
The concerns behind the res judicata principle—economy of judicial
resources and finality of litigation—apply equally to workers’ compensation
proceedings and other actions. [Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409 Mich
147, 159; 294 NW2d 165 (1980).]
Moreover, there is a final determination on the merits made by the magistrate that
plaintiff continues to have a work-related disability, as of June 2000. Defendant has not appealed
this determination and both actions (plaintiff’s petition filed on June 22, 1992, and defendant’s
petition filed on May 16, 1996) involve the same parties and the same fundamental issue,
namely, whether plaintiff suffered a work-related disability and of what duration. See id., p 162
(“Central to any application of the res judicata rule . . . is the principle that one may not relitigate
the identical question once determined.”). Further, it is of no import that the first action to be
determined finally was the second action to be commenced; rather, the first final judgment
rendered is that which becomes conclusive and res judicata. See Brownridge v Michigan Mutual
Ins Co, 115 Mich App 745, 750-751; 321 NW2d 798 (1982); Westwood Chemical Co v Kulick,
656 F2d 1224, 1227 (CA 6, 1981). Consequently, the magistrate’s ruling on June 14, 2000, a
final and unappealed ruling, that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff’s condition has
improved or changed to the extent that she no longer suffers from a work-related disability is res
judicata and precludes defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s disability ended in October 1992.2
Accordingly, we remand this case to the WCAC for an award of benefits in conformance
with the June 14, 2000, decision of the magistrate. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
2
As noted by plaintiff, “[t]o hold otherwise would lead to inconsistent opinions both of which
would be considered final and enforceable.”
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