IN RE MOORE/BILLINGSLEA MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DIMITRIUS WARREN MOORE
and SHAUN DE’VILLE BILLINGSLEA, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 2, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 223890
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-354348
BETTY BILLINGSLEA,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
WARREN JASPER MOORE and WILLIE
PRINCE,
Respondents.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Griffin and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM
Respondent Betty Billingslea appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to Shaun De’Ville Billingslea and Dimitrius Warren Moore under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (j), and (l); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g), (j), and (l).1 We affirm.
On April 4, 1997, petitioner Family Independence Agency filed a petition to take
jurisdiction over Shaun and Dimitrius after respondent had gone to the emergency room at Henry
Ford Hospital in Detroit and told a staff member that she intended to kill herself and her children.
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The parental rights of Warren Jasper Moore and Willie Prince were also terminated, Moore’s
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(h), and Jasper’s under MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii). Neither has appealed. All references to “respondent” shall be references to
Betty Billingslea.
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At a hearing before a referee held on August 4, 1997, respondent admitted that she was addicted
to crack cocaine and heroin, and that her drug use adversely affected her ability to care for her
children. Based on respondent’s admissions, the court took jurisdiction over the children on
August 26, 1997. In its order, the court directed respondent to: (1) visit the children weekly; (2)
establish a suitable home and income for the children; (3) attend and complete parenting classes
and counseling and be evaluated by the Clinic for Child Study; (4) attend domestic violence
counseling; and (5) attend in-patient drug counseling and Narcotics Anonymous and present
continuing evidence through drug screens that she was drug free.
Over the next year, respondent participated in in-patient drug treatment, family and
individual counseling, and visitation with the children. On September 21, 1998, three months
after completing in-patient drug treatment, respondent gave birth to Chantel Moore; both
respondent and Chantel tested positive for cocaine and heroin. FIA filed a petition to take
jurisdiction over Chantel on October 2, 1998; it amended the petition on December 14 to request
that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. The court terminated respondent’s rights to
Chantel on June 21, 1999.
On March 22, 1999, FIA riled a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights to
Shaun and Dimitrius under 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (j), and (l); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i),
(g), (j), and (l). A hearing was held on the petition on August 3, 1999. FIA introduced a report
completed by Wendy Roblyer, a case manager with Teen Ranch Family Services. The report
questioned respondent’s understanding of her parental role during scheduled visitation, noting
that she made special efforts to find fault in the care of the children and that she showed irritation
with them when they tried to get her attention. She was terminated from her job at Arrow
Uniform Rental in March 1999; she told Roblyer that she was working in a temporary, part-time
capacity for a janitorial service agency, a job that Roblyer characterized as insufficient to provide
for the children.
Respondent did not consistently attend the outpatient substance abuse program to which
she was assigned, and was terminated on June 7, 1999. Although respondent claimed to have
sought treatment from another program, she did not provide any information about the program
until she testified at the termination hearing. She completed all weekly drug screens between
March and May 1999. In May, Teen Ranch became aware that respondent was no longer being
screened regularly. Between May 24 and August 3, 1999, respondent submitted to five drug
screens, all of which were negative. Respondent had told Roblyer that she stopped going to
outpatient treatment because she did not have a therapist; however, on contacting the center,
Roblyer learned that respondent in fact had a therapist.
Respondent testified that she did not immediately go into outpatient drug treatment after
she left the in-patient portion of her program because of problems with her pregnancy. She had
tried to enter several programs; one had a waiting list, one simply gave her an assessment, and
her worker changed her program on another occasion. Ultimately, she was referred to the
Wendie Lee Center, which she attended from April 5, 1999 to June 7, 1999. She stopped
attending because the program frequently did not have therapists available. By the date of the
hearing, respondent was attending sessions at Quality Behavior Incorporated.
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Respondent claimed to be attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings. She claimed to
have submitted to all drug screenings, but admitted that she did not provide one on the day before
the termination hearing. She explained that she could not find her state ID, which she would
need to present at the lab; when she found that she had left her ID at the lab, she tried to get there
before it closed, but was unsuccessful in her attempt. On cross-examination, she admitted that
she had not been tested since July 16. She said her worker could contact her on her cell phone to
schedule drug screenings. However, she also said that she did not carry her cell phone with her.
Naveed Syed, a social worker with Quality Behavior, Inc., testified that he had seen
respondent once, on June 30, 1999. She had also come to the agency on July 3 and 17. She was
supposed to come in for treatment five days per week. Following the close of evidence and
argument of counsel, the court terminated respondent’s rights on the bases raised in the petition
for termination.
In a termination hearing, the petitioner bears the burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence a statutory basis for termination. MCR 5.974(F)(3). Once a statutory basis
for termination is shown, the trial court shall terminate parental rights unless it finds that
termination of parental rights is clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). This
Court reviews the trial court’s decision for clear error. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ [if] although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id., quoting In re Riffe, 147 Mich App 658, 671; 382
NW2d 842 (1985).
Respondent has limited her argument to the question of whether it was in the best
interests of the children for their rights to be terminated. She concedes that her rights to Chantel
had been terminated, which would give a basis for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(l); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(l), and leave only the question of whether termination was in the best
interests of the children. See Trejo Minors, supra at 355 (once a single basis for termination is
proven, the liberty interest of the parent no longer includes the right to custody and control of the
children). Respondent goes on to argue that none of the bases for termination were proven, other
than the termination of rights to Chantel. However, the record shows that there was ample
evidence to support termination on the other grounds found by the court.
Respondent had been drug-dependent for a number of years, resulting in cardiac
problems. In fact, the record discloses that, although respondent used an alias when she
threatened to kill the children and herself at Henry Ford Hospital in 1997, the hospital staff
recognized her because she was a cardiac patient and known drug addict. It appears from the
record that respondent made some efforts toward dealing with her drug problem, entering inpatient drug rehabilitation and, from all accounts, successfully completing the in-patient portion
of her treatment in June 1998. However, in September 1998, Chantel was born and tested
positive for cocaine and heroin. Thereafter, respondent’s cooperation with the parent/agency
agreement was limited at best. She failed to make herself available for random drug screens; she
called the office to schedule the screens, rather than the office calling her to notify her of the time
of the drug screen. In addition, she failed to have a drug screen performed as late as the day
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before the termination hearing. She had no regular phone, and did not keep her cellular phone
with her, so there was no way by which she could have been reached. She was supposed to
attend outpatient drug therapy five days per week, but attended only sporadically, and never
attended with the frequency required by the agreement. While there might have been extenuating
circumstances for respondent’s failure to comply with some aspects of the agreement, her overall
conduct justified a conclusion that she would not be able to provide the children with a stable
home. See In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 27; 501 NW2d 182 (1993) (partial noncompliance
with parent/agency agreement may support termination); In re Hall, 188 Mich App 217, 223224; 469 NW2d 56 (1991).
In addition, she and Warren Moore had been involved in a long-term relationship,
punctuated by episodes of violence against one another. Moore and respondent were both
addicted to cocaine. Respondent had indicated her intention to continue her relationship with
Moore, but wavered at the hearing, indicating that she would live with Moore again “[i]f so be
it.” Based on her testimony and the history of her relationship with Moore, the court could have
concluded that respondent would likely continue in a destructive relationship which would result
in the children’s needs being neglected.
Respondent argues that she substantially complied with the parent/agency agreement, and
thus termination was not in the best interests of the children. As noted above, respondent did
not, in fact, comply. Although she testified that she attempted to comply, her testimony was
contradicted by the testimony of her caseworker. The court clearly chose to believe the
caseworker over respondent. This Court must accord deference to the trial court’s assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses before it. In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 65; 472 NW2d 38
(1991).
In short, the evidence showed that respondent performed well when placed in a highly
controlled situation (in-patient drug treatment), but could not continue when released. She could
not maintain steady employment, remain drug-free, or fully comply with the requirements of the
parent-agency agreement, thus indicating that she would be unable to take on the responsibility of
parenting the children. The court’s actions were not clearly erroneous.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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