IN RE LANIECE ANGELETTE DAVIS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of LANIECE ANGELETTE DAVIS,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
TINA LYNETTA BARNES,
No. 225397
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-361554
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LAMARR CURTIS DAVIS,
Respondent.
In the Matter of LANIECE ANGELETTE DAVIS,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
LAMARR CURTIS DAVIS
Respondent-Appellant,
and
TINA LYNETTA DAVIS,
No. 225402
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-361554
Respondent.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Jansen and Fitzgerald, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right the order terminating their
parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to respondent Tina Barnes.
MCR 5.974; In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Considering that the child
was born premature and addicted to cocaine, and that respondent Barnes failed to follow through
with referrals for substance abuse treatment or comply with other material aspects of the case
service plan, we find no merit to respondent’s claim that petitioner failed to make reasonable
efforts to prevent the child’s removal or rectify the conditions causing her removal. Further, the
evidence did not show that termination of Barnes’ parental rights was clearly not in the child’s
best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the family court did not err in terminating respondent Barnes’ parental
rights to the child. Id.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) were established by
clear and convincing evidence with respect to respondent Lamaar Davis.1 MCR 5.974; In re
Miller,supra. Finally, we conclude that respondent Davis’ challenge regarding the sufficiency of
service for the termination proceeding is waived, given that Davis had previously advised the
court that he was waiving notice of all further proceedings in light of his position that he was not
the child’s father. See People v Carter, 462 Mich 206; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
1
The court also terminated respondent Davis’ parental rights pursuant to § 19b(3)(c)(i). Because
only one statutory ground is necessary to terminate parental rights, In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App
47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), and because we have concluded that termination was proper
under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j), we need not consider whether termination was warranted under
§ 19b(3)(c)(i), with respect to respondent Davis.
-2-
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