PEOPLE OF MI V ALONZO TERRELL BLAIR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 219142
Oakland Circuit Court
LC Nos. 98-160833-FH
98-160834-FH
98-160835-FH
ALONZO TERRELL BLAIR,
Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Neff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of one count of delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine,
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), for which the trial court, applying a
second-offense habitual offender sentence enhancement under MCL 333.7413(2); MSA
14.15(7413)(2), sentenced him to one to forty years’ imprisonment. Defendant was also
convicted of two counts of delivery of 50 to 224 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii);
MSA 14.15(7401)(1)(a)(iii), for which the trial court, again applying second-offense habitual
offender enhancements, sentenced him to two terms of eight to forty years’ imprisonment.
Defendant’s sentences are to be served consecutively. Defendant appeals as of right, and the
prosecutor cross-appeals, the two longer sentences. We agree with the prosecutor that the trial
court should not have departed downward from the mandatory minimum sentence for delivery of
50 to 224 grams of cocaine. Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s sentences for delivery of 50 to
224 grams of cocaine and remand for resentencing on those convictions. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The only issue on appeal concerns the trial court’s downward departure (to eight years)
from the mandatory ten-year minimum sentence for delivery of 50 to 224 grams of cocaine. See
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii). Defendant contends that the trial court
should have reduced the minimum sentence more than it did, whereas the prosecutor contends
that the court should not have reduced the minimum sentence at all.
A court may depart downward from a mandated minimum term if it finds on the record
that substantial and compelling reasons exist to do so. MCL 333.7401(4); MSA 14.15(7401)(4).
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Substantial and compelling reasons must be objective and verifiable, and they can be based on
pre- or post-arrest conduct. People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 62, 76-78; 528 NW2d 176 (1995).
Relevant factors include circumstances that mitigate the defendant’s culpability, as well as the
defendant’s age, prior record, and work history. People v Shinholster, 196 Mich App 531, 534;
493 NW2d 502 (1992). The determination of whether factors constitute substantial and
compelling reasons to depart from a minimum term is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Fields, supra at 78.
“[T]he Legislature intended ‘substantial and compelling reasons’ to exist only in
exceptional cases.” Fields, supra at 68; see also People v Johnson (On Remand), 223 Mich App
170, 172-173; 566 NW2d 28 (1997) (indicating that deviations from mandatory sentences are
appropriate only in exceptional cases). Here, the trial court found that a downward departure was
appropriate because defendant had given the police the name of his cocaine supplier. We cannot
conceive how merely giving the name of a supplier, under the circumstances of this case,
constituted an “exceptional” circumstance allowing departure under Fields, supra at 68, and
Johnson, supra at 172-173. Indeed, the other justifiable and verifiable factors disfavoring
departure in this case, as well as the minimal nature of defendant’s cooperation with the
authorities, convince us that a downward departure from the mandatory minimum was not
warranted.
First, defendant refused to identify the friend who aided and abetted him in the
commission of the crimes, and he provided no other information about the supplier aside from
the supplier’s name. Second, defendant had a history of controlled substance offenses involving
increasing amounts of cocaine. Third, defendant committed the instant offenses while on
probationary tether for a prior controlled substance offense. Fourth, defendant was in his midtwenties when he committed the instant offenses and therefore was old enough to understand the
ramifications of his actions. Fifth, defendant had no stable work history. In light of these
circumstances, merely providing the name of his supplier did not raise defendant’s situation to
the “exceptional” level. See Fields, supra at 68, and Johnson, supra at 172-173. The trial court
abused its discretion in departing from the mandatory minimum sentences.
Defendant’s sentences for delivery of 50 to 224 grams of cocaine are reversed, and the
case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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