PEOPLE OF MI V MARVELL DAVIS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 218901
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 97-003389
MARVELL DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Jansen and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with one count of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a); MSA 28.548(1)(a), two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL
750.83; MSA 28.278, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The charges arose from an incident wherein shots were
fired at a residence in Detroit, killing a young woman and wounding two others. Defendant was
tried jointly with two other codefendants, before separate juries. He was convicted on all charges
and appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Jury Instructions and Harmless Error
Defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury regarding
several lesser offenses, including manslaughter and offenses related to the reckless, wanton,
negligent or careless discharge of a firearm. A trial court’s failure to instruct a jury regarding
lesser offenses, including both cognate lesser offenses and necessarily included offenses, is
subject to harmless error analysis. People v Mosko, 441 Mich 496, 502-503; 495 NW2d 534
(1992); People v Beach, 429 Mich 450, 465-466; 418 NW2d 861 (1988). “‘Judicial expediency
allows courts to address issues according to their ease of resolution.’” People v Whitehead, 238
Mich App 1, 6; 604 NW2d 737 (1999), quoting People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 479-480, n 2;
581 NW2d 229 (1998). Of the two issues raised by defendant’s argument – whether the trial
court erroneously instructed the jury and, if so, whether the error was harmless – we find the
second issue easier to resolve. Whitehead, supra at 6. Accordingly, assuming without deciding
-1-
that the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury regarding lesser offenses, we consider
whether that error was harmless. We conclude that it was. 1
In Beach, supra, the trial court instructed the jury regarding conspiracy to commit armed
robbery and conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery. The jury rejected the lesser charge and
convicted the defendant of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. On appeal, defendant argued
that the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury regarding the lesser charge of conspiracy
to commit larceny in a building. Our Supreme Court applied the reasoning of People v Ross, 73
Mich App 588; 252 NW2d 526 (1977), and held that any error that the trial court might have
committed was harmless:
Beach was convicted of the greater charged offense of conspiracy to
commit armed robbery. If the jury had doubts about her guilt of the charged
offense or if it concluded that the defendant was not planning to use force, it could
have and undoubtedly would have, found her guilty of the instructed lesser
included offense of conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery, which would
represent a lesser use of force. Because it did not do so, we can conclude that it
had no reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt of conspiracy to commit armed
robbery. We believe that the jury’s decision is a reasonable indication that the
failure to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of conspiracy to
commit larceny in a building was not prejudicial to the defendant. We require a
fair trial, not a perfect trial.
The existence of an intermediate charge that was rejected by the jury does
not, of course, automatically result in an application of the Ross analysis. For it to
apply, the intermediate charge rejected by the jury would necessarily have to
indicate a lack of likelihood that the jury would have adopted the lesser requested
charge. [Beach, supra at 490-491.]
Applying such a harmless error analysis in both People v Sullivan, 231 Mich App 510,
520; 586 NW2d 578 (1998), aff’d 609 NW2d 193 (2000); and People v Raper, 222 Mich App
475, 483; 563 NW2d 709 (1997), this Court held that where the jury convicted the defendant of
first-degree murder, after rejecting the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, the trial
court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding manslaughter was harmless:
1
Defendant argues that any instructional error regarding lesser offenses could not have been
harmless in the present case. To support that argument, defendant relies on People v Rochowiak,
416 Mich 235; 330 NW2d 669 (1982), and People v Richardson, 409 Mich 126; 293 NW2d 332
(1980), two cases that are not controlling and that do not reflect the current status of the law. In
Beach, supra, our Supreme Court noted that the Rochowiak decision was of only limited
precedential value because the decision reflected an equal division of justices with regard to
substance and a concurrence in result only. See Beach, supra at 471. Further, the Beach Court
noted that the Rochowiak analysis had never been affirmatively applied by the Court. Id. at 475.
The Beach Court considered the harmless error doctrine in great detail and rejected the
approaches taken in both Rochowiak and Richardson, deciding instead to apply the harmless
error test that we apply in the present case. Beach, supra at 470, 490-491.
-2-
The jury was instructed on first-degree murder and second-degree murder,
and found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The jury’s rejection of seconddegree murder in favor of first-degree murder reflected an unwillingness to
convict on a lesser included offense such as manslaughter. [Raper, supra at 483.]
In the present case, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding several lesser
offenses, including manslaughter and offenses related to the reckless or negligent discharge of a
firearm, was harmless because the jury rejected the intermediate charge of second-degree murder.
The jury clearly found that the actions of defendant and his codefendants were premeditated,
deliberate, and conducted with the intent to kill. The jury’s rejection of the second-degree
murder charge in this case shows that the jury would not have adopted any lesser requested
charge, especially one relating to the reckless or negligent use of a firearm. If the jury had doubts
about defendant’s guilt on the charged offense of first-degree murder, at a minimum, it would
have found him guilty of second-degree murder. It did not do so. Therefore, we must conclude
that the trial court’s failure to read instructions regarding lesser offenses, if error, was harmless.
II. Insufficient Evidence
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to support his
first-degree murder conviction as an aider or abettor. We disagree. When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we must “view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Hoffman, 225
Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997), citing People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489
NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). When considering proofs in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, we must “avoid weighing the proofs or determining what testimony
to believe. Instead, we must resolve all conflicts in favor of the prosecution.” People v Terry,
224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997) (citations omitted).
In order to convict a defendant of first-degree murder, the prosecution
must prove that the defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of
killing was premeditated and deliberate. Premeditation and deliberation require
sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second look. The elements of
premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from circumstances surrounding
the killing. [People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 642; 588 NW2d 480 (1998)
(citations omitted).]
In this case, the prosecution pursued the first-degree murder charge against defendant on
the basis that he aided and abetted his codefendants, one of whom actually fired the fatal bullet.
MCL 767.39; MSA 28.979 provides:
Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he
directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or
abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on
conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.
-3-
In People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 568-569; 540 NW2d 728 (1995), this Court set
forth the elements of an aiding and abetting charge:
To support a finding that a defendant aided and abetted a crime, the
prosecutor must show that (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant
or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement
that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the
commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its
commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement. An aider and abettor’s
state of mind may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances. Factors that
may be considered include a close association between the defendant and the
principal, the defendant’s participation in the planning or execution of the crime,
and evidence of flight after the crime.
To sustain an aiding and abetting charge, the guilt of the principal must be
shown. However, the principal need not be convicted. Rather, the prosecutor
need only introduce sufficient evidence that the crime was committed and that the
defendant committed it or aided and abetted it. [Citations omitted.]
In the present case, we conclude that the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to show
that one of the codefendants committed first-degree murder, that defendant assisted and gave
encouragement to the codefendant, and that defendant intended the commission of first-degree
murder. First, it can be logically inferred from the substantial circumstantial evidence presented
at trial that defendant and his codefendants all possessed the requisite intent to kill the victim and
that the killing was premeditated and deliberate. There was testimony that defendant stated,
“[w]e don’t have to stand here and talk. Let’s go handle our business.” There was also
testimony that defendant stated that he was going to get his Glock and “come back and shoot this
b-i-t-c-h up.” Defendant and the codefendants then ran from the area, splitting up and heading in
two different directions. Approximately ten minutes later, they returned together. Witnesses saw
the three codefendants climbing over a fence and passing guns over it. They subsequently lined
up and took aim at the home, which they knew to be occupied by several people. One of the
defendants fired a nine-millimeter bullet into the house, killing a young woman. This evidence
supports the jury’s determination that defendant and his codefendants intended to kill the
occupants of the house.
Second, the evidence supports a finding that defendant assisted the commission of the
crime. After the initial confrontation, defendant and his codefendants left. Later, they returned
and assisted each other in climbing over the fence and passing weapons over it. After one
codefendant, Anguan Milburn, moved forward to the driveway of the victims’ home, either
defendant or his other codefendant called to Anguan to move back to where they were standing.
Thus, the codefendants moved Anguan to a place of safety, where he would be out of the line of
fire. Defendant and his codefendants subsequently lined up and aimed directly at the occupied
home. Defendant fired at least one shot, and police discovered gunpowder residue on his hands.
This evidence supports a finding that defendant assisted and encouraged the shooter of the ninemillimeter bullet that killed one victim.
-4-
Third, the evidence indicates that defendant intended the commission of the crime. As
previously noted, he said he would come back to the scene. He did so, arriving with his
codefendants and weapons. The men aimed the firearms at and fired upon the occupied home.
This circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s state of mind to commit
premeditated, deliberate murder. Therefore, we find sufficient evidence to convict defendant of
first-degree murder as an aider and abettor.
To support his argument that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence of the intent
necessary to sustain a first-degree murder conviction, defendant also contends that the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury regarding the issue of transferred intent. This issue is unpreserved
because defendant did not object below to those instructions. Moreover, this issue is not
properly before us because it was not raised in the statement of questions presented. People v
Miller, 238 Mich App 168, 172; 604 NW2d 781 (1999). Nevertheless, we note that defendant’s
argument is without merit. Defendant argues that the transferred intent instruction read to the
jury was erroneous because the prosecutor presented no evidence that defendant intended to kill
anyone, let alone the victim who actually died. As set forth above, we believe that the prosecutor
presented sufficient evidence regarding defendant’s intent to convince the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed first-degree murder as an aider and abettor.
III. Jury Reinstructions
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly failed to reinstruct the jury on his
theory of the case when reinstructing the jury on the charged offenses. This issue is not
preserved because defendant failed to object when the trial court reread the instructions at the
jury’s request. This Court reviews unpreserved issues for plain error. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
After deliberations began, the jury asked the trial court to repeat the charges and the
elements for each crime. The trial court told the jury that the verdict form contained a list of the
charges. Then the court reinstructed the jury on the elements of each crime. On appeal,
defendant argues that the trial court should have also reinstructed the jury that defendant’s mere
presence during the commission of a crime was insufficient to convict him as an aider and
abettor. We disagree.
In People v Darwall, 82 Mich App 652, 663; 267 NW2d 472 (1978), this Court stated:
There is no requirement that when a jury has asked for supplemental
instruction on specific areas that the trial judge is obligated to give all of the
instructions previously given. The trial judge need only give those instructions
specifically asked.
In this case, the trial court gave the instructions that the jury specifically requested and it did so in
an accurate fashion. The trial court was not required to go beyond that request. Further, we note
that the trial court’s reinstruction did not allow the jury to convict defendant as an aider and
abettor if he was merely present at the scene of the crime. The aiding and abetting instructions,
which were reread to the jury, required the jury to find that defendant engaged in some act of
-5-
assistance or encouragement in order to be held responsible as an aider and abettor. Therefore,
we find no merit in defendant’s argument regarding jury reinstructions.
IV. Probable Cause to Arrest Defendant
Defendant next argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal and the trial court therefore
should have suppressed his confession. On appeal, defendant contests neither the trial court’s
finding that the police were in hot pursuit of the codefendants at the time of their arrest, nor the
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. Rather, defendant argues that
the information that officers gathered from citizen-informants during the hot pursuit was not
reliable and did not establish probable cause. Because defendant did not raise this objection in
the trial court, we review it only for plain error. Carines, supra at 763-764.
Defendant’s argument is based on his assertion that, in order for the police to rely upon
information from an anonymous citizen-informant, the police must demonstrate both (1) that the
informer was reliable or credible and (2) that the police were aware of the underlying
circumstances upon which the informer based his conclusion. This is an incorrect statement of
the law. In People v Tooks, 403 Mich 568; 271 NW2d 503 (1978), our Supreme Court
distinguished between known criminal informants and citizens who provide police with accurate
and detailed information that can be verified. In that case, an unidentified citizen approached
two police officers and informed them that he had observed a man showing a gun to two other
men. Id. at 573. The citizen provided detailed information to police about the three men
involved, but refused to identify himself “because of fear of ‘gangs in the area.’” Id. at 573-574.
Four or five blocks from the location where the officers received the information, they
encountered three men fitting the description given by the citizen. Id. at 574. One of the officers
performed a pat-down search of defendant Tooks and discovered a .22-caliber pistol. Id. Police
then arrested the defendant for carrying a concealed weapon. Id. In upholding the validity of the
search, the Court held that citizen-informants reporting suspicious activities which they
personally observed should be deemed inherently reliable “when the information is sufficiently
detailed and corroborated within a reasonable period of time by the officers’ own observations.”
Id. at 577.
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, it was not necessary for the police in the present case
to testify about the reliability and credibility of the citizen-informants or the basis of their
knowledge. Police tracked defendants from the scene of the crime using detailed information
from citizens who had observed the suspects and their movements. The information obtained
was both detailed and specific, and police verified its accuracy within a reasonable time. The
information was thus “of sufficient detail, accuracy, and reliability to give the officers a
reasonable suspicion” that the suspects they pursued had engaged in the criminal activity at issue.
People v Armendarez, 188 Mich App 61, 69; 468 NW2d 893 (1991). Because defendant’s
confession was not the product of an illegal arrest, the argument that his confession should have
been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree must fail.
V. Waiver of Jury Trial
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his request for a waiver
trial. We disagree. MCL 763.3; MSA 28.856 provides:
-6-
In all criminal cases arising in the courts of this state the defendant may,
with the consent of the prosecutor and approval by the court, waive a
determination of the facts by a jury and elect to be tried before the court without a
jury. Except in cases of minor offenses, the waiver and election by a defendant
shall be in writing and signed by the defendant and filed in the case and made a
part of the record. [Emphasis added.]
In People v Kirby, 440 Mich 485, 492-493; 487 NW2d 404 (1992), our Supreme Court
rejected the argument that a criminal defendant possesses a constitutional right to waive a trial by
jury. “While a defendant may be allowed to waive a right that he possesses, he may not demand
an unconditional privilege to which he is not entitled.” Id. In the present case, defendant did not
possess an unconditional right to waive a jury trial in this case. By statute, such a waiver requires
the prosecutor’s consent and the trial court’s approval. In this case, the prosecutor never
consented to a waiver. In fact, the prosecutor clearly indicated that he could not agree to a bench
trial because he had not discussed the matter with the victims’ families. The prosecutor neither
requested time to talk to the families nor indicated that waiver was a possibility. In order to
receive a bench trial, defendant needed the consent of the prosecutor, which he did not receive.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.