PEOPLE OF MI V ROLONDO S CAMPBELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 216577
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-005310
ROLONDO S. CAMPBELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Rolondo S. Campbell was charged with possession of marijuana, MCL
333.7403(2)(d); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(d) and carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA
28.424. After a two-day bench trial defendant was convicted only of the carrying a concealed
weapon charge. Defendant was sentenced to three months’ probation. He now appeals as of
right. We affirm.
Defendant was stopped by police for a cracked windshield and an air freshener hanging
on the rear view mirror. Unable to provide police with his driver’s license, vehicle registration,
or proof of insurance, defendant was ordered out of the vehicle and placed under arrest. A search
of defendant’s person located a baggy of marijuana. As an officer removed the baggy from
defendant’s pocket, the officer asked, “What’s this?” Defendant replied that the marijuana was
for his personal use. Defendant was placed in the back of the patrol car.
Police then searched the vehicle, locating a loaded handgun under the passenger seat. An
officer secured the handgun and placed it in the trunk of the patrol car. As the officer got into the
patrol car, defendant stated “Come on man.” The officer replied, “What do you mean, come on
man?” Defendant then stated “That’s for my protection, I have a shop, I need protection.”
Defendant was not read his Miranda1 rights until he was subsequently interviewed at the police
station.
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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The trial court found defendant’s statement about the marijuana inadmissible on the
ground that the statement was the product of a custodial interrogation and defendant had not been
read his Miranda warnings. However, the trial court found defendant’s second statement,
concerning the handgun, admissible on the ground that it was entirely voluntary.
Defendant's only claim on appeal concerns his second statement. Defendant contends
that this statement was also secured in violation of Miranda and was therefore inadmissible. We
disagree.
We first note that defendant neither moved to suppress this statement in the trial court nor
objected to its admission at trial. Accordingly, this issue was not preserved for appeal and to
avoid forfeiture defendant must show: (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error was plain, i.e.,
clear or obvious; and (3) that the plain error affected substantial rights. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 548-549 ; 520 NW2d 123
(1994). If defendant satisfies these requirements, this Court must "exercise its discretion in
deciding whether to reverse." Carines, supra at 763. Reversal is warranted only when a plain,
unpreserved error results in an actually innocent defendant being convicted or when an error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent
of the defendant’s innocence. Id. at 763-764; Grant, supra at 549-550.
"The failure to give Miranda warnings prior to a statement made during a custodial
interrogation renders the statement inadmissible for purposes other than impeachment.” People v
Raper, 222 Mich App 475, 479; 563 NW2d 709 (1997). We have elaborated on the concept of
custody as follows:
To determine whether a defendant was in custody at the time of the interrogation,
we look at the totality of the circumstances, with the key question being whether
the accused reasonably could have believed that he was not free to leave. The
determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation rather than the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating
officers or the person being questioned. [People v Zahn, 234 Mich App 438, 449;
594 NW2d 120 (1999) (citations omitted).]
Meanwhile, “[i]nterrogation refers to express questioning and to any words or action on the part
of police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the subject." Raper, supra at 479. However, statements made voluntarily by persons in
custody do not fall with the purview of Miranda. Id.
It is uncontroverted that defendant was in custody when the statement at issue was made.
Therefore, we must first determine if an interrogation occurred. Defendant suggests that he was
interrogated because the officer expressly questioned him by stating, “What do you mean, come
on man?” However, as explained in People v O’Brien, 113 Mich App 183, 193; 317 NW2d 570
(1982), a police officer’s question, prompted by a defendant’s volunteered remark, does not
require defendant’s responsive statement to be suppressed at trial. We find that the officer’s
response to defendant’s volunteered remark, "Come on man,” did not constitute custodial
interrogation. See People v Leffew, 58 Mich App 533, 537; 228 NW2d 449 (1975).
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Defendant also appears to contend that even if the officer did not expressly question
defendant, the officer committed the functional equivalent when he seized the handgun from
defendant’s car, walked by defendant sitting in the back of the patrol car, and placed the handgun
in the trunk of the patrol car. In People v Benjamin, 101 Mich App 637, 647-649; 300 NW2d
661 (1980), we addressed a similar situation and held that the police did not interrogate a
defendant and were not required to give Miranda warnings after they “removed the knives from
defendant’s purse and held them up to her.” We reasoned that the “isolated act of holding up the
knives in front of defendant was not a practice which the officer should have known would be
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Defendant’s response was an unforeseeable
result of the brief, unembellished gesture . . . .” Id. at 649 (emphasis in original; footnote
omitted). Likewise, we find that the actions of the officer in the instant case were not designed to
elicit a response from defendant.
Defendant's one truly cognizable argument is that his statement regarding possession of
the handgun must be excluded because it followed his statement regarding the marijuana, which
was found to be secured in violation of Miranda. Defendant relies on People v Blackburn, 135
Mich App 509; 354 NW2d 807 (1984). In Blackburn, police responded to the scene of a
shooting. The defendant and several other individuals were present. One officer informed
everyone that they would need to remain at the murder scene until questioned as to what
happened, then asked if anyone present knew where the gun was. The defendant stood up and
stated “I’ll save everybody a lot of trouble. I’m the one that did it.” Id. at 516. Police arrested
the defendant and on the way to the patrol car he continued to make incriminating statements,
stating “I’m the one who did it. I’m the one who shot him.” Id. The defendant was only advised
of his Miranda rights as he was booked at the police station.
This Court found that given the officer's specific instruction that the individuals could not
leave until they gave statements, the defendant was in custody for the purposes of Miranda at the
time the officer asked his question concerning the murder weapon. Id. at 518. The defendant's
initial statement, his admission that he shot the victim, was accordingly suppressed on the ground
that he could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave until someone responded to
the officer. Id. at 519. The defendant’s subsequent volunteered statements were then excluded
as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. This Court noted that in determining whether to suppress the
statements because they were tainted by antecedent police misconduct, the question to be
answered was whether there existed any causal connection between the failure to give Miranda
warnings and the subsequent statements. Id. This Court stated:
Utilizing this approach, we conclude that evidence of all of the statements
given by defendant before he was given Miranda warnings must be suppressed.
The time span between the initial statement given without the benefit of Miranda
warnings and the statements made on the way to and in the patrol car was slight.
Although these subsequent statements were not the product of interrogation but,
rather, were volunteered, defendant having already admitted to the shooting, could
well have believed that it was pointless not to speak freely.” [Id. at 519-520.]
Here, unlike Blackburn, we find no causal connection. Although the trial court
appropriately suppressed defendant's incriminating statement concerning his marijuana use, the
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officer's failure to advise defendant of his Miranda rights before eliciting that statement was
wholly unrelated to defendant's subsequent volunteered statement regarding the handgun. In
Blackburn the defendant's statements were similar in nature, if not repetitive, and related to the
singular offense to which defendant openly confessed in response to a police question. This
Court's conclusion that the defendant may have believed it was pointless not to continue speaking
about that one offense into which the police had inquired is accordingly understandable. Here,
however, while in response to questioning defendant had made an admission concerning his
marijuana possession, nothing suggested that the police sought information concerning the
unrelated offense of carrying a concealed weapon. We conclude that defendant's unsolicited
incriminating comments relevant to this separate and distinct latter offense were not tainted by
the police conduct related to the investigation of the former offense.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ William B. Murphy
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