SAMUEL KARP V MICHIGAN NATIONAL BANK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SAMUEL KARP,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 213703
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-514249-NZ
MICHIGAN NATIONAL BANK,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Saad and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right from an order granting summary disposition to defendant under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10) in this case involving a complicated loan agreement. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
This case arose from a loan agreement between plaintiff’s partnership and defendant to
construct an office building in Auburn Hills. On February 4, 1987, Concorde Centre Venture
(“Concorde”), a Michigan partnership, entered into a loan agreement with All American
Insurance Company (“All American”). The Concorde partners were plaintiff and Armando and
Nora Ongtengco. Under the agreement, Concorde was to obtain a loan from a construction
lender to finance the construction of an office building, known as the Concorde Centre, and
construct the building. When the building was completed, All American was to pay off the
construction loan, provide five years of financing to Concorde on specified terms, and deed title
to the building to Concorde. Plaintiff alleges that, as part of this agreement, Concorde was to pay
commitment fees to All American on a periodic basis to keep the commitment open during the
construction of the office building. The closing date on this loan between All American and
Concorde was to be on or before August 27, 1989.
On May 22, 1987, defendant entered into a loan agreement with Concorde to finance the
construction of the Concorde Centre. Under this loan agreement, defendant agreed to provide
$13 million for the construction of the building, which was to be secured by a mortgage. To this
end, Concorde executed a real estate mortgage note, agreeing to repay defendant $13 million plus
interest. Plaintiff alleges that, under the loan agreement, defendant agreed to make periodic
payments to All American on behalf of Concorde from a $520,000 “hold back” contained in the
loan agreement. Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to § 1.03 of the loan agreement between
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Concorde and defendant, All American was to pay off defendant’s loan to Concorde when the
construction of the office building was substantially complete and after a certificate of occupancy
had been issued. In addition, Concorde executed a real estate mortgage note agreeing to repay
defendant the borrowed amount of $13 million plus interest. Concorde also executed and
delivered to defendant a construction mortgage and security agreement. Further, Concorde
entered into an assignment of lease and rents, assigning to defendant all rents, income, and
profits of the property and all present and future leases pertaining to the property, as well as
assigning to defendant the right to take possession of and perform all acts necessary for the
operation and maintenance of the property. Finally, plaintiff and his two partners each executed
and delivered to defendant a guaranty whereby they jointly and severally guaranteed repayment
of the loan.
By the latter part of 1988, the construction of the Concorde Centre was completed, and a
certificate of occupancy was issued. At the time of completion, the Concorde Centre was only
partially pre-leased. Plaintiff alleges that the requirements of All American to pay off
defendant’s loan to Concorde had been met, but defendant did not call upon All American to pay
off its loan, even though the All American loan remained open through August 27, 1989,
provided that defendant paid the February 1989 commitment fee of $130,000.
In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on January 25, 1989, defendant sent a
letter to Concorde falsely stating that a stipulation entered during arbitration between plaintiff
and his partners had the effect of voiding All American’s end loan commitment and that, as a
result, Concorde and plaintiff were in default under the terms of defendant’s loan agreement with
Concorde. Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n fact, Concorde was not in violation of the All American
loan agreement” and that he relied upon defendant’s representations to his detriment.
Plaintiff further alleges that unknown to Concorde or plaintiff at the time, defendant’s
representative met with a senior vice president of All American’s parent company on February 6,
1989 and falsely represented to Bell that the Concorde partnership was dissolved and that
Concorde was in breach of All American’s “end-loan commitment.” However, a memo from
Butler dated March 2, 1989 states that All American would stand behind its commitment and pay
off defendant’s construction loan if the Concorde partners signed the mortgage and defendant
paid the scheduled $130,000 extension fee. In his amended complaint, plaintiff also alleges that
“[defendant] withheld this information from Concorde and plaintiff and falsely represented to
them that the payment of the $130,000 commitment fee to All American would not provide the
continued option to finance to pay out [defendant’s] construction loan and consequently
[defendant] refused and did not pay the $130,000 commitment fee called for in the All American
Loan Agreement” [sic] [emphasis in original]. According to plaintiff, he did not learn about
defendant’s “false communications with All American until November of 1997, when the Bank
finally produce[d] requested documents.”
Plaintiff further alleges in his amended complaint that defendant used the claim that the
“end-loan commitment” was void as the basis for refusing to make the $130,000 payment to All
American on February 27, 1989. Plaintiff alleges that when defendant failed to make the
commitment fee payment, the agreement between All American and Concorde lapsed and
became invalid. Thus, plaintiff alleges that defendant’s failure to pay the commitment fee of
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$130,000 by the due date of February 27, 1989 denied plaintiff the opportunity to exercise his
right to pay off defendant by entering into a permanent loan agreement with All American,
resulting in plaintiff’s breach of the construction loan agreement with defendant and the loan
agreement with All American.
On April 3, 1989, defendant filed suit in Oakland Circuit Court against Concorde,
plaintiff, and the Ongtengcos, jointly and severally, alleging that Concorde had defaulted on the
terms of the loan agreement between defendant and Concorde. In the first count, defendant
sought judgment against Concorde only in the amount of the balance owed on the debt, roughly
$10,315,333 plus interest. Defendant’s second count was based upon the guaranty and sought
judgment against plaintiff and the Ongtengcos, jointly and severally, in the same amount. In the
third count, defendant sought to foreclose on the mortgage. In addition, defendant moved to
appoint plaintiff as the receiver to collect rents and accounts and operate and maintain the
property. Plaintiff filed his answer on April 18, 1989 but did not file any affirmative defenses or
counterclaims.
On June 9, 1989, the parties to this litigation (defendant, Concorde, plaintiff, and the
Ongtengcos) entered into a settlement agreement, resulting in the conveyance of title to the
Concorde Center to defendant and the dismissal of defendant’s lawsuit without prejudice, while
allowing plaintiff, upon buying out his former partners, the opportunity to manage the property
and pay off the debt. In pertinent part, the settlement agreement provided:
4.10 Consent Judgment: Concurrently herewith, the parties have agreed
with respect to the Litigation that:
4.10.1 An order shall be entered dismissing the claims of Plaintiff against
Concorde and Karp, without prejudice, but with the further proviso that upon an
Execution Date (hereafter defined), a Consent Judgment in form attached as
Exhibit 4.10, may be entered against Karp in the amount of $1 million, or such
lesser amount as is hereinafter provided. The consent judgment may be filed by
Lender at any time after an Execution Date by filing an Affidavit that an
Execution Date under the Settlement Agreement has occurred, and that Lender is
entitled to file a motion to re-open the case, enter the Consent Judgment and fill in
the appropriate amount thereof;
***
4.11 Right to Execute Upon Consent Judgment. Lender [defendant] may
not file, execute upon or exercise any of its rights and remedies against Karp
under the Consent Judgment until the earlier to occur of the following events:
4.11.1 December 31, 1989 (“First Execution Date”), if by such date the
Premises have not been leased to the extent of fifty (50%) percent of the total net
rentable square footage. . . .
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4.11.2 If the leasing requirements of 4.11.1 are met, then the First
Execution Date shall have passed, and Lender shall not execute upon the Consent
Judgment until December 31, 1990 (“Second Execution Date”).
In addition, the settlement agreement provided that defendant was obligated to exercise
reasonable business judgment in its review and approval of all proposed leases and rentals:
4.12. Control of the Premises. From and after date of conveyance of the
Premises to Lender, which shall occur contemporaneously herewith, Lender shall
have full control of the Premises and the unrestricted right to make all decisions
relating thereto including the right to sell the Premises for any price or on any
terms it desires. Concorde and/or Karp shall have the right to bring leasing
opportunities to the attention of Lender. Lender shall not be required to accept
any lease of the Premises and shall have sole and absolute discretion with respect
to leasing of the Premises, and the amount to be expended on tenant
improvements; provided, however, Lender shall exercise reasonable business
judgment in connection with all leasing decisions.
The settlement agreement also set forth:
5.7 Full Settlement of Claims. It is the intention of the parties hereto that
this Agreement shall, subject to the conditions hereof, constitute a full settlement
and resolution of all pending issues and disputes between the parties as of the
closing date, and also with respect to Lender’s future relationship to the Premises.
Plaintiff alleges that immediately after the settlement agreement went into effect,
defendant refused to cooperate with his efforts to lease the building, to regain title to the
building, or to sell it. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant selected its own leasing agent
to take over the building, ignored prospective tenants recommended by plaintiff; refused to lease
office space to plaintiff, “rekeyed” the building to restrict plaintiff’s access to the building, and
ignored purchase offers procured by plaintiff. Plaintiff thus alleges that “[b]ecause of the
financial losses occasioned by the breaches and tortious acts of Defendant, and because of the
entry of the consent judgment,” he had to forego other business opportunities and suffered
damages to his reputation and financial standing as a real estate developer. He further alleges
that defendant damaged his credit record and interfered with his credit relationships with other
lenders.
When plaintiff failed to meet the occupancy conditions and leasing requirements by the
first execution date, defendant filed a motion for reinstatement of the case and the entry of a
consent judgment in the amount of $1 million on June 13, 1990. According to plaintiff, he
entered a limited defense to defendant’s motion, “claiming certain known breaches of the
Settlement Agreement by the Bank, including fraudulent inducement to ent[er] the Settlement
Agreement because of negligent representations made as to future performance by the Bank.”
Plaintiff contends that he did not raise, nor was he required to raise, any cause of action that he
had independent of the consent judgment, especially claims that did not involve releases and
waivers contained in the settlement agreement, or any causes of action that were unknown to him
at the time.
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Defendant then moved for summary disposition and immediate entry of the consent
judgment. After defendant’s motion for summary disposition was denied, an evidentiary hearing
was held over the course of six days in 1992 and early 1993 to determine whether defendant was
entitled to the entry of the consent judgment. According to plaintiff, defendant “acknowledged
the limited nature of the proceedings and maintained that any claims that Karp had should
properly be raised in another separate legal proceeding.” Specifically, defendant, in its reply to
Karp’s answer to its motion for reinstatement of case and entry of consent judgment, stated that:
In other words, once MNB [defendant] files the affidavit (which it has
done) there are no other conditions or defenses allowed to the entry of the Consent
Judgment
MNB suggests that if Karp truly believes that MNB has breached the
Settlement Agreement, that [sic] Karp’s only method of relief is a separate action
seeking damages for such alleged breach.
***
Moreover, as noted above, if Karp believes that MNB is in violation of this
provision of the Settlement Agreement [¶ 4.12], he is able to bring a separate
action claiming damages as a result of that breach. Such breach, if any exists,
(again, which the bank denies) is not a proper legal defense to the entry of the
Consent Judgment. [Emphasis provided.]
Further, at the January 21, 1991 summary disposition hearing, defendant objected, on grounds of
relevancy, plaintiff’s introduction of testimony about defendant’s fraudulent inducement
regarding the settlement agreement:
Merely because the defendant [Karp] put something in its answer does not
make it relevant to what the issues are. This Court makes the determination
ultimately upon the testimony as to what the relevant issues are. . . .
***
[T]he only issue here is whether the Bank and Mr. Karp performed the agreement.
That’s the issue. What went on beforehand, what the intention of the parties - I
don’t know what . . . Mr. Karp’s intention was and I don’t much care because it’s
irrelevant.
This is the agreement. Did we breach it or didn’t we breach it? And if we
breached it, is it an independent covenant or dependent covenant, that’s the issue.
What went on beforehand is totally irrelevant and there’s been no testimony – in
fact, the testimony that I’ve listened to has been exactly on. . . .
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on February 22, 1993, the Oakland Circuit
Court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
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We’ve spent an awful lot of time on this not only today but the entire time.
Certainly it’s been well briefed with numerous documents and exhibits. But
actually, in this Court’s opinion, it’s a rather simple issue. And what it comes
down to primarily is paragraph 4.12 in the settlement agreement entered into by
the parties on June 9th , 1989. And that paragraph 4.12 gives the Bank full control
of the office building and the right to make decisions relating thereto including the
right to sell it at any time. Also it gives the right to the lender to exercise – this is
the key word, reasonable business judgment – you can actually call it leasing
decisions. Also it gives the Bank the right to not to be required to accept any
lease of the premises, they have absolute sole and absolute discretion with respect
to the leasing of the premises. And the amount to be expended on tenant
improvements as provided . . .
[T]he Court applying the reasonable business judgment test doesn’t find
that it is unreasonable. That’s what we’re really coming down in the contract
itself.
***
I just find that the Bank did not make any unreasonable business
operations with respect to the leasing decisions. Therefore, I’m finding as a
matter of law that Michigan National Bank, the plaintiff, has a right under the
terms of the settlement agreement to have a consent judgment entered in the
amount of one million dollars against Mr. Samuel Karp.
On March 2, 1993, the court entered the consent judgment against plaintiff.
On May 18, 1995, plaintiff commenced the instant action by filing a five-count complaint
in Wayne Circuit Court seeking $12 million in damages, alleging breach of the settlement
agreement, tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, fraud, commercial fraud,
and breaches of express warranties. The claims related to defendant’s actions with respect to the
settlement agreement. On September 12, 1995, defendant moved for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10).
The trial court issued an opinion on August 20, 1997, granting in part and denying in part
defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition regarding plaintiff’s claim of
breach of the settlement agreement, denied defendant’s motion regarding plaintiff’s claims of
tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, fraud, and commercial fraud, and
granted in part and denied in part defendant’s motion regarding plaintiff’s claim of breach of an
express warranty.
On November 12, 1997, defendant moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s October
29, 1997 order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10). The trial court granted defendant’s motion for reconsideration
and granted summary disposition of all plaintiff’s remaining claims on the basis of res judicata.
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Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion requesting reconsideration of the trial court’s opinion
granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition and seeking leave to file an amended
complaint. Plaintiff claims that this motion was based upon the newly-made-available evidence
contained in recently-produced documents that revealed defendant’s interference with plaintiff’s
contractual relationship. As a result, plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege five
additional causes of action regarding plaintiff’s relationship with All American. The trial court
denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and his motion for leave to amend the complaint.
II. Res Judicata
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred when it determined that plaintiff’s claims
from his original complaint were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and therefore granted
defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a summary disposition motion.
Roberson v Occupational Health Centers of America, Inc, 220 Mich App 322, 324; 559 NW2d
86 (1996). In reviewing a motion for summary disposition because the claim is barred under
MCR 2.116(C)(7), the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true, unless
contradicted by documentary evidence, Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 434, n 6; 526 NW2d
879 (1994), and the appellate court examines the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions,
and documentary evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stamps
v City of Taylor, 218 Mich App 626, 630; 554 NW2d 603 (1996). If the pleadings show that a
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if the proofs show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, then the trial court must enter judgment without delay. Id; MCR
2.116(I)(1).
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual
support for a claim. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). In reviewing
a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court considers the pleadings, affidavits, depositions,
admissions, and other documentary evidence available to it in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. Id. A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition if the
affidavits or other documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co,
451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
Moreover, the applicability of res judicata is a question of law that is reviewed de novo
on appeal. Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 379; 596 NW2d 153
(1999).
Res judicata bars a subsequent action between the same parties if the evidence or
essential facts are identical. Dart v Dart, 224 Mich App 146, 156; 568 NW2d 353 (1997), aff’d
460 Mich 573; 597 NW2d 82 (1999). Res judicata requires that: (1) the prior action was decided
on the merits, (2) the decree in the prior action was a final decision, (3) the matter contested in
the second case was or could have been resolved in the first, and (4) both actions involved the
same parties or their privies. Id; Kosiel v Arrow Liquors Corp, 446 Mich 374, 379; 521 NW2d
531 (1994). Res judicata applies to consent judgments. Schwartz v Flint, 187 Mich App 191,
194; 466 NW2d 357 (1992). If the same facts or evidence would sustain two actions, the actions
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are the same for purposes of res judicata. In re Koernke Estate, 169 Mich App 397, 399; 425
NW2d 795 (1988).
While plaintiff purports to claim that the trial court erred when it concluded that all of his
original claims were barred by res judicata, a close reading of plaintiff’s appeal brief and reply
brief leads us to conclude that plaintiff is not challenging the trial court’s original opinion and
order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion for summary disposition but only
the trial court’s opinion and order granting defendant’s motions for reconsideration and summary
disposition. Indeed, plaintiff states that “the trial court’s original ruling was correct” and thus
indicates that the court got it right the first time when it granted defendant’s motion for summary
disposition regarding plaintiff’s claims of breach of the settlement agreement and breach of
express warranty to act in a commercially reasonable manner but denied its motion as to
plaintiff’s claims of tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, fraud,
commercial fraud, and breach of express warranties to regain title and to act in good faith.
Accordingly, the question becomes whether the trial court erred when it determined that these
remaining claims were barred by res judicata.
We conclude that res judicata barred all of plaintiff’s claims raised in the original
complaint, including his claims of tortious interference with a prospective business advantage,
fraud, commercial fraud, and breach of express warranties to regain title and to act in good faith.
Indeed, the record indicates that the claims were in fact addressed by the Oakland Circuit Court.
While plaintiff contends that the only issue actually litigated in the prior litigation was whether
defendant was entitled to have a consent judgment in the amount of $1 million entered against
plaintiff under the terms of the settlement agreement, we conclude that all of plaintiff’s present
claims constituted an attempt to relitigate the defenses raised at the evidentiary hearing regarding
the entry of the consent judgment. Indeed, a review of the record indicates that the Oakland
Circuit Court ruled that defendant was entitled to a consent judgment under the terms of the
settlement agreement because it found that “the Bank did not make any unreasonable business
operations with respect to the leasing decisions.” As defendant correctly points out, “[t]he entire
gravamen of the [instant] Wayne County action is that the Bank first fraudulently induced Karp
into signing the Settlement agreement [by stating that it would act reasonably under the
settlement agreement], and then committed several breaches,” as alleged in plaintiff’s original
complaint. The Oakland Circuit Court’s finding that defendant did not breach the settlement
agreement and that defendant acted in a commercially reasonable manner effectively disposed of
all the claims that plaintiff raised in his original complaint. Ultimately, plaintiff’s action in
Wayne Circuit Court alleging breach of the settlement agreement, tortious interference with a
prospective business advantage, fraud, commercial fraud, and breach of express warranties to
regain title, to act in good faith, and to act in a commercially reasonable manner was an attempt
to relitigate the Oakland Circuit Court’s ruling that defendant did not breach the settlement
agreement and to obtain an outcome inconsistent with the prior proceeding. Accordingly, res
judicata barred plaintiff’s claims. See Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409 Mich 147, 160163; 294 NW2d 165 (1980) (indicating that claims actually litigated in prior proceedings are
barred by res judicata).
We note that the trial court did not rely on the fact that the claims had already been
litigated in granting defendant summary disposition. Instead, the court relied on the fact that the
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claims could have been litigated in the Oakland County proceeding. See Sprague v Buhagiar,
213 Mich App 310; 539 NW2d 587 (1995). While Sprague indeed purports to bar an action
involving a counterclaim that could have been brought in a prior proceeding, see id. at 313,
another panel of this Court reached a contrary conclusion in Eaton Road Comm’rs v Schultz, 205
Mich App 371; 521 NW2d 847 (1994). We need not address this conflict, however, in light of
our conclusion that plaintiff’s claims from his original complaint actually were litigated in the
prior proceeding. While the trial court may have erroneously relied on the fact that the claims
were not previously litigated but could have been litigated, we will not reverse a trial court if it
reached the correct result for the wrong reasons. See Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513,
532; 564 NW2d 532 (1997).
Plaintiff contends that res judicata should not be held applicable to the instant case
because there was no judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff contends that the pleadings in the
prior litigation in Oakland Circuit Court were never litigated, having been dismissed without
prejudice and reinstated by motion for the purpose of entering a consent judgment. Plaintiff
maintains that because the instant case involves the application of res judicata to a consent
judgment, there was no determination on the merits of the issues being raised in the instant
action. However, as defendant points out, there was an evidentiary hearing held over six days
before the entry of the consent judgment; plaintiff made proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law that dealt with his claims raised in his original complaint, including his claims
of tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, fraud, commercial fraud, and
breach of express warranties to regain title and to act in good faith. Specifically, plaintiff
claimed that defendant “did not exercise reasonable business judgment in its leasing efforts,” that
defendant “induced Karp into entering into executing the Settlement Agreement”[sic], that
defendant interfered with his efforts to lease the building, and that defendant failed “to act in
good faith.” So even though, strictly speaking, there was “no judgment on the pleadings,” it
cannot be denied that the question whether defendant breached the settlement agreement was
placed in issue and actually litigated in the prior action in Oakland Circuit Court. Accordingly,
res judicata applied.
Plaintiff further argues that defendant waived its defense of res judicata by statements
made in the prior litigation. As set forth earlier in this opinion, defendant maintained that
because of the limited nature of the proceedings involving the entry of the consent judgment,
plaintiff was allowed to raise any claims against defendant in a separate proceeding. The
doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a
position in a prior proceeding from asserting an inconsistent one at a subsequent proceeding.
Lichon v American Universal Ins Co, 435 Mich 408, 416; 459 NW2d 288 (1990); Auto-Owners
Ins Co v Harvey, 219 Mich App 466, 474; 556 NW2d 517 (1996). We do not find the doctrine
of judicial estoppel to be controlling in this case. Indeed, as set forth in the above cases, judicial
estoppel applies if a party has successfully asserted a position in a prior proceeding. There is no
indication from the record that the Oakland Circuit Court made a ruling with regard to
defendant’s argument that plaintiff could not raise certain defenses in the proceedings but was
instead obligated to pursue them in independent actions. Accordingly, we cannot say that
defendant successfully asserted a position in the prior proceeding, and judicial estoppel therefore
did not apply.
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III. Collateral Estoppel
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition on the
basis of collateral estoppel. Initially, the trial court, in granting in part and denying in part
defendant’s motion for summary disposition, ruled that “collateral estoppel precludes Karp from
litigating his claims against MNB for breach of contract [breach of settlement agreement] and
breach of a warranty to act in a commercially reasonable manner,” but that collateral estoppel did
not bar his “remaining claims” of tortious interference with a prospective business advantage,
fraud, commercial fraud, and breach of warranties to regain title and to act in good faith. In
granting defendant’s motion for reconsideration and granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition, the trial court ruled that plaintiff’s “remaining claims” were barred by the doctrine of
res judicata. In other words, the trial court left untouched its original ruling that collateral
estoppel barred plaintiff’s claims of breach of contract and breach of an express warranty to act
in a commercially reasonable manner but did not bar his “remaining claims” of tortious
interference with a prospective business advantage, fraud, commercial fraud, and breach of
express warranties to regain title and to act in good faith. Thus, the issue is whether the trial
court erred in granting summary disposition regarding plaintiff’s claims of breach of contract and
breach of an express warranty to act in a commercially reasonable manner on the basis of
collateral estoppel.
However, as discussed earlier, plaintiff’s appellate brief does not adequately challenge the
trial court’s original opinion and order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion
for summary disposition but instead adequately challenges only the court’s opinion and order
granting defendant’s motions for reconsideration and summary disposition on the basis of res
judicata. In effect, plaintiff has abandoned the issue.
Even if plaintiff had not abandoned the issue, we would nonetheless find no basis for
relief. As stated in People v Gates, 434 Mich 146, 154, 156-158; 452 NW2d 627 (1990):
Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent,
different cause of action between the same parties where the prior proceeding
culminated in a valid, final judgment and the issue was (1) actually litigated, and
(2) necessarily determined.
***
In analyzing whether an issue was "actually litigated" in the prior
proceeding, the Court must look at more than what has been pled and argued. We
must also consider whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
***
An issue is necessarily determined only if it is "essential" to the judgment.
Here, the trial court, in its original opinion granting in part and denying in part
defendant’s motion for summary disposition, properly granted summary disposition to defendant
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regarding plaintiff’s claims of breach of the settlement agreement and breach of an express
warranty to act in a commercially reasonable manner on the basis of collateral estoppel. As the
trial court noted, plaintiff argued in the prior litigation in Oakland County that the consent
judgment should not enter because defendant had breached the settlement agreement by failing to
exercise reasonable business judgment. In his original complaint in the instant matter, plaintiff
likewise alleged that defendant breached the settlement agreement by failing to exercise
reasonable business judgment. Thus, as the trial court correctly found, the same issue had been
presented to both courts.
Further, whether defendant breached the settlement agreement by failing to exercise
reasonable business judgment was actually litigated in the prior proceeding. Indeed, the issue of
defendant’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement by failing to exercise reasonable business
judgment was “necessarily determined” in the prior proceeding because it was "essential" to the
entry of the consent judgment. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition
regarding plaintiff’s claims of breach of the settlement agreement and breach of an express
warranty to act in a commercially reasonable manner on the basis of collateral estoppel.
IV. The Amendments to the Complaint
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint. Plaintiff argues that justice required leave to amend because defendant’s actions in
obstructing discovery prevented him from learning about certain of defendant’s wrongful actions
until defendant was compelled to produce documents by a court order entered on October 29,
1997. This Court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for leave to amend pleadings for an
abuse of discretion. Horn v Dept of Corrections, 216 Mich App 58, 65; 548 NW2d 660 (1996).
According to plaintiff, the relevant documents produced after the October 1997 order
were memoranda showing that defendant misled plaintiff “concerning his rights under a stand-by
commitment for end loan financing by All American” and that defendant interfered with
plaintiff’s agreement with All American. Specifically, in his amended complaint, which was
dated February 6, 1998, plaintiff alleged twelve additional counts: (1) inducing breach of contract
involving the loan agreement between Concorde and All American by defendant’s alleged refusal
to make the periodic payments to All American; (2) interfering with the contract involving the
Concorde partnership agreement by inducing plaintiff to buy out his partners “on the false
promise” that defendant would assist plaintiff in maintaining ownership of the Concorde Centre;
(3) breach of contract involving the loan agreement between Concorde and defendant because of
defendant’s failure to make a payment that was due to All American, “thereby allowing the End
Loan Commitment to lapse;” (4) interference with existing contractual relationships between
Concorde and All American and between plaintiff and his Concorde partners by defendant’s false
assertions to the Concorde partners and representatives of All American that the “end-loan
agreement” was no longer valid; (5) intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage by defendant’s wrongful interference with Concorde’s economic relationship with All
American and plaintiff’s economic relationship with his Concorde partners; (6) negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage involving plaintiff’s future economic benefits
arising from the Concorde Centre; (7) negligent misrepresentations inducing plaintiff to enter
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into the settlement agreement; (8) fraud based upon “false promises” inducing plaintiff to enter
the settlement agreement; (9) commercial fraud based upon the negligent misrepresentations
inducing plaintiff to enter into the settlement agreement; (10) slander based on the false
statement that defendant made to tenants of the Concorde Centre and lenders that defendant was
going into bankruptcy; (11) fraud based upon defendant’s intentional misrepresentation to
plaintiff in a letter dated January 25, 1989 that Concorde and plaintiff were in default of their
loan agreement with defendant; and (12) breach of express warranties upon the execution of the
settlement agreement.1
At the outset, we note that counts 1-6 and 10-11 in plaintiff’s amended complaint appear
to be new claims alleging misconduct by defendant with respect to plaintiff’s relationship with
All American, whereas counts 7-9 and 12 essentially overlap the claims made in plaintiff’s
original complaint. Because the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary
disposition regarding plaintiff’s claims raised in his original complaint, it must now be
determined only whether the trial court erred in not allowing plaintiff to amend his complaint to
add counts 1-6 and 10-11.2
Defendant claims that by entering into the settlement agreement with defendant, plaintiff
waived his right to file a suit against defendant pertaining to claims arising out of the
construction loan. In pertinent part, the settlement agreement provides:
4.5 Release by Concorde and Karp of Lender. Concorde and Karp . . .
hereby release and forever discharge Lender, its officers, employees, agents,
servants, directors, successors and assigns from any and all claims, damages,
liabilities, actions or causes of action of any kind, nature or description
whatsoever, arising out of, or in any manner connected with the Loan, the Loan
Documents, Lender’s administration of the Loan, or any and all other matters
which are, could be or may be connected with the Loan, or the Loan Documents
including the Guarantor Disputes.
As indicated by the language of the settlement agreement, the parties intended to resolve
issues and disputes relating to plaintiff’s loan agreement with defendant. Counts 1 and 3 of the
amended complaint pertain to defendant’s alleged breach of this loan agreement. Accordingly,
counts 1 and 3 were barred by the settlement, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow them. Counts 2, 4-6, and 10-11, however, relate to actions apart
from the loan agreement between plaintiff and defendant and therefore are not barred by the
settlement agreement.
1
We note that plaintiff filed a “corrected” amended brief on February 28, 1998. The corrected
brief did not vary substantially from the brief dated February 6, 1998, although some of the
counts were renumbered.
2
We note that plaintiff’s appellate brief does not set forth any evidence that the newlydiscovered evidence applied to counts 7-9 and 12 of the amended complaint. Moreover, even
assuming, arguendo, that counts 7-9 and 12 of the amended complaint constituted new claims, it
appears that they would be barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, as discussed infra.
-12-
Defendant, however, claims that counts 2, 4-6, and 10-11 of plaintiff’s amended
complaint were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. See James v Logee, 150 Mich
App 35, 37-38; 388 NW2d 294 (1986) (indicating a three-year statute of limitations for claims
involving tortious interference with contractual relations or business relationships), Wilson v
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc, 190 Mich App 277, 279; 475 NW2d 388 (1991) (indicating a
one-year statute of limitations for slander claims), and Kuebler v Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the US, 219 Mich App 1, 6; 555 NW2d 496 (1996) (indicating a six-year statute of
limitations for fraud claims). As a response to defendant’s argument, plaintiff contends only that
statutes of limitation do not bar claims under circumstances involving fraudulent concealment of
those claims. MCL 600.5855; MSA 27A.5855 provides:
If a person who is or may be liable for any claim fraudulently conceals the
existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the claim
from the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the claim, the action may be
commenced at any time within 2 years after the person who is entitled to bring the
action discovers, or should have discovered, the existence of the claim or the
identity of the person who is liable for the claim, although the action would
otherwise be barred by the period of limitations.
Plaintiff contends that defendant’s opposition to discovery indicates that defendant sought
to conceal discovery of its wrongful conduct to avoid liability. However, to toll the statute of
limitations based on fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must plead in the complaint the acts or
misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment and must prove that the defendant
committed affirmative acts or misrepresentations that were designed to prevent subsequent
discovery. Sills v Oakland General Hospital, 220 Mich App 303, 310; 559 NW2d 348 (1996);
Witherspoon v Guilford, 203 Mich App 240, 248; 511 NW2d 720 (1994). Here, plaintiff did not
set forth in his complaint the acts that constituted the fraudulent concealment of the claims. In
fact, plaintiff did not even mention the fraudulent concealment doctrine in his complaint.
Accordingly, the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.3 No error occurred in the trial
court’s failure to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint.
V. Copying Costs
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in requiring plaintiff to pay defendant
certain costs for copying documents. “This Court reviews the circuit court's determination of the
reasonableness of fees ordered for the production of documents for an abuse of discretion.” In re
Document Fees, 224 Mich App 665, 669; 569 NW2d 898 (1997).
Under an order compelling discovery, defendant was required to produce documents and
plaintiff was required to reimburse defendant for the reasonable costs incurred to make copies of
the documents. On November 14, 1997, defendant delivered eleven boxes of documents to
plaintiff’s counsel’s office, along with a copying bill in the amount of $9,555.43 for
3
We note that even if counts 1 and 3 were not barred by the settlement agreement, they would
nonetheless be barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.
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reimbursement. Upon delivery, plaintiff’s counsel, Alan Cooper, sent a letter to defendant’s
counsel, Douglas Bernstein, in which Cooper stated that he was disputing reimbursement
because two weeks prior, when Cooper asked Bernstein for an estimate about the copying costs
and whether the amount would exceed $500, Bernstein told him that there were four boxes of
documents and that the cost “probably would not” exceed $500. According to plaintiff, if he had
been told that there were eleven boxes and that the copying bill would be almost $10,000, he
would have asked to examine the documents to determine if he wanted them copied. Plaintiff
additionally contends that the invoices were erroneous because defendant charged plaintiff for
“Bates Numbering” and also required plaintiff to pay for defendant’s own copies.
On December 12, 1997, the trial court, after hearing argument from counsel on plaintiff’s
motion to declare the copying costs unreasonable, ruled from the bench denying the motion.
Considering the ninety requests for production of documents in litigation involving claimed
damages of $12 million, the trial court ruled that plaintiff could not have anticipated that the bill
would be only $500.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that he was overcharged at least $4,295.81, consisting of
charges for “Bates Numbering” that he did not request in the amount of $1,325.27 and an
additional $2,970.54 for extra copies made for defendant. Plaintiff did not make a specific
objection below, however, to “Bates Numbering”4 and to extra copies made for defendant.
Accordingly, he has not properly preserved this argument for appeal, and we therefore decline to
review it. See Garavaglia v Centra, Inc, 211 Mich App 625, 628; 536 NW2d 805 (1995).
Plaintiff additionally contends that he should not have been required to pay for the copying costs
because he believed that they would be only $500. Plaintiff, however, agreed to reimburse
defendant for copying costs, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that
plaintiff should have anticipated that the costs would far exceed $500.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
4
While plaintiff did state below that the costs included a “six cent numbering charge,” he did not
indicate below why this charge was unreasonable or that “Bates Numbering” had not been
requested. Accordingly, the trial court did not address the specific issue now raised on appeal.
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