IN RE RODRIGUEZ/NINO, MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of A.D.R., J.R., and C.N., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 23, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 221980
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-366870
MARIO RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DOLORES CHAVEZ and CONSTANTINO NINO,
Respondents.
In the Matter of A.D.R., J.R., C.N., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 222062
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-366870
DOLORES CHAVEZ,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MARIO RODRIGUEZ and CONSTANTINO
NINO,
Respondents.
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Before: Meter, P.J., and Neff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents Mario Rodriquez and Dolores Chavez appeal
as of right the termination of their parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j). We
affirm.
The family court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j) were each
established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to respondent Rodriquez. MCR 5.974;
In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Because only one statutory ground is
required to support an order terminating parental rights, we need not consider whether
termination was warranted under § 19b(3)(a)(ii).
We reject respondent Rodriquez’ claim that relief is warranted because the court
suspended his visitation until he complied with the parent-agency agreement. In re Prater, 189
Mich App 330, 333; 471 NW2d 658 (1991). Respondent Rodriguez did not raise this issue in the
trial court, and it is apparent from the record that Rodriguez’ parental rights were properly
terminated for reasons independent of the suspension of visitation. Further, Rodriquez’ claim
that the lack of visitation resulted in the breakdown of the bond between parent and child is
disingenuous in light of the evidence that Rodriguez attended less that a third of his available
visits and then frequently left after only a few minutes of the few visits that he did attend.
Finally, we conclude that respondent Chavez has not shown that she was denied her right
to due process where her attorney arrived after the start of the first termination hearing
proceeding. In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 111; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). She did not raise this issue
below, and so it is unpreserved. Respondent Chavez must show that she suffered plain error that
affected her substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The record indicates, and the trial court expressly found, that the testimony during counsel’s
absence related solely to respondent Rodriguez. Moreover, counsel for respondent Chavez had
the opportunity between the two termination hearing proceedings to review the record of the
missed testimony and could have asked to recall the witness in question if there were any
questions or concerns, but declined to do so. Under the circumstances, respondent Chavez has
not established that that she suffered plain error that affected a substantial right.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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