MARTY LIGGETT V JEAN BUTTERFIELD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARTY LIGGETT,
UNPUBLISHED
February 23, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 221946
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 96-000078-NO
JEAN BUTTERFIELD,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this negligence action, plaintiff appeals by of right from a judgment of no cause of
action entered on a jury verdict. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
I
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the sudden
emergency defense. We agree.
The determination whether a jury instruction is applicable under the facts of a case and
accurately states the law is within the discretion of the trial court. Bordeaux v Celotex Corp, 203
Mich App 158, 168-169; 511 NW2d 899 (1993).
The court instructed the jury as to MCL 324.80145; MSA 13A.80145 as follows:
[A] person operating or propelling a vessel upon the waters of this state shall
operate it in a careful and prudent manner, and at such a rate of speed so as not to
endanger unreasonably the life or property of any person. A person shall not
operate any vessel at a rate of speed greater than will permit him or her in the
exercise of reasonable care to bring the vessel to a stop within the assured clear
distance ahead. A person shall not operate a vessel in a manner so as to interfere
unreasonably with the lawful use by others of any waters. If you find that the
defendant violated this statute before or at the time of the occurrence, you may
infer that the defendant was negligent.
-1-
The court then read SJI2d 12.02:
However, if you find that the defendant used ordinary care and was still unable to
avoid the violation because she was confronted by an emergency not due to her
own misconduct, then her violation is excused. If you find that the defendant
violated this statute, and that the violation was not excused, then you must decide
whether such violation was a proximate cause of the occurrence.
In order for a court to give a requested jury instruction, sufficient evidence must be
presented to warrant the instruction. Wincher v Detroit, 144 Mich App 448, 456; 376 NW2d 125
(1985). This Court held in Dennis v Jakeway, 53 Mich App 68, 74; 218 NW2d 389 (1974), that
a party seeking to invoke the sudden emergency doctrine must be aware that he is being
confronted with a sudden emergency.
In other words, the doctrine applies only in situations where
a defendant is confronted with a “sudden emergency”—something “unusual or
unsuspected”—and the situation is not of his own making, he actually observes
the sudden emergency, comprehends that a sudden emergency is occurring
and then uses ordinary care and is not able to avoid the collision . . . . [White,
Michigan Torts (2d ed), § 3:13, pp 194-195 (emphasis added).]
In this case, in order for defendant to be entitled to a sudden emergency instruction, she
was required to show that she realized that there was a swimmer directly in her path and about to
be hit and that she reacted to that sudden emergency. However, defendant’s undisputed
testimony was that “[she] did not see Marty Liggett swimming,” and she did not realize that she
hit him until she heard the resulting thump. Additionally, Ryan Pointer, who was skiing behind
defendant’s boat at the time, testified that in dropping the tow rope, he “caused” defendant to
turn the boat so that it only struck a glancing blow to plaintiff. This testimony establishes that
defendant was unaware of plaintiff’s presence and only turned the boat as a reaction to Pointer’s
actions.
Accordingly, this evidence is insufficient to show that defendant turned the boat away
from plaintiff because she was aware that she was “confronted by” an emergency situation.
Because defendant has failed to make the requested showing that she reacted to the sudden
emergency of plaintiff’s presence, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing
the jury on the sudden emergency instruction.
-2-
Because we find that the sudden emergency instruction was erroneously given, we must
next decide whether the error was harmless. 1 Instructional error is harmless unless it results in
an “error or defect” in the trial such that failing to set aside the verdict would be “inconsistent
with substantial justice.” Johnson v Corbet, 423 Mich 304, 326; 377 NW2d 713 (1985). The
structure of the verdict form makes it impossible to ascertain whether the jury was influenced by
the improper instruction. Accordingly, we conclude that failure to set aside this verdict would be
inconsistent with substantial justice. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the
merits.
II
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s
motion for new trial based on the allegation that the jury verdict was against the great weight of
the evidence. We need not address this contention in light of the dispositive nature of our ruling
on plaintiff’s first issue.
We reverse and remand for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
1
We reject plaintiff’s argument that the sudden emergency instruction erroneously allowed jurors
to base their decision regarding defendant’s negligence on a finding of contributory negligence
by plaintiff. The sudden emergency doctrine operates to excuse the negligence of a defendant
based on how abruptly he or she is confronted with “unusual” or “unsuspected” circumstances.
Although the doctrine’s requirement that the circumstances must not be of defendant’s own
making will sometimes require the trier of fact to look to the actions of others involved in the
situation, the focus does not shift away from defendant’s culpability.
-3-
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