PEOPLE OF MI V MARVIN L MAYWEATHER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 23, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee
v
No. 217345
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-006613
MARVIN L. MAYWEATHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and O'Connell and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA
28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to four to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the
armed robbery conviction and two years’ consecutive imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of felonyfirearm because the evidence did not establish that he possessed a “firearm.” A firearm is
described in MCL 8.3t; MSA 2.212(20) as “any weapon from which a dangerous projectile may
be propelled by using explosives, gas, or air as a means of propulsion,” excluding BB guns.
Defendant maintains that this definition implies that a firearm must also be operable. He
contends that no evidence at trial established the operability, caliber, means of propulsion, if any,
or other characteristics of the alleged weapon, and therefore the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he possessed a “firearm” within the statutory meaning.
Defendant’s argument concerning operability is misplaced. “Operability is not and has
never been an element of felony-firearm.” People v Thompson, 189 Mich App 85, 86; 472
NW2d 11 (1991). Direct examination established that the robbery occurred in a lighted area.
Complainant testified that she had an unobstructed view of the gun and that she was close
enough to touch it. While complainant could only describe the gun as “dark,” she stated that she
thought she knew the difference between a revolver and an automatic handgun but could not tell
the difference in this specific instance. There was no cross examination of complainant on any
aspect of the firearm. Moreover, defendant’s motion for directed verdict did not address this
subject. Thus we conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, was sufficient to convict defendant of felony-firearm. See People v Perry, 172
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Mich App 609, 432 NW2d 377 (1988) (Evidence was sufficient to establish felony firearm when
victim felt what she believed to be the tip of a gun).
Defendant next contends that his conviction must be reversed because the trial court’s
jury instruction, regarding the elements of felony-firearm, did not include a definition of
“firearm.” Defendant did not object to the jury instructions as given. Absent an objection, relief
is only granted in cases of manifest injustice. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 545; 494
NW2d 737 (1993). The instruction as given “fairly presented the issues to be tried and
sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights.” People v Bell, 209 Mich App 273, 276; 530 NW2d
167 (1995). We therefore found no manifest injustice and decline to further consider this issue.
Next, defendant claims that he was denied due process when the trial court refused to
suppress his identification at a pretrial lineup and the subsequent in-court identification. At trial,
defendant argued that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive because defendant was older than
the description complainant had given police. Defendant also argued that he was of a lighter
complexion than the other lineup participants. On appeal, defendant asserts that the
complainant’s description was too vague for police to even place defendant in a lineup.
Defendant also suggests that the skullcaps worn during the lineup impermissibly altered his
appearance. Lastly, defendant maintains that police photographed him prior to the lineup and
that this picture was shown to complainant.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit identification evidence for clear error. People
v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d 528 (1993), cert den 510 US 1058; 114 S Ct 725;
126 L Ed 2d 689 (1994); People v McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 472; 616 NW2d 203 (2000).
Upon defendant’s motion to suppress the lineup identification and in-court identification, the trial
court held an evidentiary hearing. Complainant testified that she was robbed at gun point and
that she got a good look at the robber. She reported the robbery to police that day, describing the
robber as an African-American male, approximately twenty-one to twenty-four years old, with a
medium complexion, short Afro haircut, and a mustache. Approximately ten months later,
complainant saw a man that she recognized as the robber crossing the street. Again, complainant
called the police and about a month later the police requested that she view a lineup.
The police conducted a line-up of six participants. According to the officer, these
individuals possessed similar weight, complexion, and overall characteristics. Once in the
observation room complainant immediately identified defendant as her robber. An attorney was
present at the lineup and did not make any objections. At the evidentiary hearing, complainant
denied three times that police showed her any photographs before the lineup. There was no
evidence presented that police used improper procedures in conducting the lineup. The trial
court admitted the identification.
Complainant had ample time to see her robber and defendant failed to establish that the
lineup was impermissibly suggestive. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 287; 545 NW2d
18 (1996), lv den 454 Mich 853; 562 NW2d 203 (1997). To sustain a due process challenge to a
pretrial identification, defendant must establish “that the pretrial identification procedure was so
suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances that it led to a substantial likelihood of
misidentification.” Kurylczyk, supra at 302, citing Neil v Biggers, 409 US 188, 196; 93 S Ct
375; 34 L Ed 2d 401 (1972). Generally, physical differences between lineup participants and the
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suspect do not, alone, constitute impermissible suggestiveness. Id. at 312. Rather, such
differences go to the weight of the identification, not its admissibility. People v Sawyer, 222
Mich App 1, 3; 564 NW2d 62 (1997). The trial court did not err in admitting the identification
testimony.
Finally, defendant asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Defendant
bases this claim on the fact that his counsel failed to call the arresting officer and defendant as
witnesses at the evidentiary hearing to establish the circumstances of his arrest. Moreover,
defendant claims counsel was inadequate in failing to question the police or defendant about an
alleged photograph taken of defendant prior to the lineup. Defendant also points to his counsel’s
failure to call defendant as a trial witness to testify on this own behalf. In order to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000).
Because there was no Ginther1 hearing, the Court’s review of this issue is limited to
mistakes apparent on the record. People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649
(1997). There was no evidence on the record of counsel’s ineffectiveness during the evidentiary
hearing or trial.
Likewise, there was no evidence presented that defendant was photographed before the
lineup. Rather, complainant denied three times during the evidentiary hearing that she was
shown any photographs before viewing the lineup. Based on complainant’s denial and with no
further proof presented, defendant has not shown that his counsel’s failure to call the arresting
officer or defendant to testify regarding the alleged photograph resulted in prejudice.
Defendant also claims that defense counsel was ineffective because she failed to put
defendant on the stand to testify on his own behalf. Defendant contends that his only defense
was a sworn denial that he committed the crime. He maintains that he had no criminal record
with which to impeach his testimony and that an attorney of ordinary skills and training would
have called defendant to the stand. The decision of whether to call a defendant to testify is
considered a matter of trial strategy and this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of trial
counsel. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). At most,
defendant’s testimony would have set up a credibility contest with complainant, who was
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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“certain” at trial that defendant was the man who robbed her. Thus, defendant has failed to show
that his testimony would have changed the trial result and has not established that his counsel
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to call him to testify.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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