IN RE MERCIDEZE DIXON MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MERCIDEZE DIXON, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 20, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
ERIC BRIAN DIXON,
No. 228232
Mecosta Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-003492-NA
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DENISE DIXON,
Respondent.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Neff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the family court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (h), (j) and (n); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g), (h), (j) and (n). We affirm. This case is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Respondent first argues that the family court erred in finding that the minor child was not
an Indian child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC 1901 et seq. The
record indicates that the required notices were sent to the applicable tribes in accordance with 25
USC 1912. Although respondent argues that the court failed to ascertain if he had a relationship
with the Ottawa tribe, we conclude that the court did not err in failing to contact the Ottawa tribe
where respondent did not identify that tribe until closing arguments of the termination hearing,
provided no explanation for why he now believed that he may have a possible relationship with
that tribe rather than the Crow or Cherokee tribes, and never requested an adjournment to further
investigate that question.
Next, contrary to what respondent argues, the family court did not clearly err in finding
that §§ 19b(3)(g) and (h) were each established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974;
In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Respondent also argues that the presentence report contained hearsay, which was
improperly considered at the termination hearing because it concerned a circumstance different
from the circumstances that led to the court’s assumption of jurisdiction. See MCR 5.974(E)(1);
In re Snyder, 223 Mich App 85, 89-90; 566 NW2d 18 (1997). Respondent maintains that this
hearsay evidence served as the basis for the court’s decision to terminate his parental rights under
§§ 19b(3)(j) and (n) and, therefore, requires reversal. However, respondent failed to preserve this
issue with an appropriate objection to the evidence at trial. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27,
44; 597 NW2d 176 (1999); MRE 103(a)(1); Anton v State Farm, 238 Mich App 673, 688; 607
NW2d 123 (1999). Furthermore, our failure to consider this issue will not result in manifest
injustice, given our conclusion that termination was properly ordered under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (h),
and respondent does not argue that the challenged information affected the court’s decision to
terminate under those statutory subsections. See In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480
NW2d 293 (1991) (only one statutory ground is required to support a decision to terminate
parental rights).
Respondent’s claim that he did not have notice to defend against § 19b(3)(n) is not raised
in respondent’s statement of the questions presented and, therefore, is not properly before this
Court. Hammack v Lutheran Social Services, 211 Mich App 1, 7; 535 NW2d 215 (1995).
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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