PEOPLE OF MI V ELIJAH ALEXANDER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 20, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217191
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 94-009957
ELIJAH ALEXANDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Smolenski and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317;
MSA 28.549, and sentenced to twenty to forty years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed as of
right, and this Court affirmed in part but remanded for an evidentiary hearing concerning
defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Defendant now appeals as of right from
the trial court’s finding after remand that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel and was not entitled to a new trial. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that he was denied a fair trial and his right to due process
because his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance deprived him of the opportunity to present an
alibi defense. To justify reversal based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing norms, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result
of the proceedings would have been different. People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 592; 569
NW2d 663 (1997). A defendant is entitled to have his counsel prepare, investigate, and present
all substantial defenses. In re Ayres, 239 Mich App 8, 22; 608 NW2d 132 (1999); People v
Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). A substantial defense is one that might
have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Ayres, supra at 22; Kelly, supra at 526. At a
post trial evidentiary hearing, a defendant must show that he made a good faith effort to avail
1
People v Alexander, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 11,
1997 (Docket No. 186291).
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himself of this right to present a defense and that the defense of which he was deprived was
substantial. Kelly, supra at 526.
At the evidentiary hearing, defendant’s trial counsel testified and specifically denied
knowledge of any claimed alibi defense. Defendant conversely testified that he had raised the
alibi issue with his trial counsel. Defendant first stated that his alibi witnesses were his wife and
daughter. On closer questioning from the trial court, defendant told the court that the witness
who had testified against him at his preliminary examination approached defendant’s wife a
month after the examination. The witness allegedly told defendant’s wife that he knew that
defendant did not commit the crime, but that the police had threatened to charge him with the
murder if he did not testify against defendant. Even if this allegation is true, it does not establish
an alibi defense for defendant. Moreover, the sole witness at defendant’s preliminary
examination also testified at defendant’s trial that defendant and his brother were the individuals
responsible for the murder.
Notwithstanding the above testimony, the trial court gave defendant the opportunity to
explain his alibi defense, defendant presented no other testimony at his evidentiary hearing, other
than a vague mention of his daughter,2 to substantiate the existence of witnesses who would
testify that he did not participate in the murder or was somewhere else when the offense
occurred. Accordingly, defendant failed to establish that he was deprived of a substantial
defense, because he failed to show that any witness would provide an alibi for him. We conclude
that even assuming that defendant’s trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate an alibi
defense, defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by this alleged error, and he
therefore cannot establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Leonard, supra
at 592; Kelly, supra at 526.
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress defendant’s
statement to the police constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. At defendant’s trial, Detroit
Police Officer Deborah Monti testified that after advising defendant of his constitutional rights,
she questioned defendant and took his statement. Officer Monti reduced defendant’s statement
to a writing, which defendant signed. In the statement, defendant acknowledged the role that he
played in the victim’s shooting death. Defendant asserts that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not move to suppress the statement, which
defendant denies having made, and that this refusal led to a breakdown in communication
between defendant and his attorney before and during trial.
At the evidentiary hearing held after remand, defendant’s trial counsel testified that
during conversations with defendant before trial, it became apparent to him that defendant had
agreed to talk to the police, and that therefore a motion to suppress the statement on the basis of
involuntariness was inappropriate. According to trial counsel, defendant’s claim was not that the
statement was involuntary, but that what he told Officer Monti was different than what she had
written in the statement. Defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing that he told defense
counsel that he did not make the statement and was forced to sign a statement that he did not
2
Defendant did not indicate his daughter’s age or the substance of what her testimony would be.
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make. He also acknowledged at the hearing that he made a statement to the police, however, and
admitted that he voluntarily signed the statement.
When a defendant challenges the admissibility of his statements, the trial court must hear
testimony regarding the circumstances of the defendant’s statement outside the jury’s presence.
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 337-339; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). Whether the
defendant’s statement was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is a question of law that the court
must determine under the totality of the circumstances. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393,
417; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). A statement’s voluntariness is determined by examining police
conduct, while the question whether it was made knowingly and intelligently depends in part on
the defendant’s capacity. People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 538; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). The
question whether a statement actually was made, however, represents a question separate from a
determination of voluntariness. People v Weatherspoon, 171 Mich App 549, 554; 431 NW2d 75
(1988). While the issue of voluntariness is for the trial court to decide, whether the defendant
made a statement is a question of fact for the jury to decide. People v Neal, 182 Mich App 368,
371; 451 NW2d 639 (1990); Weatherspoon, supra at 554-555.
In its opinion following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that defendant had
acknowledged that “he gave the statement freely and voluntarily and that he signed it without
coercion.” The court further stated, “It is readily apparent from this record that grounds for a
motion to suppress the statement did not remotely exist. Defendant did not agree and became
upset at counsel’s refusal to file a frivolous motion.” In light of defendant’s acknowledgment
that he voluntarily spoke to Officer Monti and signed the statement that she presented to him,
these factual findings are not clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C); People v Marsack, 231 Mich
App 364, 372; 586 NW2d 234 (1998). Because the question whether defendant actually made
the statement or whether the police fabricated it constitutes a factual question that need not be
decided before trial, Neal, supra at 371; Weatherspoon, supra at 554, we conclude that counsel
was not ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion to suppress the statement.3 Leonard, supra
at 592.
Lastly, defendant suggests that the trial court erred in denying him a motion for new trial
following the evidentiary hearing because the court did not sufficiently review defendant’s claim
of an alibi defense or his claim that he did not make the statement to the police. Our review of
the hearing transcript and the trial court’s opinion illustrates that the court considered defendant’s
3
We further note that defendant presented no credible evidence, either at trial or during his
evidentiary hearing, that he did not actually make the statement, and therefore failed to
demonstrate any prejudice arising from his counsel’s failure to move to suppress the confession.
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contentions. As we have indicated, the trial court did not clearly err in making its findings.
Given our holdings regarding defendant’s first two issues, we need not further review this claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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