PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT DAVID KULP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 9, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 215805
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-156364-FC
ROBERT DAVID KULP,
Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Jansen and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a). He was thereafter sentenced to
consecutive terms of 3 to 4 ½ years’ imprisonment for each count. Defendant appeals as of right.
The prosecutor cross-appeals as of right from the sentences imposed. We affirm in all respects.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.
When determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, this
Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether a
rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992).
A defendant is guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct if he engages in sexual
penetration with another person, and the other person is under the age of thirteen. MCL
750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a); In re Hawley, 238 Mich App 509, 511; 606 NW2d 50
(1999); People v Hammons, 210 Mich App 554, 557; 534 NW2d 183 (1995). Sexual penetration
is defined as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion,
however slight, of any part of a person’s body. . . .” MCL 750.520a(l); MSA 28.788(1)(l);
People v Reid, 233 Mich App 457, 479; 592 NW2d 767 (1999) (emphasis added). This Court
has previously held that cunnilingus, in and of itself, constitutes penetration for the purposes of
§ 520b(1)(a) and that no separate intrusion or act of penetration need exist in order for
cunnilingus to be performed. People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131, 132-134; 494 NW2d 797
(1992); People v Harris, 158 Mich App 463, 470; 404 NW2d 779 (1987).
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Sufficient evidence existed at trial to support defendant’s convictions of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct. The victim (who was eight years old at trial) told her father that
defendant “put his thing in her” and testified that he put his “private spot” inside her. She also
told a doctor that defendant put his “thing” in her “peepee.” Moreover, she testified that
defendant touched her “bottom” with his tongue and that her bottom is where she “goes pee.”
The victim’s father saw defendant with his face “buried” between her legs when she was not
wearing any pants or underwear, and she told the doctor that defendant put his tongue in her
“private spot” where she “pees.” The above evidence, without more, was sufficient to establish
the act of cunnilingus. Legg, supra at 132-134; Harris, supra at 470. Therefore, sufficient
evidence existed at trial to support both of defendant’s convictions.
Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient because the victim’s testimony
was inconsistent, weak, and insubstantial. However, the credibility of a witness is a matter of
weight and not a matter of sufficiency, and credibility determinations are to be made by the trier
of fact. People v Sharbnow, 174 Mich App 94, 105; 435 NW2d 772 (1989). Moreover, in light
of the above evidence, sufficient evidence existed at trial to support defendant’s convictions
notwithstanding the victim’s testimony.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the victim’s
statements to the doctor and a medical report containing the statements. The decision whether to
admit evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only where there is
a clear abuse of discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
Under MRE 803(4), a statement that otherwise constitutes hearsay is admissible if it is
reasonably necessary for the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis, and it describes a
person’s medical history, past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source of the injury. See also, People v Meeboer (After
Remand), 439 Mich 310, 322; 484 NW2d 621 (1992). This exception to the hearsay rule may be
applicable in cases involving a child’s statement if the statement is sufficiently established as
trustworthy. Id. at 322, 331-334. Factors to consider when determining the trustworthiness of a
child’s statement are: (1) the age and maturity of the child, (2) the manner in which the
statement was elicited, (3) the manner in which the statement is phrased, (4) use of terminology
unexpected of a child of similar age, (5) who initiated the examination, (6) the timing of the
examination in relation to the assault, (7) the timing of the examination in relation to the trial, (8)
the type of examination, (9) the relation of the declarant to the person identified, and (10) the
existence of or lack of motive to fabricate. Id. at 324-325.
Applying the above factors to the present case, the victim was seven years old during the
examination, and there is no indication that she was immature for her age. The doctor asked her
open-ended questions, such as why she was at the hospital and what happened to her that day, as
well as asking her whether any ejaculation, intercourse, or oral intercourse had occurred. As
such, her statements were not elicited in a manner that would undermine her credibility. People
v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 281; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). Moreover, the manner in which
her statements were phrased and her terminology indicate that she was not coached into making
the statements. She used terms such as “private part,” “thing,” and “peepee,” rather than proper
terms for human anatomy. In addition, her negative responses to the doctor’s questions regarding
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ejaculation, intercourse, and oral intercourse indicate that she probably did not understand those
terms and that her statements were not induced by an adult. Meeboer, supra at 324-325;
McElhaney, supra at 280-282.
Furthermore, the victim’s father initiated the examination by taking her to the hospital
immediately after leaving the police station. Although a police detective told the victim’s father
to take her to the hospital, there is no indication that the purpose of the examination was for any
reason other than concern for her health. The examination was not conducted to gather evidence
to support defendant’s arrest because he was arrested based solely on the detective’s discussion
with the victim and her father. The examination occurred within hours after the victim’s father
observed defendant with the victim and nearly eleven months before trial. The victim’s
statements were given during a physical examination as opposed to a psychological examination,
and her relation to defendant negates the possibility of misidentification. In addition, defendant
acknowledged that he did not know of any motive that either the victim or her father would have
to fabricate their story. Meeboer, supra at 324-325; McElhaney, supra at 280-282. Therefore,
we find that the victim’s statements to the doctor were trustworthy.
Further, although defendant argues that the victim’s statements were not necessary for
treatment or diagnosis, the statements allowed the doctor to structure his examination to address
the particular harms that she claimed to have suffered. Id. at 283. In particular, the doctor
conducted an abdominal examination to ensure that no injury had occurred to her internal organs.
In addition, as recognized in Meeboer, and, here, by the trial court, identification of defendant in
the victim’s statements to the doctor was reasonably necessary considering the possibility that
she could have contracted a sexually transmitted disease during the assault. Meeboer, supra at
328-329. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly admitted the victim’s medical
records and her statements into evidence pursuant to MRE 803(4).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to ensure that the victim was
competent before allowing her to testify. The determination of the competency of a witness is
within the trial court’s discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v
Breck, 230 Mich App 450, 457; 584 NW2d 602 (1998).
Defendant contends that the trial court’s brief questioning of the victim before her
testimony was inadequate to ensure her competency to testify pursuant to MCL 600.2163; MSA
27A.2163. However, this statute was repealed before trial. Rather, MRE 601 provides that every
person is competent to testify unless a court finds that he or she does not have sufficient physical
or mental capacity or sense of obligation to testify truthfully and understandably. Therefore,
under MRE 601, a witness is presumed competent to testify. People v Flowers, 222 Mich App
732, 737; 565 NW2d 12 (1997); People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 597; 470 NW2d 478
(1991).
The victim was presumed competent to testify, and, in the absence of the statute, the trial
court was not obligated to inquire about her intelligence or sense of obligation to tell the truth.
Therefore, the presumption of competency under MRE 601 was not rebutted. Coddington, supra
at 597. Furthermore, once a trial court is satisfied regarding to a child witness’ competency, a
later showing of the child’s inability to testify truthfully reflects only on credibility, not
competency. Id.; People v Jehnsen, 183 Mich App 305, 308; 454 NW2d 250 (1990). The trial
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court instructed the jury regarding the factors to consider when weighing the credibility of a
witness, and, apparently, the jury chose to believe the victim’s testimony. Id. Therefore, the trial
court was under no obligation to strike her testimony as defendant requested and did not abuse its
discretion by allowing her to testify at trial.
On cross-appeal, the prosecutor first argues that the trial court erred by scoring zero
points, as opposed to twenty-five points, for offense variable (OV) 12. In People v Mitchell, 454
Mich 145, 175; 560 NW2d 600 (1997), our Supreme Court stated:
[B]ecause this Court’s [sentencing] guidelines do not have the force of law, a
guidelines error does not violate the law. Thus, the claim of a miscalculated
variable is not in itself a claim of legal error.
This holding was reaffirmed in People v Raby, 456 Mich 487, 496; 572 NW2d 644 (1998).
Additionally, “[t]here is no juridical basis for claims of error based on alleged misinterpretation
of the guidelines, instructions regarding how the guidelines should be applied, or misapplication
of guideline variables.” Id. at 497, quoting Mitchell, supra at 176-177.
On postsentence review, guidelines departure is relevant solely for its bearing on
the . . . claim that the sentence is disproportionate. Thus, application of the
guidelines states a cognizable claim on appeal only where (1) a factual predicate is
wholly unsupported, (2) a factual predicate is materially false, and (3) the sentence
is disproportionate.
Appellate courts are not to interpret the guidelines or to score and rescore
the variables for offenses and prior record to determine if they were correctly
applied. [Raby, supra at 497-498, quoting Mitchell, supra at 177-178.]
Thus, as our Supreme Court has clearly stated, “[a] putative error in the scoring of the sentencing
guidelines is simply not a basis upon which an appellate court can grant relief.” Raby, supra at
499.1
Here, the scoring of OV 12 is not based on a factual predicate that is wholly unsupported
or materially false. The sentencing guidelines directs the sentencing court to not score the one
penetration that forms the basis of the conviction offense in a first-degree criminal sexual
conduct case. Moreover, defendant’s sentence is not disproportionate. Because defendant’s
sentence is within the guidelines range of thirty-six to ninety-six months, it is presumptively
proportionate. People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 354-355; 408 NW2d 789 (1987). The trial court
based defendant’s sentence on the need to punish him and to protect society, and these objectives
were proper sentencing considerations. People v Rice, 235 Mich App 429, 446; 597 NW2d 843
(1999). The trial court also considered defendant’s health, his age, the fact that he had no prior
1
These statements describe sentencing principles applicable to crimes committed before January
1, 1999. MCL 769.34(1); MSA 28.1097(3.4)(1). For crimes committed on or after January 1,
1999, the new sentencing guidelines are statutory and require adherence absent substantial and
compelling reasons for departure. MCL 769.34(3); MSA 28.1097(3.4)(3).
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criminal record, and the likelihood that he would be unable to participate in a counseling
program required for parole eligibility for a lengthy period of time. The prosecutor has not
established the existence of any unusual circumstances that would render defendant’s sentence
disproportionate. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 661; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Accordingly, we
find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Lastly, the prosecutor next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
sentenced defendant by limiting the authority of the Michigan Parole Board to determine when
he should be paroled. More specifically, the prosecutor contends that the trial court erred by
sentencing defendant to a maximum sentence only eighteen months longer than his minimum
sentence because it interferes with the authority of the Michigan Parole Board to determine when
he should be paroled and under what terms.
There is no error because the sentence of thirty-six to fifty-four months comports with the
concept of indeterminate sentencing set forth in People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 690; 199 NW2d
202 (1972), where our Supreme Court held that, when an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the
minimum sentence may not exceed two-thirds of the maximum sentence. Because defendant’s
minimum sentence does not exceed two-thirds of his maximum sentence, the prosecutor’s
argument that defendant’s sentence interferes with the authority of the parole board fails.
Tanner, supra at 687-688, 690; see also People v Legree, 177 Mich App 134, 143; 441 NW2d
433 (1989); People v Leighty, 161 Mich App 565, 580-581; 411 NW2d 778 (1987). Moreover,
our Supreme Court has recognized that parole eligibility is a proper consideration when
determining a defendant’s sentence. People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 258; 562 NW2d 447
(1997); People v Merriweather, 447 Mich 799, 809-811; 527 NW2d 460 (1994).
Accordingly, the prosecutor has not identified an issue on which to conclude that
defendant’s consecutive sentences of 3 to 4 ½ years are invalid and, therefore, the sentences
cannot be set aside. MCR 6.429(A).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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