PEOPLE OF MI V AL EVANS AKA CRAIG JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 6, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214710
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-004723
AL EVANS, a/k/a CRAIG JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Talbot and J.B.Sullivan,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA
28.797, assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.484(2). He was sentenced
to five to fifteen years’ imprisonment for armed robbery, a concurrent five to fifteen years for
assault with intent to commit armed robbery, and a consecutive sentence of two years for felonyfirearm. Defendant now appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Complainant testified that, on March 31, 1998, at approximately 12:00 a.m., he stopped
on his way home from work to talk with a female who appeared to be a prostitute. She directed
him to a house, and they went into a bedroom. She left the bedroom in search of a condom, and
returned with a gun which she used to rob him of his money, keys, license, and pager. She then
directed him to walk toward the front room of the house, where defendant was standing, and
handed the gun to defendant. Defendant pointed the gun at complainant’s chest and asked if he
had anything else of value. Complainant told them that he did not, and was released.
Both defendant and the female were subsequently arrested and bound over for trial on
charges of armed robbery and felony-firearm, and defendant was also charged with assault with
intent to commit armed robbery. Prior to defendant’s trial, the now codefendant female, who had
made a statement to the police inculpating both herself and defendant, pleaded nolo contendere to
armed robbery, and was sentenced to eighteen months to ten years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s
theory at trial was that he was not the person who assisted codefendant, and complainant’s
testimony was not credible.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Defendant first argues that his right to confrontation was violated by the trial court’s
erroneous admission of codefendant’s statement under MRE 804(b)(3).1 We agree. The
admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, People v Schutte, 240 Mich App
713, 714; 613 NW2d 370 (2000), and constitutional questions are reviewed de novo. People v
Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 557; 609 NW2d 581 (2000). In determining whether a statement
against penal interest is admissible as substantive evidence against an accused other than the
declarant, the trial court must first determine whether the statement is admissible as substantive
evidence pursuant to the Michigan Rules of Evidence. People v Poole, 444 Mich 151, 157; 506
NW2d 505 (1993). Generally, a codefendant’s statement which inculpates an accomplice is
presumptively unreliable and inadmissible as substantive evidence under MRE 804(b)(3).
Schutte, supra, 717; see also Poole, supra, 151 n 8. However, if the statement is made in the
context of a narrative, at the declarant’s initiative, without prompting or inquiry, and the
statement as a whole is against the declarant’s penal interests, it may be admissible under MRE
804(b)(3). Id., citing Poole at 161; Beasley, supra, 553-554. Statements to acquaintances, family
or friends are more likely to qualify for admission than statements made while in custody. Poole,
supra, 162.
If a statement against interest which inculpates another is admissible under the rules of
evidence, the inquiry then becomes whether the statement violates the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation. Poole, supra, 162-163. The statement must either fall within
a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, or must bear adequate indicia of reliability. Schutte, supra,
718. Because Michigan does not recognize a declaration against interest as a “firmly rooted”
hearsay exception, id., we look for adequate indicia of reliability, determined on a case by case
basis. Poole, supra, at 163-164. The indicia of reliability necessary to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause may not be established by extrinsic, corroborative evidence. Id. at 164; Schutte, supra,
718. Factors favoring the admission of a statement include whether the statement was
voluntarily given, made contemporaneously with the events discussed, made to someone to
whom the declarant would speak truthfully, and made without inquiry or prompting. Poole,
supra, 165; Beasley, supra, 557. Factors favoring inadmissibility include whether the statement
was made to the police, reduces the declarant’s responsibility, was made to curry favor, or
whether declarant had a reason to lie. Poole, supra, 165; Beasley, supra, 557-558. The factors
for determining admissibility are not exclusive, and the totality of the circumstances must
indicate that the statement is sufficiently reliable to allow its admission although the defendant is
unable to cross-examine the declarant. Poole, supra, 165; Beasley, supra, 558.
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MRE 804(b)(3) provides that “[t]he following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:”
Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far
contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against
another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement [emphasis added].
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In this case, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
codefendant’s statement under MRE 804(b)(3). Schutte, supra, 714. While the statement was
against codefendant’s penal interest, it inculpated defendant and is therefore presumptively
unreliable. Schutte, supra, 717. Further, the statement was not made on codefendant’s own
initiative without inquiry or prompting, but rather was a custodial statement given in response to
questions from a police officer. Accordingly, the statement should not have been admitted as
substantive evidence pursuant to MRE 804(b)(3). For many of the same reasons, we conclude
that the admission of the statement was also violative of defendant’s right to confrontation.
Beasley, supra, 557. Additionally, while codefendant was arrested within an hour after the
commission of the crime and given her rights shortly thereafter at approximately 2:00 a.m., she
did not make the statement until 8:00 p.m., after she had spent eighteen hours in the lockup,
supporting defense counsel’s closing argument suggestion that her statement was not voluntary.
A nonstructural, preserved constitutional trial error is reviewed to determine whether the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d
130 (1999); People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 405-406; 521 NW2d 538 (1994);
People v Smith, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 209326, rel’d 12/15/2000), sl
op at 17. The party benefited by the error bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
“that there is no ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed
to the conviction.’” Anderson, supra, 406, quoting Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 23; 111 S
Ct 1246; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991).
In this case, after examining the entire record, we conclude that the trial court’s erroneous
admission of codefendant’s statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Complainant’s
testimony and identification of defendant, which was clearly believed by the jury, standing alone,
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crimes. The trial court
instructed the jury on an aiding and abetting theory of armed robbery, MCL 767.39, 750.529;
MSA 28.979, 797, pursuant to which the prosecution must show that the crime was committed,
that the defendant assisted in the commission of the crime through acts or encouragement, and
that the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal
intended its commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement. People v Turner, 213 Mich
App 558, 568; 540 NW2d 728 (1995). Complainant’s testimony established not only that
defendant assisted codefendant by receiving the gun from her, keeping it pointed at complainant
while inquiring if he had anything else and while complainant walked out the front door, but also
that defendant had knowledge that codefendant had robbed the complainant
Complainant’s testimony also proved defendant’s guilt of assault with intent to commit
armed robbery, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).
The elements of assault with intent to rob while armed are: (1) an assault with force and
violence; (2) an intent to rob or steal; and (3) the defendant’s being armed. People v Cotton, 191
Mich App 377, 391; 478 NW2d 681 (1991). Assault with intent to commit armed robbery is a
felony. MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284. The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant
possess a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. People v Avant,
235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). In short, even without the admission of
codefendant’s statement (which, we note, added nothing to the primary issue of identity), the
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prosecution can prove all the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and reversal is
not warranted.
Defendant next argues he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor intimidated
codefendant into not testifying so that her statement could be introduced as substantive evidence
under MRE 804(b)(3) rather than merely for impeachment purposes. We disagree. A trial
court’s decision regarding a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, People v
Crear, 242 Mich App 158, 167; 618 NW2d 91 (2000), and its rulings on a motion to suppress
evidence are reviewed de novo. People v Marsack, 231 Mich App 364, 372; 586 NW2d 234
(1998). The burden is on the prosecution to show that a witness’ refusal to testify was not due to
the prosecution’s intentional or negligent conduct. People v McIntosh, 142 Mich App 314, 327328; 370 NW2d 337, aff’d in part 422 Mich 951 (1985). Issues of credibility are left to the trier
of fact. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 341; 584 NW2d 336 (1998).
At the evidentiary hearing following remand from this Court, the prosecutor testified that
she told codefendant, in a conversational tone of voice, that codefendant would be questioned
regarding the contents of her statement if codefendant testified. The prosecutor did not threaten
codefendant with additional charges or attempt to intimidate codefendant. Codefendant testified
that she was threatened and intimidated by the prosecutor into not testifying. The trial court
found that codefendant was not credible. Since this Court defers to the trial court on credibility
issues, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion
for new trial.
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because of inaccurate scoring
of the guidelines. We disagree. Defendant’s failure to object waives appellate review of this
issue. See, People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 129; 605 NW2d 28 (1999); MCR 6.429(C). In any
event, there is no juridical basis for claims of error based on alleged misinterpretation or
misapplication of guideline variables. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 176-177; 560 NW2d
600 (1997); People v Winters, 225 Mich App 718, 729-730; 571 NW2d 764 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
Judge Talbot concurs in the result, and additionally would find no error in the admission
of codefendant’s statement under MRE 804(3)(b).
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