ANGELL & COSTOPOULOS PC V SOUTHFIELD DATA PROCESSING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANGELL & COSTOPOULOS, P.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
SOUTHFIELD DATA PROCESSING, INC., and
JIM RICHARDSON,
No. 215540
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 92-211122-CH
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an amended judgment dismissing its case against
defendants for unpaid rent. We affirm.
This case was originally brought by plaintiff to recover rent from defendants, Southfield
Data Processing, Inc. (SDP) and Jim Richardson as personal guarantor of SDP’s lease.
Defendants argued that the lease could not be enforced because it was barred by the statute of
frauds, MCL 566.108; MSA 26.908; MCL 566.132(1)(b); MSA 26.922(1)(b).
Following a one-day bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff, on
October 8, 1993, after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties had a valid,
enforceable agreement. Defendant Richardson appealed, and on September 20, 1996, this Court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Angell & Costopoulos, Inc v Southfield Data
Processing, Inc, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued 9/20/96 (Docket
No. 171527). In so doing, this Court directed the trial court to use the clear and convincing
standard of proof to determine whether a contract was in existence between the parties. If the
clear and convincing standard was not met by plaintiff, the trial court was directed to consider
whether promissory or equitable estoppel barred the statute of frauds defense. On remand, the
trial court found that plaintiff did not establish the existence of a contract by clear and convincing
evidence nor were the elements of estoppel met. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the case.
In this appeal, plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the case
against defendants because there was clear and convincing evidence establishing an existence of
an enforceable contract. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in finding that
there was not clear and convincing evidence that defendant Richardson signed the alleged lease
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agreement and therefore the trial court erred in vacating its original judgment and dismissing the
case. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to vacate a judgment and dismiss a case for an
abuse of discretion. Heugel v Heugel, 237 Mich App 471, 478; 603 NW2d 121 (1999).
Both John Angell and Andrew Costopoulos testified that a lease agreement existed.
Costopolous testified that he prepared a lease that took effect on April 1, 1990, was for a threeyear term, and testified that the lease was signed by all parties. Richardson, however, testified
that the parties never reached an agreement and that the lease was shown to him after he moved
into the premises on March 31, 1990. Richardson never signed the lease, although he did pay
$1,200 a month until October 1990. Plaintiff also introduced an unsigned contract that
purportedly was an exact copy of the parties’ three-year lease.
In Zander v Ogihara, 213 Mich App 438, 444; 540 NW2d 702 (1995), this Court held
that extrinsic or parol evidence must be clear and convincing to prove an alleged signature of a
lost contract. In Zander, the defendant denied signing the lease in question, while the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant had signed the lease, and the plaintiffs offered no other parol or
extrinsic evidence to corroborate their testimony.
Plaintiff contends that Zander is distinguishable from the present case because, here,
plaintiff presented other evidence that corroborated the testimony of Angell and Costopoulos
such as the unsigned lease, the fact that defendants paid monthly rent of $1,200, and evidence of
the two previous leases. It is true that plaintiff presented some additional evidence; however, the
trial court concluded that this evidence did not constitute clear and convincing proof of the
existence of an enforceable contract. The trial court’s reliance on Zander was proper and we find
no basis for overturning the trial court’s decision that the evidence was not clear and convincing
to find that there was a valid and enforceable lease.
Plaintiff’s second issue on appeal is that even if the evidence did not rise to the clear and
convincing standard, promissory estoppel should apply.
The elements of promissory or equitable estoppel are:
(1) a promise; (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce
action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee; (3) which
in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature; and (4) in circumstances
such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided. [Schipani v
Ford Motor Co, 102 Mich App 606, 612-613; 302 NW2d 307 (1981).]
Applying these elements, the trial court determined that plaintiff failed to establish the first
element, a promise by the defendant to lease the premises for three years at $1,200 per month.
After reviewing the record, it is clear that the only direct evidence that defendant agreed to the
three-year lease was the testimony of Costopoulos and Angell. While defendant did move into
the premises in April 1990 and paid the rent until October of 1990, this does not establish a
promise on defendant’s part to enter into a three-year lease; it simply indicates that defendant
rented the office space for the months in question. This is consistent with defendant’s testimony
that no lease had been entered into and that he was simply a month-to-month tenant.
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Accordingly, the trial court’s factual determination that no promise existed between the
two parties for a three-year lease is not clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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