PEOPLE OF MI V JERYL GWINNER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214703
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-000842
JERYL GWINNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Talbot and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, MCL
750.321; MSA 28.553, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the
manslaughter conviction, and to a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his statement to the
police where he remained silent during his ride to the police station following the initial reading
of his rights after his arrest. Defendant maintains that such silence constituted an invocation of
his rights, precluding the police from later questioning defendant. We disagree. The Fifth
Amendment is not self-executing. See, generally, Minnesota v Murphy, 465 US 420; 104 S Ct
1136; 79 L Ed 2d 409 (1984). The police are not required to cease questioning a suspect merely
because, upon reflection, the suspect’s conduct might be construed to amount to an assertion of
his rights. Unless the suspect expressly makes an assertion of his rights, the police are under no
obligation to terminate questioning. See Davis v United States, 512 US 452, 459-461; 114 S Ct
2350; 129 L Ed 2d 362 (1994); People v Granderson, 212 Mich App 673, 677-678; 538 NW2d
471 (1995); People v Catey, 135 Mich App 714, 722-726; 356 NW2d 241 (1984).
Defendant also maintains that his statement to the police should have been suppressed as
involuntary because he lacked the necessary intelligence and experience to be able waive his
rights and to read and comprehend the assertions contained in the statement prepared by the
police. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that defendant possessed the
requisite knowledge, education and experience to be able to understand his rights, and sufficient
reading ability to verify that the assertions in the statement were accurate. According deference
to the trial court’s superior ability to weigh the factual evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s
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determination was not clearly erroneous. People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752;
609 NW2d 822 (2000); People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 543; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of careless, reckless or negligent use of a firearm resulting in death. MCL
752.861; MSA 28.436(22). Because the uncontested facts adduced at trial established that the
firing of the weapon by the defendant was intentional, the trial court properly refused the
requested instruction. People v Cummings, 458 Mich 877; 585 NW2d 299 (1998).
Lastly, defendant argues that his ten to fifteen year sentence is disproportionate in light of
the offense and the offender, especially where it exceeded the minimum guidelines’
recommended range of two to seven years and was the maximum sentence allowable by law. We
disagree. We review a trial court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. People v
Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 98; 617 NW2d 721 (2000). An abuse of discretion will be found
where the sentence imposed violates that principle of proportionality. People v Milbourn, 435
Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). The “key test of proportionality is not whether [the
sentence] departs from or adheres to the guidelines’ recommended range, but whether it reflects
the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Id. at 660-661.
In this case, the trial court articulated several aggravating factors which justified its
decision to depart from the recommended minimum guidelines’ range. Contrary to defendant’s
contention, the fact that the offense involved a situation in which defendant was selling drugs and
that defendant killed the victim with an assault rifle were not considered or adequately weighed
by the guidelines for voluntary manslaughter. People v Coulter (After Remand), 205 Mich App
453, 456; 517 NW2d 827 (1994). The court also properly considered evidence that the shooting
occurred at a hospital sometime after the original struggle at defendant’s house, which suggested
that defendant had a reasonable time to “cool off.” “Although a trial court may not make an
independent finding of guilt with respect to a crime for which a defendant has been acquitted and
then sentence the defendant on the basis of that finding, the court in fashioning an appropriate
sentence may consider the evidence offered at trial, including other criminal activities established
even though the defendant was acquitted of the charges.” People v Compagnari, 233 Mich App
233, 236; 590 NW2d 302 (1998) (citations omitted); People v Purcell, 174 Mich App 126, 130131; 435 NW2d 782 (1989) (where there is record support that a greater offense has been
committed by a preponderance of the evidence, it may constitute an aggravating factor to be
considered by the trial court at sentencing without an admission of guilt by defendant). After a
thorough review of the record and the trial court’s stated reasons for departure, we conclude that
the minimum sentence imposed was proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense
and the offender. Further, the maximum fifteen-year sentence did not exceed that authorized by
our Legislature. MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
sentencing discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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