BRANSON M COULTER V GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS INTL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BRANSON M. COULTER and DONALD R.
LARSON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 214432
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 97-001618-CZ
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL UNION and GRAPHIC
COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL
UNION LOCAL 289M,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants. We affirm.
Plaintiffs, nonunion replacement workers, were hired by Tweddle Litho Co. (Tweddle) as
press operators. Before they began working, representatives of Graphic Communications
International Union (Union) and its Local 289M met with Tweddle’s representatives. At this
meeting, a Union official allegedly implied that if Tweddle hired plaintiffs, it would have
problems in upcoming contract negotiations with the Union. Tweddle subsequently rescinded its
employment offers to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought suit in state court alleging intentional
interference with business relations. Defendants moved for summary disposition, and the trial
court granted the motion on the basis that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the
conduct at issue was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 USC 151 et
seq.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition
because their claim was not preempted by the NLRA. We disagree. We review de novo a trial
court’s decision to grant a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456
Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(4) alleging a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we must determine
whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact.
-1-
Manning v Amerman, 229 Mich App 608, 610; 582 NW2d 539 (1998). Whether a court has
subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Steiner School v Ann Arbor Twp, 237 Mich App
721, 730; 605 NW2d 18 (1999).
The NLRA vests the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with the primary authority
to interpret and apply labor statutes and regulations. 29 USC 160; San Diego Bldg Trades
Council v Garmon, 359 US 236, 242-243; 79 S Ct 773; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959). In most cases, the
NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over such issues. Garmon, supra; Union of Operating
Engineers v Jones, 460 US 669, 680-681; 103 S Ct 1453; 75 L Ed 2d 368 (1983). The NLRA
will preempt state action in every instance except where the state’s regulation is peripheral to the
Act or where the regulated conduct involves “interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility” that it could not be inferred that Congress deprived the state of the power to act.
Garmon, supra at 243-244.
According to the NLRA, it is an unfair labor practice:
(1) “to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3),”1 29 USC 158(b)(2),
(2) “to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 1572 of this title,” 29 USC 158(b)(1)(A), or,
(3) “to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is . . . .
forcing or requiring any person to . . . . cease doing business with any other
person.” 29 USC 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
In this case, plaintiffs alleged that they suffered adverse employment action as a result of
defendants’ intentional interference with Tweddle’s decision to hire them. Specifically, plaintiffs
claimed that the Union representative’s statements were veiled threats to Tweddle that, if it hired
1
29 USC 158(a)(3) provides, in part, that “[i]t shall be unfair labor practice for an employer . . . .
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . .”
2
29 USC 157 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
-2-
plaintiffs, the Union would make things difficult during upcoming contract negotiations. If
plaintiffs’ allegations are true, defendants’ actions would have violated the above cited
provisions of the NLRA and the NLRB would have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.
Further, we find no evidence in this case that would lead to the conclusion that the Garmon
preemption doctrine should not apply here. Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional interference with
business relations is not “peripheral” to the NLRA because several provisions of the Act directly
address the conduct at issue. Further, plaintiffs failed to establish how their claim is so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility that the state was not divested of its power to act.
For these reasons, we conclude that plaintiffs’ cause of action was preempted by the
NLRA, and the court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition on the
basis that it lacked jurisdiction.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.