PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN GRADY HARDMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 221311
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 98-091065-FC
STEVEN GRADY HARDMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Zahra and B.B. MacKenzie*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1); MSA 28.788(2)(1), and first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2); MSA 28.305(a)(2). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 25 to
40 years’ imprisonment for the CSC I conviction and 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the home
invasion conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial because he was handcuffed and in
belly chains during jury voir dire. A decision to shackle a defendant during court proceedings is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion under a totality of the circumstances. People v Dixon, 217
Mich App 400, 404-405; 552 NW2d 663 (1996). Such action by the trial court generally is not
permitted absent a record that establishes the defendant was prone to escape, could possibly
injure other persons inside the courtroom, or that such action was necessary to maintain an
orderly trial. See People v Dunn, 446 Mich 409, 425-426; 521 NW2d 255 (1994).
Defendant asserts that inasmuch as the record lacks support as to any of the foregoing
circumstances, his conviction must be reversed. We disagree. Any deficiencies of the record in
relation to this matter result from defendant’s failure to raise an objection to his alleged
shackling. Therefore, we decline to afford defendant the requested relief. See People v
Solomon(Amended Opinion), 220 Mich App 527, 531-532; 560 NW2d 651 (1996).
II
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during the course of
closing arguments. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s argument. Therefore,
defendant must show a plain error that affected substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 761-764, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). We cannot reverse a conviction on the basis of a
forfeited error unless the defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
Defendant claims that the prosecutor mischaracterized testimony, which she later used to
impeach the credibility of defendant and bolster that of the complainant. We conclude that
defendant has not shown plain error. The trial court explicitly instructed that the attorneys'
statements and arguments are not evidence. Any prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s
comments that was not cured by the trial court’s general instruction, could have been cured by
additional cautionary instructions had such instructions been requested by defendant. See People
v Crawford, 187 Mich App 344, 354; 467 NW2d 818 (1991).
Moreover, we do not share defendant’s characterization of the prosecutor’s statement
concerning the importance of the DNA evidence in establishing witness credibility as
impermissible vouching for the testimony of the complainant. The challenged remark in this
case was not a statement as to the prosecutor’s personal belief in the credibility of the
complainant, but rather a statement that the facts and evidence demonstrated the witness was
credible. See People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). We therefore
find no error in the challenged statement.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the sympathies of jurors by
stating during her rebuttal closing argument that the complainant was being “violated” a second
time as a result of the trial process. Defendant further argues that the prosecutor denied him a
fair trial when she urged the jurors to reward the complainant’s efforts in testifying at trial by
returning a verdict of guilty. Arguments which are little more than an appeal to the jury's
sympathy for the victim are improper. People v Swartz, 171 Mich App 364, 372-373; 429 NW2d
905 (1988). A prosecutor's closing argument must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of
defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial. People v
Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 353-354; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). However, otherwise improper
prosecutorial remarks might not require reversal if they address issues raised by defense counsel.
People v Simon, 174 Mich App 649, 655; 436 NW2d 695 (1989).
Here, a portion of the prosecutor’s argument cited by defendant was a response to defense
counsel’s attack, during his own closing statement, on the credibility of the complainant’s
version of the assault. Specifically, counsel for defendant argued that the complainant engaged
in consensual intercourse with defendant in her boyfriend’s room, but that when defendant
passed out and she was unable to awaken him so that he could leave, she fabricated the rape
claim in order to avoid having her infidelity discovered should her boyfriend return home before
she was able to remove defendant from the bedroom. In making the challenged remarks, the
prosecutor was arguing simply that in light of all that the complainant had been required to
endure in order to bring her testimony to the jury, counsel’s theory that her version of events had
been fabricated to avoid her boyfriend discovering that she had been unfaithful, was itself not
credible.
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To the extent that the remainder of the prosecutor’s remarks in this regard were improper,
we conclude that they were not so inflammatory that a curative instruction would not have
prevented prejudice to defendant. Crawford, supra. A timely requested curative instruction
would have averted any resulting prejudice. See Swartz, supra at 372-373 (finding that a request
of the jury not to forget that the victim had to “bare her soul,” although improper, could have
been cured by timely objection and instruction).
III
Defendant next argues that the provisions of the criminal sexual conduct statute under
which he was charged, MCL 750.520b(1)(c); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(c) and MCL 750.520b(1)(e);
MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e), are unconstitutionally vague. Under the Michigan and United States
Constitutions, this Court reviews de novo a claim that a statute is void-for-vagueness. People v
Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 484; 552 NW2d 493 (1996). A statute may be
challenged for vagueness on three grounds: “(1) it does not provide fair notice of the conduct
proscribed; (2) it confers on the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine
whether an offense has been committed; and (3) its coverage is overly broad and impinges on
First Amendment freedoms.” Id.
Defendant argues that the CSC I statute is overly broad because it allows a person to be
convicted of criminal sexual conduct for engaging in consensual sexual penetration with a legally
consenting adult, thereby impinging on that person’s right of free association as guaranteed by
the First Amendment.
The CSC I statute provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she
engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following
circumstances exists:
***
(c) Sexual penetration occurs under circumstances involving the commission of
any other felony.
***
(e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner
to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon. [MCL 750.520b(1)(c)
and (e); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(c) and (e).]
Statutes are presumed constitutional and are so construed unless their unconstitutionality is
clearly apparent. People v Wilson, 230 Mich App 590, 593-594; 585 NW2d 24 (1998). In order
for a statute to be found unconstitutionally overbroad, its overbreadth must be real and
substantial as judged in relation to the legitimate sweep of the challenged law. People v Jensen
(On Remand), 231 Mich App 439, 444; 586 NW2d 748 (1998). This Court has long held that
consent to an act of sexual penetration is a defense to a CSC I charge. See People v Hearn, 100
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Mich App 749, 754-755; 300 NW2d 396 (1980). Thus, criminal responsibility under the
circumstances suggested by defendant simply does not exist. See, e.g., Jensen, supra at 448-449;
see also People v Khan, 80 Mich App 605, 619 n 5; 264 NW2d 360 (1978) (recognizing that the
statute “impliedly comprehends that a willing, noncoerced act of sexual intimacy or intercourse
between persons of sufficient age . . . is not criminal sexual conduct”).
We similarly reject defendant’s assertion that the statute improperly allows for unlimited
discretion in its application by not requiring a finding of moral culpability. Defendant’s
argument in this regard in premised upon the flawed notion that the statute creates an irrebuttable
presumption that innocent, consensual sexual penetration will be afforded criminal status solely
upon a showing that such penetration occurred during the commission of another felony, MCL
750.520b(1)(c); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(c), or in the presence of a weapon, MCL 750.520b(1)(e);
MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e). However, as explained above, a person charged under such circumstances
has a complete defense to the charged crime, i.e., consent, which, when proven, will implicitly
include a finding of no moral culpability on the part of the actors. Hearn, supra at 754.
Therefore, defendant’s constitutional challenge on this ground is equally without merit.
IV
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s instructions to the jury concerning the
elements of the crimes were inadequate to protect his constitutional right to due process.
Defendant did not object to the jury instructions given at trial on this basis and, therefore, has not
preserved this issue for appeal. People v Cross, 202 Mich App 138, 148; 508 NW2d 144 (1993).
This Court reviews unpreserved claims of instructional error for plain error that affected
substantial rights. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 420; 608 NW2d 502 (2000), citing
Carines, supra. We review jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether error requiring
reversal exists. People v Piper, 223 Mich App 642, 648; 567 NW2d 483 (1997). Even if
somewhat imperfect, there is no error if the instructions fairly presented the issues to be tried and
sufficiently protected defendant's rights. People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 14; 577 NW2d 179
(1998).
Defendant contends that inasmuch as the crimes of CSC I and first-degree home invasion
require proof of the other as an element of the offense, the trial court erred in failing to provide as
part of the instructions on these offenses, a complete restatement of the elements of the other.
We disagree. The court fully instructed the jury as to the elements of each of the crimes that
would have to be proven in order to support a conviction under the facts of this case. Although
the instructions as to each individual offense did not include a restatement of the elements of the
other, when viewed as a whole, the trial court’s instructions adequately informed the jury of the
law applicable to the case and protected defendant’s rights. Therefore, we conclude that no error
requiring reversal exists.
V
Last, defendant argues that he was denied his constitutional right to due process when the
trial court refused his request to instruct the jury on the defense of consent in relation to the CSC
I offense. We agree that such an instruction should have been given. Daoust, supra; see Hearn,
supra. However, we find that this error does not require reversal of defendant’s convictions.
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The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury with respect to the law applicable to the case.
MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052. “[I]nstructions must include all elements of the charged offense
and must not exclude material issues, defenses, and theories, if there is evidence to support
them.” People v Caulley, 197 Mich App 177, 184; 494 NW2d 853 (1992). In this case,
defendant himself offered evidence in support of the consent instruction when he testified that
the sex acts were mutually consented to by himself and the complainant. Moreover, that these
acts were consensual represented a large portion of defense counsel’s theory of the case as
presented to the jury during closing argument.
However, even assuming that this error is of constitutional magnitude, it does not entitle
defendant to relief because it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Anderson (After
Remand), 446 Mich 392, 404-406; 521 NW2d 538 (1994). A "nonstructural" constitutional error
that occurs during the presentation of a case to the jury does not require reversal if the reviewing
court is satisfied the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In reaching this
determination, the error is to be assessed in the context of the evidence admitted at trial, to
determine whether, absent the error, there is a “reasonable possibility” that the jury would have
acquitted. See People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 9; 604 NW2d 737 (1999).
In this case, the complainant testified at trial that while she was pregnant, defendant, who
was a stranger to her, sexually penetrated her at knife point and without consent after entering her
home uninvited during the early morning hours. Consistent with this testimony police found a
knife lying on the floor near the complainant’s bed, which neither the complainant nor her
boyfriend’s roommate could identify as belonging inside the house. The roommate also testified
that following the assault the complainant came to his room hysterically shouting that she had
just been raped, and that later that morning he noticed damage to the front door of the home
which was consistent with a break-in. In addition to this evidence, the parties stipulated to the
admission of DNA tests which found a match between defendant's blood and semen found in the
complainant’s vagina.
Defendant acknowledged that he entered the house sometime after midnight and without
permission. He testified that after finding the complainant lying in her bed, the two engaged in
an act of consensual intercourse within ten minutes of meeting each other and while the
complainant’s five-year-old nephew slept beside them. Despite these claims by defendant, we
are not convinced that when considered in the full context of the evidence presented at trial, there
is a reasonable possibility the jury would have acquitted defendant absent the trial court’s
instructional error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
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