PEOPLE OF MI V JERRY CLIFFTON RILEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 15, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219815
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-009944-FC
JERRY CLIFFTON RILEY, a/k/a JERRY
CLIFTON RILEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Zahra and B. B. MacKenzie,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); MSA 28.548(1)(a), two counts of felony murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b); MSA 28.548(1)(b), conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MSA
28.354(1), armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, four counts of assault with intent to rob
while armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, and one count each of assault with intent to murder,
MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a mandatory two year
prison term for the felony-firearm conviction, to be followed by concurrent life terms for each of
the eleven remaining convictions. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm in part, vacate in
part, and remand for modification of the judgment of sentence.
This case arises from the armed robbery of a Pittsfield Township moving and storage
business in March 1997, during which two employees, Neal Green and Duane Holder, were shot
and killed, and the owner of the business, David Pepper, was shot and suffered a traumatic brain
injury that left him paralyzed.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
Pepper’s neuropsychologist, Dr. Karen Price, to testify on rebuttal that following the shootings
she had seen defendant loitering in the hallways of St. Joseph Mercy Hospital where Pepper had
been a patient. In so arguing, defendant asserts that, because this testimony was not responsive
to evidence introduced by the defense, but rather to denials elicited by the prosecutor during
cross-examination of defendant, this testimony was not proper rebuttal and, therefore, should not
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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have been permitted by the court. Although we agree that admission of the challenged evidence
was error, we find it to be harmless.
The test of whether rebuttal evidence was properly admitted is “whether the evidence is
properly responsive to evidence introduced or a theory developed by the defendant.” People v
Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 399; 547 NW2d 673 (1996). As explained by this Court in People v
Leo, 188 Mich App 417, 422; 470 NW2d 423 (1991):
Rebuttal testimony may be used to contradict, repel, explain, or disprove evidence
presented by the other party in an attempt to weaken and impeach it. The test for
error regarding rebuttal evidence is whether it is justified by the evidence it is
offered to rebut. A prosecutor cannot elicit a denial during the cross-examination
of a defense witness and use such denial to inject a new issue into the case.
Cross-examination cannot be used to revive a right to introduce evidence that
could have been, but was not, introduced in the prosecutor's case in chief.
[Citations omitted.]
Here, we find that nothing in defendant’s direct testimony supported admission of the
challenged testimony on rebuttal; rather, his denials with respect to having been at any of the area
hospitals during the summer of 1997 came during the prosecutor’s cross-examination and were,
thus, not the proper subject of rebuttal. Nonetheless, we find the erroneous admission of Dr.
Price’s rebuttal testimony to be harmless. Although, the prosecutor inappropriately argued
during closing argument that the rebuttal testimony supported an inference that defendant had
gone to the hospital hoping to “eliminate” the witness he had left behind, this preserved
nonconstitutional error requires reversal only if it is shown that, in the context of the untainted
evidence, “it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the
error.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). After a review of the
untainted evidence admitted at trial, we find that no such probability exists.
Defendant next argues that his convictions of two counts each of first-degree
premeditated murder and felony-murder, stemming from the deaths of Duane Holder and Neal
Green, violate his right against double jeopardy. The prosecution concedes this error. The
proper treatment of such dual convictions is to draft a judgment of sentence which reflects that
the defendant has received a single conviction and sentence for each count of first-degree murder,
supported by two theories: premeditated murder and felony-murder. People v Bigelow, 229
Mich App 218, 221-222; 581 NW2d 744 (1998). Accordingly, we remand to the trial court
which shall modify defendant’s judgment of sentence consistent with the requirements of
Bigelow.
Defendant further argues, and the prosecution agrees, that defendant’s convictions and
sentences for both felony-murder and the predicate felony violate double jeopardy principles.
Defendant was charged with two counts of felony-murder involving the deaths of Neal Green and
Duane Holder with the predicate offenses being assault with intent to rob while armed. The
offense of assault with intent to rob while armed constitutes a proper predicate robbery offense
for felony-murder. MCL 750.316(1)(b); MSA 28.548(1)(b). See People v Gibson, 115 Mich
App 622; 321 NW2d 749 (1982); People v Ross, 242 Mich App 241; ___ NW2d ___ (2000)
(holding that the offense of assault with intent to commit unarmed robbery constitutes a predicate
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robbery offense for felony-murder). However, convictions and sentences for both felony-murder
and assault with intent to rob while armed violate the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy. Gibson, supra at 626-627. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s two convictions and
sentences for assault with intent to rob while armed involving victims Duane Holder and Neal
Green and remand for modification of the judgment of sentence.1
Affirmed in part and vacated in part. We remand to the trial court for amendment of the
judgment of sentence in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
1
We note that, when instructing the jury regarding the offenses of felony-murder, the trial court
misspoke in stating that the predicate offense for felony-murder was armed robbery. We decline
to attach any significance to this error given that neither party objected to the instruction and, in
any event, the error was harmless. The jury foreman, in reading the jury’s verdict, expressly
stated that the jury had found defendant guilty of armed robbery involving David Pepper and
assault with intent to rob while armed involving Neal Green and Duane Holder.
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