IN RE ZACHARY WILLIAMSON MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SHANE GRUMMET, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 5, 2000
Petitioner -Appellee,
v
No. 222229
Ionia Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 97-000197-NA
BRIDGET SPRAGUE,
Respondent -Appellant,
and
STEVEN GRUMMET,
Respondent.
In the Matter of CATERINA GRUMMET, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 222334
Ionia Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 97-000244-NA
BRIDGET SPRAGUE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
STEVEN GRUMMET,
Respondent.
-1-
In the Matter of ZACHARY WILLIAMSON,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 222335
Ionia Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 98-000134-NA
BRIDGET SPRAGUE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MICHAEL WILLIAMSON,
Respondent.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Sawyer and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This consolidated appeal comes before this Court by grant of respondent-appellant’s
applications for delayed leave to appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental
rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii), (g), and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (ii), (g), and (j).1 We affirm.
Respondent-appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her
motion for mistrial. We disagree. We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Persichini
v William Beaumont Hospital, 238 Mich App 626, 635; 607 NW2d 100 (1999), citing Schutte v
Celotex Corp, 196 Mich App 135, 142; 492 NW2d 773 (1992). While questioning a witness at
the termination hearing in the present case, the trial court indicated it believed respondentappellant was pregnant. Respondent-appellant moved for a mistrial, claiming the court made that
assumption without any evidentiary basis. In ruling on the motion, the court acknowledged that
it “came to a false conclusion in observing [respondent-appellant] through the last several days,
1
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii) only applied to Zachary, while §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j)
applied to all three children.
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that I thought perhaps she was pregnant . . . I don’t know whether she is or not, in fact.” The trial
court made no further mention of whether respondent-appellant was pregnant or whether she was
involved in a relationship directly prior to or during the termination hearing. In particular, the
trial court did not indicate that any of its factual findings or conclusions of law were based on the
belief that respondent-appellant was pregnant. Given that there is no indication the trial court’s
initial belief that respondent-appellant was pregnant affected its ultimate decision regarding
termination and given that there was substantial evidence supporting termination, the trial court’s
decision on the motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of
justice. Persichini, supra.
Respondent-appellant also argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental
rights to the children because there was not clear and convincing evidence supporting
termination. We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights under
the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 5.974(I); In re Cornet, 422 Mich 274, 277; 373 NW2d 536
(1985). A trial court’s specific findings are also reviewed for clear error. MCR 2.613(C). A
finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 455
NW2d 161 (1989). We are required to give regard to the special ability of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses before it. MCR 2.613(C); In re Miller, supra.
After reviewing the record in the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that termination was warranted under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii), (g), and (j).
The evidence suggested respondent-appellant was unable to adequately protect the children from
physical and emotional harm during times the children were in her custody. Although there was
no evidence that respondent-appellant, herself, physically harmed the children, it was apparent
that she allowed respondent Grummet to have contact with the children after Grummet admitted
he slapped Zachary and after the circumstances suggested Grummet was responsible for
Zachary’s broken leg. It was also evident that respondent-appellant allowed her boyfriend,
Joseph Lathrop, to have contact with Shane and Zachary even after she was informed of criminal
sexual conduct allegations against Lathrop. Moreover, the overwhelming evidence suggested
respondent-appellant did not benefit from services aimed, in part, at helping her to protect her
children. Respondent-appellant completed a six-session parenting class and a short stress
management class. However, FIA caseworkers and service providers testified that the children
remained at risk if returned to respondent-appellant’s care because respondent-appellant had
failed to apply the parenting skills she had been taught and failed to participate in and benefit
from other necessary services. Caseworkers who observed visits between respondent-appellant
and the children opined that respondent-appellant was unable to provide proper discipline,
structure, and consistency. There was also testimony that respondent-appellant felt she did not
need to improve her ability to protect the children and did not need the services offered by the
FIA. Testimony from the children’s foster parents and respondent Williamson suggested each of
the children was physically and socially underdeveloped when first placed in foster care.
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Additionally, two psychologists opined that respondent-appellant would not be able to
properly care for her children without years of intense therapy.2 Although respondent-appellant
engaged in some counseling and one witness testified that respondent-appellant may be able to
learn to properly care for her children within three months, we will not second guess the trial
court’s ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses before it. MCR 2.613(C); In re Miller,
supra. Evidence that respondent-appellant attempted and threatened suicide in the presence of
her children suggested she was unable to protect the children from emotionally harmful
situations. Given those circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in finding termination
appropriate.
Respondent-appellant’s arguments challenging several of the trial court’s specific
findings lack merit. There was testimony that respondent-appellant strongly resented the FIA’s
involvement in removing her children from her custody, threatened one caseworker, and did not
believe that she needed the services offered by the FIA. Therefore, it was not clear error for the
trial court to find that respondent-appellant did not want to listen to caseworkers and rejected
caseworkers. Given the substantial evidence suggesting respondent-appellant had not acquired
skills necessary to enable her to properly care for her children, the trial court also did not clearly
err in finding that respondent-appellant had not advanced toward meeting the goals of her
parent/agency treatment plan. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding
testimony regarding alleged sexual abuse the children suffered while in foster care. Even
assuming the alleged abuse hindered respondent-appellant’s relationships with the children, there
was sufficient evidence that respondent-appellant had not benefited from services aimed at
helping her implement appropriate parenting techniques and helping her improve her
psychological well-being.3 The record does not support respondent-appellant’s claim that the
trial court specifically found that she “hated” the court.
We decline to consider respondent-appellant’s constitutional challenge to § 19b(3)(j)
given that she has not cited any legal authority to support her position. An appellant may not
merely announce her position and leave it to this Court to discover or rationalize the basis for her
claims, Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998), nor may the appellant give
issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority. Goolsby v Detroit, 419
Mich 651, 655 n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984); Community National Bank v Michigan Basic
Property Ins Ass’n, 159 Mich App 510, 520-521; 407 NW2d 31 (1987); see MCR 7.212(C)(7).
Last, respondent-appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding termination was in
the children’s best interests. If a statutory ground for termination of parental rights is established,
the court must terminate parental rights unless there exists clear evidence, on the whole record,
that termination is not in the child’s best interest.
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
2
Given that evidence, we reject respondent-appellant’s claim that the trial court clearly erred in
determining that respondent-appellant could not rectify her conditions within a reasonable time.
3
We further note that respondent-appellant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the testimony.
Testimony regarding the alleged sexual abuse was introduced at a prior dispositional hearing.
Consequently, the trial court was aware of the alleged abuse and, presumably, was also aware of
the psychological trauma such abuse would likely cause.
-4-
27.3178(598.19b)(5); MCR 5.974(E)(2); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354, 364-365; ___ NW2d
___ (2000).4 It is apparent from our review of the record that respondent-appellant made
minimal improvements and that the children would likely suffer harm if returned to her care.
The trial court did not err in determining termination was in the children’s best interests.
Respondent-appellant’s argument that the trial court did not adequately consider the best interests
of each child is not supported by the record.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
4
Our Supreme Court recently clarified that § 19b(5) does not impose any additional burden of
production on a respondent parent. In re Trejo, supra at 365.
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