PEOPLE OF MI V MICHELLE A OLIVERIO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 5, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 212986
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-156800-FH
MICHELLE A. OLIVERIO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and McDonald, JJ.
HOLBROOK, JR., J. (dissenting).
The majority concludes that the “the various techniques used during the questioning in
this case” approached, but did not cross, the line between proper police procedure and improper
inducement or coercive conduct. Ante, p __. Because I believe that under the circumstances
present in this case the police did cross over that line, I respectfully dissent.
The essential question a trial or an appellate court must answer in cases such as these is
“whether the defendant’s will was overborne” at the time the defendant made the incriminating
statements. Lynumn v Illinois, 372 US 528, 534; 83 S Ct 917; 9 L Ed 2d 922 (1963). Accord
Dickerson v United States, ___ US ___; 120 S Ct 2326, 2331; 147 L Ed 2d 405 (2000). “And, of
course, whether the confession was obtained by coercion or improper inducement can be
determined only by an examination of all of the attendant circumstances.” Haynes v Washington.
373 US 503, 513; 83 S Ct 1336; 10 L Ed 2d 513 (1963).
The word “coercion” is a strong term that conjures up pictures of using actual or
threatened physical violence to brow beat a confession from a suspect. However, police
“conduct which renders a confession involuntary does not consist only of express threats so
direct as to bludgeon a defendant into failure of the will. Subtle psychological coercion suffices
as well, and at times more effectively . . . .” Jones v Cardwell, 686 F2d 754, 757 (CA 9, 1982).
Accord Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 438; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966); Townsend v
Sain, 372 US 293, 307; 83 S Ct 745; 9 L Ed 2d 770 (1963).
After reviewing the record, I conclude that the not so subtle psychological coercion
employed by the interrogating officer rendered defendant’s confession involuntary. The record
clearly indicates that defendant’s confession came only after the officer told her that she and her
family faced pervasive public disclosure of the incident if she did not confess before leaving the
-1-
police station. Defendant was told that if she did not confess, the police would question her
fellow employees at the restaurant where she and the complainant worked. She was told the
police would question “all” of her “employers,” the clear implication being that the police
investigation would not be limited to her employer at the above mentioned restaurant. She was
told that the police would “talk to all of her neighbors” and would place “an article in the paper
about this to see if anyone else comes forward.” The officer told defendant that if she did not
“come clean,” his superior might “assign[] a criminal task force” that would lead to “a lot of
people askin’ a lot of questions about you.”
Thus, defendant was presented with the following Hobson’s choice: either confess to the
crime alleged, or not confess and face public humiliation for herself, her husband, and her
children.
The coercive atmosphere was further compounded by the officer’s repeated assurances
that if she confessed, the matter could somehow be kept between defendant and the family of the
complainant. See Bram v United States, 168 US 532, 542-543; 18 S Ct 183; 42 L Ed 568 (1897),
quoting 3 Russ. Crimes (6th ed), p 478 (observing that “‘a confession, in order to be admissible, .
. . must not be . . . obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight’”). Indeed, when
defendant expressed concern on how this matter would affect her husband and her children, the
officer responded, “Well, they don’t have to know about this. All right? Like I say, we can keep
this just between you and the [complainant’s] family.” Having had no prior experience with the
criminal justice system, defendant had no reason not to believe the officer’s assurances that her
family could be protected from the psychological strain of a public airing of this public matter if
she would only confess.
The officer also deceived defendant by repeatedly telling her that the complainant had
taken and passed a lie detector test. See Miranda, supra at 453. Further, Nadine Glappa—the
woman who came with defendant to the police station and the only person defendant might have
been able to turn to during the interrogation—was not allowed to accompany her friend to what
was characterized by the police just routine questioning. Then, when Glappa asked whether she
should call either a lawyer or defendant’s husband, Glappa was assured that this would not be
necessary. Blackburn v Alabama, 361 US 199, 208; 80 S Ct 274; 4 L Ed 2d 242 (1960)
(observing that “the absence of . . . friends, relatives, or legal counsel” is a factor to be
considered when considering the voluntariness of a confession). While such conduct alone
would not be enough to support the conclusion that the statements were involuntary, they were
not isolated occurrences in the case at hand.
The record also clearly indicates that at the time of the interrogation, defendant was under
extreme emotional distress. The interrogating officer admitted that he was fully aware of
defendant’s precarious emotional state. Further, while the fact that defendant was told that she
was free to leave is important, it is not decisive. United States v Eccles, 859 F2d 1357, 1361 (CA
9, 1988) (observing that “even those defendants who are free to leave may be exposed to
coercion sufficient to keep their confession from being” voluntary). In the case at hand, the fact
that defendant was told that she was free to leave was tempered by the threat that if she did, she
and her family would certainly face far-reaching public humiliation.
-2-
Under these circumstances, I conclude that defendant’s will was overborne, rendering her
subsequent confession involuntary. Accordingly, I believe that the trial court erred in failing to
suppress defendant’s statement. Finding this error not to be harmless, I would reverse
defendant’s conviction and sentence.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.