IN RE ADAMS & LEISGANG MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of AA, MA, AA, JL, AL, KL, and GL,
Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 227142
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 93-033900-NA
TAMMY ADAMS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Talbot and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Tammy Adams appeals by right from the family court’s order terminating her
parental rights to seven minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (“[t]he parent was a
respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the
issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . .
. [that] the conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable
likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s
age”), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) (“[t]he parent, without regard to
intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation
that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time
considering the child’s age”).
This Court reviews for clear error a family court’s finding that a statutory basis for
termination has been met. MCR 5.974(I); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Once a statutory basis has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, see
MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3), the court must terminate parental rights unless
the court finds that termination is clearly not in the best interests of the child. MCL
712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); Trejo, supra at 344, 355. A family court’s finding on
the best interests prong is also reviewed by this Court for clear error. Trejo, supra at 356-357,
365.
-1-
Respondent argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence overall to justify terminating
her parental rights, and (2) because petitioner sought termination based on circumstances new or
different from those listed in the original petition, petitioner was obligated to use legally
admissible evidence to prove that termination was warranted. See MCR 5.974(E)(1).
Respondent contends that she received ineffective assistance from her trial attorney, and that
reversal is warranted, because the attorney failed to object to the hearsay evidence from the
children that supported the termination of respondent’s rights.
We disagree that there was insufficient evidence to justify termination and that the
performance of respondent’s trial attorney warrants reversal in this case. Indeed, even
disregarding any possible hearsay, the evidence supporting termination was strong. First, a social
worker testified that respondent acknowledged that she knew about physical and emotional
neglect perpetrated by a primary caregiver of the children and that she did nothing to protect the
children. This constituted an admission by a party opponent and was therefore admissible
evidence. See MRE 801(d)(2). The social worker also testified that (1) respondent failed to
obtain a driver’s license even though she was asked to do so in order to live more independently;
(2) during respondent’s first visitation with the children, “it was clear that the children were very
angry with their mom;” (3) respondent was oblivious to fights among the children during visits;
(4) respondent and the children were not bonded; (5) each child had special emotional needs that
respondent could not meet; (6) the behavior of each of the children improved after visitation with
respondent ceased; (7) respondent never sought to reinitiate visitation with the children or to
improve her compliance with the parent-agency agreement in order to get her children back; (8)
respondent had difficulty showing empathy for her children; and (9) respondent had moved from
abusive relationship to abusive relationship and had trouble living independently. There was no
indication that any of this testimony was hearsay.
Moreover, a different therapist testified that (1) the children’s attendance in counseling
improved drastically since they entered foster care; (2) certain of the children needed intensive
therapy; (3) respondent was not aware of the children’s needs and how to address them; (4) there
was a connection between respondent’s poor parenting skills and the children’s poor mental
health, because respondent was not providing them with the help they needed; and (5) respondent
had not demonstrated an ability to live independently and had a tendency to gravitate toward
unhealthy relationships that put her children at risk. Again, there was no indication that any of
this testimony was hearsay.
In light of the aforementioned, non-hearsay evidence, the trial court did not clearly err in
concluding that respondent could not adequately care for her children and that termination under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) was therefore warranted and in the best
interests of the children.1 Moreover, the non-hearsay evidence supporting termination was
sufficiently strong that the attorney’s failure to object to the hearsay testimony elicited could not
reasonably have affected the outcome of the case. See People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 6241
Because only one statutory basis is required in order to terminate parental rights, see Trejo,
supra at 360, we need not decide whether termination was also proper under the additional
grounds cited by the court.
-2-
625; 601 NW2d 393 (1999) (setting forth standard for ineffective assistance of counsel).
Accordingly, reversal is unwarranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.