PEOPLE OF MI V LYLE ANDREW DROGULA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 221260
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 97-009146-FH
LYLE ANDREW DROGULA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Murphy and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Lyle Andrew Drogula appeals as of right from his convictions of false report
of a felony, MCL 750.411a(1)(b); MSA 25.643(1)(b), and insurance fraud, MCL 500.4511(1);
MSA 24.14511(1), following a two-day jury trial in Cass Circuit Court. We affirm.
Defendant argues his counsel was ineffective when he failed to move for a directed
verdict of acquittal because the information alleged that the crimes had occurred “on or about
6/6/96” and, defendant contends, the prosecution had not proven defendant guilty of committing
the offenses on that date. We disagree.
Allegations pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel must first be heard by the trial
court to establish a record of the facts pertaining to such allegations. People v Ginther, 390 Mich
436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). In cases such as this, where a Ginther hearing has not been
held, review by this Court is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Price, 214
Mich App 538, 547; 543 NW2d 49 (1995).
To establish that the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel was so
undermined that it justifies reversal of an otherwise valid conviction, this Court must find that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and the
representation so prejudiced the defendant as to deny him a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446
Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
The information alleged that “on or about 6/6/96” defendant made a false report of a
felony contrary to MCL 750.411a(1)(b); MSA 25.643(1)(b), and presented a fraudulent insurance
claim, contrary to MCL 500.4511(1); MSA 24.14511(1). Defendant does not argue that he had
inadequate notice to defend against the charges. In fact, defendant indicates in his brief, “the
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prosecution presented evidence that over one month before the defendant made a false report of a
felony.” Similarly, defendant indicates that “Gary Koch testified that the alleged false claim was
submitted on April 24, 1996,” and that the “supporting documentation was submitted on June 17,
1996.” In so stating, defendant concedes that there was evidence presented at trial showing
defendant committed the crimes, just not “on or about 6/6/96” as the information alleges.
It is well established that a defendant is, within reasonable bounds, required to take notice
that the prosecution may offer proof of a date for the offense charged other than that expressly
alleged in the information. People v Smith, 58 Mich App 76, 90; 227 NW2d 233 (1975). A time
variance contained in an information is permissible unless time is an element of the offense or of
the essence of the offense. People v Miller, 165 Mich App 32, 46; 418 NW2d 668 (1987),
remanded on other grounds 434 Mich 915; 456 NW2d 235 (1990); People v Bowyer, 108 Mich
App 517, 523; 310 NW2d 445 (1981).
Time is not an element of the crime of false report of a felony, MCL 750.411a(1)(b);
MSA 25.643(1)(b), or insurance fraud, MCL 500.4511(1); MSA 24.14511(1). Therefore, the
time variance contained in the information is not grounds for reversal.
Furthermore, MCL 767.45(1)(b); MSA 28.985(1)(b) requires only that the information
contain the “time of the offense as near as may be” and also provides that “[n]o variance as to
time shall be fatal unless time is of the essence of the offense.” The proper inquiry is whether the
information sufficiently apprised defendant of the charges against him. See People v Mast, 126
Mich App 658, 661-662; 337 NW2d 619 (1983).
Defendant does not claim that he received inadequate notice to defend against the
charges. There was no confusion regarding which insurance claim defendant had instigated or
regarding which snowmobile was allegedly stolen. There was only one insurance claim, one
allegedly stolen snowmobile, one occurrence in which defendant’s father’s garage was allegedly
broken into, and one false police report filed. Defendant’s argument is purely technical and is
without merit, as he was sufficiently apprised of the charges against him.
Because the substance of defendant’s claim is without merit and any argument in support
of a motion for directed verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence which relied on the “on or
about 6/6/96” language in the information should have necessarily failed, counsel was not
ineffective for failing to argue it. Counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position.
People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). Accordingly, defendant’s first
ineffective assistance claim fails.
Next, defendant argues that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to a police
detective’s testimony regarding what defendant’s father had told the detective during a meeting
that occurred in preparation for the preliminary examination, which defendant subsequently
waived.
The detective’s testimony regarding what defendant’s father had told him previously
about his son’s admission was admissible for the purpose of impeaching defendant’s father’s
credibility under MRE 607 and 613, which allow the use of a witness’ prior inconsistent
statement to impeach that witness. The court twice instructed the jury that the testimony was to
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be used for impeachment purposes only, and was not to be taken as substantive evidence—once
in the context of the father’s testimony and once in the context of the general jury instructions.
Therefore, the detective’s testimony was properly admitted.
Counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position. Snider, supra at 425.
Accordingly, defendant’s second ineffective assistance of counsel claim also fails.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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