IN RE NOOM & JOHNSTONE MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DN, CN, and JJ, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 28, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 226781
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-001089-NA
KATHLEEN ASH,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Collins, P.J., and Jansen and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Kathleen Ash appeals as of right challenging the family court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her three1 sons, DN, CN, and JJ, pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g). We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
The original petition, as amended at the preliminary hearing on October 12, 1998, made
four allegations. First, Ash had a long history of chronically neglecting her children and had
misrepresented her circumstances to Family Independence Agency staff. Second, she left the
three boys in a park without food or supervision for six hours while she visited her husband in
the hospital. Third, on August 24, 1998, Ash and the children were homeless and, at that time,
she was arrested on an outstanding warrant for an unspecified offense. Fourth, at the time of the
hearing, Ash remained in jail and continued to refuse to sign a voluntary placement form for her
sons.
1
Ash’s fourth son, an infant, passed away in February 1998. Although the reason for his death is
not clear, there are no allegations that he died because of abuse or neglect.
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Ash admitted to the allegations in the petition. Although she did not give any great detail
to the circumstances described in the petition, she noted that she believed that the children had
adequate supervision at the time she left them in the park. She also said that she had refused to
sign the temporary placement forms because she had not been given an opportunity to read them.
She had two “options,” presumably living arrangements, but could not follow through with either
option because she was jailed. The family court found a sufficient factual basis to accept Ash’s
plea.
After a short break in the proceedings, the family court held a dispositional hearing at
which time it endorsed the preexisting foster arrangement for the three boys; DN and CN were
living with their paternal aunt and uncle. It is not clear whether JJ was living in a different foster
home. The original parent/agency agreement between Ash and Bethany Christian Services
(BCS) required Ash to find suitable housing, obtain employment, undergo a substance abuse
assessment and psychological evaluation, attend parenting classes and counseling, and visit her
children as well as her BCS caseworker on a regular basis.
Ash made inconsistent progress under the parent/agency agreement. She attended
supervised visitation, parenting classes, and counseling. The boys displayed their affection for
their mother during visitations and Ash had improved her ability to redirect them when they
misbehaved; however, Ash sometimes had problems following through with discipline. Kara
Van Drie, a BCS caseworker, reported that Ash did not open up in counseling in a way that
allowed the professionals to assess whether she had made significant progress. Ash had
expressed some concern over how to deal with CN’s behavioral problems but had not exhibited
progress in parenting techniques that gave Van Drie confidence in her ability to parent the
children. Urine and hair analysis as well as breathalyzer tests confirmed that Ash was not using
alcohol or drugs. Still, Van Dire suggested that Ash attend Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics
Anonymous so that she would strengthen her coping mechanisms and not resort to drug or
alcohol use if she was stressed. Ash did not attend AA or NA because she did not think it was
necessary. Van Drie continued to be concerned about the choices Ash made about having many
men in her life.
As for her housing and employment, two factors that played a large role in FIA’s decision
to file the petition in this case, Ash made intermittent – but not permanent – progress. Although
her need to use public transportation limited her options for work hours, Ash originally found a
job working at Toys R Us as a customer service representative in fall 1998. Her employer
thought she had improved and had no complaints as of the March 1999 dispositional review
hearing. Additionally, by that time, she had been in the same apartment for 2½ months, had
resolved a rent dispute with her landlord, and was working to furnish the apartment.
Ash lost this apartment in May 1999 because she could not pay her rent, having lost her
job at Toys R Us after a viral illness. Although her former boss at Toys R Us said that she might
be able to have her old job if she brought in a doctor’s note explaining the illness, she did not
follow through with that offer. Ash claimed that she had given her former boss medical
documentation concerning her illness, but she did not dispute that she had failed to follow up on
being reinstated to her job at Toys R Us. At this time, she was living with a friend and had
applied to Kindred, a housing assistance program, where she was on a waiting list.
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By the June 1999 dispositional review hearing, Ash had secured a job working two days
each week at a laundromat while she looked for a job at variety of stores, including K-Mart, Big
Lots, and Wal-Mart. Although she lost her job at the laundromat after less than a month, Ash
found a job working twenty to thirty hours each week at K-Mart in August 1999.
As of the September 1999 dispositional review hearing, Van Drie and Ash estimated that
she would be able to find housing through the Kindred program by around October 1, 1999.
However, even if Ash did find housing through Kindred, she would not be allowed to have her
children live with her until she had been in the apartment for six months according to Kindred’s
rules. At this hearing, Van Drie recommended terminating Ash’s parental rights because she had
failed to maintain stable housing and employment, the children had been in foster care for a year,
and she had not “internalized” the lessons taught in her parenting classes. She did not render an
opinion on whether termination was in the children’s best interests, but she did say that returning
DN and JJ to Ash would be risky for their emotional and physical well-being. Don Lappinga,
CN’s caseworker, thought that CN’s psychiatric problems made returning him to his mother’s
custody unwise because it would be difficult for her to offer the support he needed. Ash said that
she was still in poor health, but her doctors expected her to be completely healthy by December
1999. She said that she was willing to do whatever was necessary to regain custody and
explained that some of her problems with her parenting classes were due to miscommunication;
she thought she was working on significant goals with her sons while the instructors thought she
should be determining and working on new goals. In response to Van Drie’s concern about her
relationships with men, she said that most of her friends were male and, with the exception of a
single night, she had not had a physical relationship with any of these men. The family court
ordered termination proceedings after this hearing.
The termination petition, filed on November 15, 1999, restated the allegations in the
original petition, summarized Ash’s problems with securing housing and employment, and noted
insufficient progress in her therapy and parenting classes. At the termination hearing in January
2000, Gayle Robbert-Voogt, a social worker at BCS, said that she had met with Ash in
November 1999. At that time, Ash said that she had been in the Kindred program for only a few
weeks and had several months before her children could join her in her subsidized apartment.
Robbert-Voogt was concerned about the number of gifts and the type of food Ash brought her
boys during visits, as well as two situations in which Ash encouraged the children not to tell the
truth about small gifts she had given them. Still, Robbert-Voogt generally thought Ash was
“appropriate” during these visits and was able to adjust her behavior as needed. Sometime
between November 1999 and January 2000, Ash began experiencing problems paying her rent,
apparently because she injured her hand and could not work as much. Robbert-Voogt
recommending terminating Ash’s parental rights because she would not be able to have her
children live with her in any reasonably short period of time and the boys were showing signs of
stress from their temporary foster care placements.
Ash said that her work hours had been cut because of her injury but also because there
was less work available after the Christmas seasons. She estimated that she would be in the
Kindred program for twelve to eighteen months and, other than problems with rent, she was on
schedule with her program goals and benefiting greatly. Also, she had just found a way to catch
up with her rent payments by giving the program her next paycheck and relying on a gift of $150
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from a friend. She admitted that she was behind in rent partly because she gave her boys
Christmas gifts. She explained that she told the boys not to tell others about some small gifts that
she had given them because, ordinarily, her gifts were thrown away. She added that she thought
that she handled the children well and she was concerned about keeping them together because
the boys offered support to each other. She reported that the boys liked being with her. Ash
stressed that she had complied with all the conditions BCS had imposed in her case and that the
remaining problems in her situation, such as an inconsistent source of income, were not her fault.
Although she agreed that she could seem distant at times during her therapy sessions, she
explained that it was her coping mechanism.
The family court subsequently issued a written order and opinion terminating Ash’s
parental rights. After summarizing the allegations in the petitions filed in this case, the family
court gave an overview of Robbert-Voogt’s testimony and conclusion that termination was in the
boys’ best interests. The family court did not make any independent findings of fact. Rather, it
adopted Robbert-Voogt’s findings as its own. The family court concluded that there was clear
and convincing evidence to terminate Ash’s parental rights under subsection (c)(i) and (g) and
that termination was in the children’s best interests because there is a “legislative mandate for
permanency . . . .”
II. Standard Of Review
This Court reviews all aspects of a family court’s decision to terminate parental rights for
clear error.2
III. The Termination Decision
Preliminarily, we note that the family court articulated two separate legal bases to
terminate Ash’s parental rights: failure to correct conditions leading to the adjudication and
failure to provide proper care and custody. On appeal, Ash does not dispute the family court’s
decision to terminate her parental rights for failing to provide proper care and custody. This
alone would be reason to affirm the family court’s decision because it need only find one reason
to support termination.3
Regardless of this alternative ground for affirming, the family court properly concluded
that there was clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to adjudication had not
been rectified by the time of the termination proceedings and that they were not likely to be cured
within a reasonable time given the children’s ages. Although Ash correctly notes that the
Kindred program had provided her with some stability in her housing situation by October 1999,
she conceded that she continued to have problems with having a steady income and that the
children would not be able to live with her in her subsidized housing for several months.
Robbert-Voogt also testified that the children were showing signs of stress from their temporary
2
In re Huisman, 230 Mich App 372, 384; 584 NW2d 349 (1998), rejected on other grounds by
In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353, n 10; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
3
See In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993).
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foster placements, which underscored why time was of the essence in this case. Ash had
received FIA assistance even before this cases was opened and she also had fifteen months in
which to prove that she could secure housing and employment that would no longer put her
children at risk of being homeless. While it is fair to say that not every problem she encountered
during this fifteen month period was her fault, by January 2000 she had not demonstrated that her
living situation was sufficiently secure that she would be able to have her sons live with her in
any reasonable amount of time given their special needs. There simply is no basis from which to
conclude that the family court erred in terminating Ash’s parental rights on this basis.
IV. Best Interests
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5) states that a family court “shall order
termination of parental rights” if it finds clear and convincing evidence to terminate. In other
words, termination is mandatory once the court finds evidence of at least one statutory ground to
terminate parental rights. See In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 450-451; 592 NW2d 751 (1999).
Only if the family court finds evidence on the record as a whole that termination is not in the
child’s best interests can it refuse to terminate parental rights. See Trejo, supra at 353-354. In
this case, the family court affirmatively stated that termination was in the children’s best
interests, which Ash now disputes.
There is evidence on the record to support Ash’s argument that she and her sons loved
each other and had a bond. For instance, Van Drie and Robbert-Voogt reported that Ash was
good with the children during visits. The concern Ash showed for her children through her
testimony demonstrated her affection for her sons. Moreover, no one ever disputed that they had
a bond. Still, the children had pressing emotional needs that were not fully met because they
were in foster care and not a permanent home. Lappinga even testified that he thought it would
be unwise to return CN to Ash’s custody because of the depth of CN’s problems. Given Ash’s
inability to provide any of the children with a stable home in any certain amount of time, much
less a reasonable amount of time given the children’s ages, it is impossible to say that the family
court clearly erred when it concluded that termination was in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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