DOUGLAS E. NOWLIN V MICHIGAN AUTOMOTIVE COMPRESSOR INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DOUGLAS E. NOWLIN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 14, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN AUTOMOTIVE COMPRESSOR,
INC.,
No. 219045
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 98-089573-CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
DOUGLAS E. NOWLIN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
MICHIGAN AUTOMOTIVE COMPRESSOR,
INC.,
No. 219107
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 98-089573-CZ
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases arising from the same lower court case, plaintiff appeals as of
right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s claim of
discrimination based on disability. Defendant appeals as of right the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion to compel payment of expert witness fees. We affirm the trial court’s grant
of summary disposition, but reverse and remand with regard to expert witness fees.
This case arises from plaintiff’s claim that his employer, defendant Michigan Automotive
Compressor, Inc., discriminated against him based on a disability because it would not allow
plaintiff to change from the night-shift to the day-shift. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that
defendant violated the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA
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3.550(101) et seq.,1 by directly or constructively discharging him based on his disability and by
refusing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability.
In Docket No. 219045, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary
disposition in favor of defendant because 1) defendant failed to identify the grounds on which it
based its motion for summary disposition; 2) the motion was granted prematurely where
discovery was not completed; and 3) genuine issues of material fact remain concerning whether
plaintiff was disabled.
We review a trial court’s grant of summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); Russell v Dep’t of Corrections, 234
Mich App 135, 136; 592 NW2d 125 (1999). Motions under MCR 2.116(C)(10) test whether
there is factual support for the plaintiff’s claim. Spiek, supra. This Court must review the record
in the same manner as the circuit court to determine whether the movant was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998).
The court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions and other evidence
submitted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a genuine
issue of any material fact exists to warrant trial. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120;
597 NW2d 817 (1999).
Plaintiff first claims that the trial court should have denied summary disposition because
defendant failed to state the grounds on which the motion was based. This argument is without
merit because it was apparent from the motion and brief that the motion was pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Tumbarella v The Kroger Co, 85 Mich App 482, 488-489; 271 NW2d 284 (1978).
Even so, defendant corrected this oversight in its reply brief in support of its motion for summary
disposition, and thus the trial court did not err in deciding defendant’s motion for summary
disposition despite defendant’s initial oversight.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant’s motion for summary disposition should have been
denied as premature because defendant filed this motion before the close of discovery. “‘As a
general rule, summary disposition is premature if granted before discovery on a disputed issue is
complete.’ ‘However, summary disposition may be proper before discovery is complete where
further discovery does not stand a fair chance of uncovering factual support for the position of
the party opposing the motion.’” Village of Dimondale v Grable, 240 Mich App 553, 566; ___
NW2d ___ (2000) (citations omitted). A party opposing a motion for summary disposition on
the ground that discovery is incomplete “must at least assert that a dispute does indeed exist and
support that allegation by some independent evidence.” Bellows v Delaware McDonald’s Corp,
206 Mich App 555, 561; 522 NW2d 707 (1994). A party may show that a grant of summary
1
Although the parties refer to and use terminology in the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights
Act (MHCRA), plaintiff filed this action after the Legislature amended the act in March 1998,
which resulted in changes both to the name of the act and to some of the nomenclature in the act
without changing the substantive language of the act. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the
act under its new name, the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), and to the
new terminology in the amended act.
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disposition would be premature through an affidavit pursuant to MCR 2.116(H). Hyde v Univ of
Mich Bd of Regents, 226 Mich App 511, 519; 575 NW2d 36 (1997).
In the present case, the trial court did not err in deciding defendant’s motion for summary
disposition before discovery was complete. Plaintiff failed to show additional discovery would
uncover factual support on the issue of whether plaintiff is disabled. Plaintiff produced no
affidavit pursuant to MCR 2.116(H), nor asserted that additional testimony or evidence would
show that plaintiff is disabled under the PWDCRA. Hence, we find no error.
Next, plaintiff argues that genuine issues of material fact remain concerning whether
plaintiff was disabled. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the PWDCRA, a
plaintiff must show (1) that he is disabled as defined by the PWDCRA, (2) that the disability is
unrelated to his ability to perform the duties of a particular job, and (3) that he was discriminated
against in one of the ways described in the statute. Chiles v Machine Shop, Inc, 238 Mich App
462, 473; 606 NW2d 398 (1999); Lown v JJ Eaton Place, 235 Mich App 721, 727; 598 NW2d
633 (1999). As relevant herein, the PWDCRA defines a “disability” as:
A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which
may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional
disorder, if the characteristic:
(A) . . . substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that
individual and is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a
particular job or position or substantially limits 1 or more of the major life
activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual's qualifications for
employment or promotion. [MCL 37.1103(d)(i)(A); MSA 3.550(103)(d)(i)(A).]
This Court has noted that the United States Supreme Court’s test for determining whether a
plaintiff has a disability under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), 42 USC § 12101 et seq,
“tracks closely the language found in the PWDCRA definition of a disability and is thus
reasonably well-suited for determining the existence of a disability under the PWDCRA.”
Chiles, supra at 474-475. The Supreme Court explained:
First, we consider whether respondent's [complaint] was a physical impairment.
Second, we identify the life activity upon which respondent relies ... and
determine whether it constitutes a major life activity under the ADA. Third, tying
the two statutory phrases together, we ask whether the impairment substantially
limited the major life activity. [Bragdon v Abbott, 524 US 624, 631; 118 S Ct
2196; 141 L Ed 2d 540 (1998).]
Under the third prong, it is not enough for an impairment to affect a major life activity; rather, the
plaintiff must proffer evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that such activity
is substantially limited. Chiles, supra at 479. Because of definitional similarities between the
PWDCRA and the ADA, it is appropriate to look at the ADA and cases interpreting the ADA for
guidance in determining “substantially limits” and “major life activities.” Stevens v Inland
Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212, 217; 559 NW2d 61 (1996). A court must examine a plaintiff’s
impairment as it exists with the benefit of medication when deciding whether the impairment
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constitutes a disability. Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593, 605-607; 580 NW2d 817
(1998).
In the present case, plaintiff argues that his physical impairments, consisting of attention
deficit disorder (ADD) and dysthymic disorder, constitute disabilities and could support a jury
finding that plaintiff “suffers from a substantially limiting [disability] while medicated.”
However, plaintiff testified that, with the benefit of medication, he has no problems with many
major life activities, including performing manual tasks and caring for himself. The problems he
stated that he continued to experience even while medicated included minor problems with
learning, punctuality, cleaning up things at home and sleeping. Because plaintiff was not
substantially limited by these problems more than an average person, his impairment does not
rise to the level of a disability under the PWDCRA. See Price v National Bd of Examiners, 966
F Supp 419, 427-428 (SD W Va, 1997) (holding that students who suffered from ADD were not
disabled when the evidence failed to show that the students could not learn as well as the average
person). The evidence, including plaintiff’s own deposition, reveals that plaintiff was performing
his job in a satisfactory manner, with the benefit of medication, and his condition did not
substantially limit his job performance any more than an average person’s.2 Blackston v WarnerLambert Co, ___ F Supp ___ (ND Ala, 2000). Moreover, the record reveals that plaintiff is not
precluded from performing a broad range of jobs. Stevens, supra at 218. In sum, the trial court’s
grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant was proper.
In Docket Number 219107, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied
defendant’s motion to compel payment of expert witness fees pursuant to MCR
2.302(B)(4)(c)(i). We agree. The facts and circumstances leading to this error are as follows.
After litigation commenced, plaintiff deposed defendant’s expert, David J. Forsythe,
M.D., P.C. Plaintiff noticed the deposition pursuant to MCR 2.306 as a lay witness deposition,
including a $6.00 check for witness fees. By letter, defendant’s attorney informed plaintiff’s
attorney that Dr. Forsythe’s charge for the deposition would be $400 per hour. Later, in
defendant’s responses to plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories, defendant identified Dr. Forsythe
as an expert that it may call at trial. In another letter, defendant again informed plaintiff’s
attorney of Dr. Forsythe’s fee for the deposition and, in response, plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter
explaining that defendant was obligated to pay Dr. Forsythe’s fee because defendant noticed his
deposition as that of a lay witness. At the outset of the deposition, plaintiff’s attorney expressly
stated that Dr. Forsythe had been identified as an expert and would be called at trial by defendant.
Days later, defendant filed a preliminary witness list identifying Dr. Forsythe as a psychiatric
expert.
At the hearing on defendant’s motion to compel, plaintiff claimed that because he did not
depose Dr. Forsythe as an expert witness, plaintiff was not obligated to pay expert witness fees to
2
To the extent that plaintiff relies on affidavits to support his claim of disability, these affidavits
cannot create an issue of fact. The affidavits contradict clear evidence presented during
plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which was given well before the affidavits were produced.
Palazzola v Karmazin Products Corp, 223 Mich App 141, 155; 565 NW2d 868 (1997).
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him. Plaintiff argued that Dr. Forsythe admitted during the deposition that he had not met with
defendant’s attorney before the time of the deposition, that Dr. Forsythe did not know what the
case was concerning, and that he had not formed expert opinions after the lawsuit was filed.
Finding that Dr. Forsythe was not an expert on the basis that Dr. Forsythe was unaware of the
nature of the case during the deposition, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel fees.
This appeal ensued.
This issue entails a review of the trial court’s findings of fact and interpretation of a court
rule. A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. MCR 2.613(C); Cipri v
Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc, 235 Mich App 1, 8; 596 NW2d 620 (1999). “A finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 9. This Court reviews the interpretation of
a court rule de novo as a question of law. In re Contempt of United Stationers Supply Co, 239
Mich App 496, 501; 608 NW2d 105 (2000). When interpreting court rules, the same basic
principles governing statutory interpretation apply. Bush v Mobil Oil Corp, 223 Mich App 222,
226; 565 NW2d 921 (1997). “A court rule should be construed in accordance with the ordinary
and approved usage of its language in light of the purpose the rule seeks to accomplish.” Id.
To obtain payment of witness fees for an expert, a party must provide evidence that the
witness was an expert. See Michigan Nat’l Bank v Mudgett, 178 Mich App 677, 682; 444 NW2d
534 (1989). A witness qualified as an expert based on his or her knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise. MRE 702. An expert
is permitted to base his or her opinion on the facts or data perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. MRE 703.
Defendant hired Dr. Forsythe before any litigation commenced to give his opinions
concerning plaintiff’s medical condition. A review of Dr. Forsythe’s deposition testimony
reveals that plaintiff asked Dr. Forsythe’s opinion beyond what the doctor had already reported in
his letters to defendant. Plaintiff asked the doctor about his opinions and conclusions regarding
plaintiff’s medical condition and his ability to work. Thus, the record reveals that despite the
deposition being noticed as a lay witness deposition, plaintiff deposed Dr. Forsythe as an expert,
not merely as a lay witness. Although plaintiff claims on appeal that the decision to notice the
deposition pursuant to MCR 2.306(A) and (B) as a lay witness deposition was unrelated to
defendant’s decision to list Dr. Forsythe as an expert witness, it is not opposing counsel’s role to
dictate the status of an opposing party’s witness. MCR 2.302(B)(4)(a)(ii) provides that a “[a]
party may take the deposition of a person whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial.” [Emphasis supplied.] Because defendant identified Dr. Forsythe as its expert
and because plaintiff clearly solicited expert opinions from the doctor during his deposition, we
find that the trial court clearly erred in finding that Dr. Forsythe was not an expert.
Having determined that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Dr. Forsythe was
not an expert witness, we look to MCR 2.302, which covers the scope of discovery, to determine
whether plaintiff was required to pay Dr. Forsythe’s deposition fee.
MCR 2.302 provides in relevant part:
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(4) Trial Preparation; Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions
held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subrule (B)(1) and
acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained
only as follows:
***
(a)(ii) A party may take the deposition of a person whom the other party
expects to call as an expert witness at trial.
***
(c) Unless manifest injustice would result
(i) the court shall require that the party seeking discovery under
subrules (B)(4)(a)(ii) or (iii) or (B)(4)(b) pay the expert a reasonable fee
for time spent in a deposition, but not including preparation time . . . .
Because Dr. Forsythe was an expert, plaintiff was required to pay the expert a reasonable fee for
his time spent in deposition unless manifest injustice would result. Id. Thus, we remand to the
trial court for a determination as to whether manifest injustice would result if plaintiff were
ordered to pay Dr. Forsythe’s deposition fee and, if no manifest injustice would result, to
determine if Dr. Forsythe’s requested fee is reasonable and for entry of an order requiring
plaintiff to pay Dr. Forsythe the reasonable fee decided by the court.
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part for further action consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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