PEOPLE OF MI V DENNIS GEORGE CLIFFORD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 3, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220750
St. Joseph Circuit Court
LC No. 98-009483-FC
DENNIS GEORGE CLIFFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277,
larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592, larceny of a firearm, MCL 750.357b; MSA
28.589(2), carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, committing a felony while in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and possession of marijuana, MCL
333.7403(2)(d); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(d). Defendant was sentenced as a second habitual offender,
MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to a term of 4 to 6 years’ imprisonment for the felonious assault
conviction, 5 to 7½ years’ imprisonment for the larceny of a firearm conviction, 5 to 7½ years’
imprisonment for the carrying a concealed weapon conviction, 2 years’ imprisonment for the felony
firearm conviction, and to time already served for the larceny in a building and possession of marijuana
convictions. We affirm.
This case arises from an incident in which defendant fired several shots in the direction of Scott
Reynolds and Jack Wetzel when defendant realized that Reynolds and Wetzel were watching him
burglarize Gerald Timar’s house. At trial, defendant claimed that he was not shooting at Reynolds and
Wetzel, but instead was firing at a dirt mound in order to disarm the guns. Defendant further claimed
that he was not burglarizing Timar’s house because he had Timar’s consent to enter his house.
I.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to read certain requested instructions
to the jury. We disagree.
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At trial, defense counsel requested that the trial court read the following standard criminal jury
instructions: CJI2d 11.23, intentionally pointing a firearm without malice; CJI2d 11.24, discharge of a
firearm while intentionally aimed without malice; CJI2d 17.4, mitigating circumstances; and CJI2d
25.2b, second-degree home invasion—breaking and entering. Intentionally pointing a firearm without
malice, MCL 750.233; MSA 28.430, and discharge of a firearm while intentionally aimed without
malice, MCL 750.234; MSA 28.431, are misdemeanors, whereas second-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a; MSA 28.305(a), is a felony.
We analyze a trial court’s refusal to read lesser included felony offense instructions under the
test set forth in People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379, 390; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), which requires that
a trial court instruct the jury regarding a cognate lesser included felony if the evidence could support a
conviction of that felony. However, we analyze a trial court’s refusal to read lesser misdemeanor
offense instructions under the framework first enunciated in People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252; 330
NW2d 675 (1982), in which our Supreme Court adopted a rational basis test for lesser misdemeanor
offense instructions. People v Steele, 429 Mich 13, 20; 412 NW2d 206 (1987).
A.
We first address defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly refused to give the requested
lesser misdemeanor offense instructions. The decision to grant or deny a requested lesser included
misdemeanor instruction will be reversed on appeal only upon a finding of an abuse of discretion.
Stephens, supra, 265. A trial court should grant a request to read a lesser misdemeanor offense
instruction if the following conditions are met: (1) the party must inform the court of exactly what lesser
offenses are being requested; (2) an “appropriate relationship” must exist between the charged offense
and the requested misdemeanor; (3) the requested misdemeanor must be supported by a rational view
of the evidence at trial; (4) if the prosecutor requests the instruction, the defendant must have adequate
notice of it as one of the charges against which he may have to defend; and (5) the requested instruction
must not result in undue confusion or injustice. Steele, supra, 208-210.
Here, the third condition was not satisfied. The trial court correctly refused to read the two
requested misdemeanor instructions – intentionally pointing a firearm without malice and discharge of a
firearm while intentionally aimed without malice – because the requested misdemeanors were not
supported by a rational view of the evidence adduced at trial. Stephens, supra, 262-263. The
testimony of Wetzel and Reynolds indicated that defendant pointed the gun at them after yelling at them
in an angry manner because they were watching his activities at Timar’s house. Defendant testified that
he never pointed his guns at the victims. If the jury believed Wetzel’s and Reynolds’ testimony, it could
only conclude that defendant pointed the gun with malice. If the jury believed defendant's testimony, it
could only conclude that defendant did not point the gun at the victims at all. There was no evidence
from which the jury could conclude that defendant pointed the gun at the victims without malice. Thus,
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the trial court properly determined that a rational view of the evidence adduced at trial would not
support a conviction of either misdemeanor.1
B.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to give the lesser included felony
offense instruction for second-degree home invasion. A trial court must give a requested instruction on
a lesser included felony if the evidence could support a conviction of the lesser felony. See Steele,
supra, 20; Ora Jones, supra, 390. Here, the trial court explained that it refused to give either second
degree home invasion instruction2 because the instruction for first-degree home invasion was more
appropriate. Unlike second-degree home invasion, under the facts of this case, a conviction of first
degree home invasion required that the prosecutor prove that defendant was armed with a dangerous
weapon. There was no dispute that defendant possessed a firearm when he was leaving Timar’s house.
Where the only difference between first-degree home invasion and second-degree home invasion is that
first-degree home invasion requires proof that the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon,
while second-degree home invasion does not, and where there was no dispute that defendant was
armed with a dangerous weapon when he entered Timar’s home, the trial court did not err in refusing
defendant's request for an instruction regarding second-degree home invasion.3
C.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on mitigating
circumstances for the assault with intent to murder count. Michigan Criminal Jury Instruction 17.4
instructs the jury that a defendant can be convicted of assault with intent to commit murder only if he
would have been guilty of murder had the person he assaulted actually died. If the circumstances of the
assault would have reduced the charge to manslaughter had the assault victim died, the defendant is not
guilty of assault with intent to commit murder. See CJI2d 17.4. Here, the trial court refused to instruct
the jury regarding mitigating circumstances, concluding that being detected while committing a burglary is
not a legally recognized state of provocation that would have reduced the charge from murder to
manslaughter had one of the assault victims died. Moreover, where defendant never introduced
evidence or made any arguments to indicate that he committed assault with intent to murder under
justifiable or mitigating circumstances but, rather, emphatically denied committing the crime altogether,
the requested instructed was not warranted by the evidence. We therefore conclude that the trial court
did not err in refusing to instruct the jury regarding mitigating circumstances.
II.
1
We note that upon defendant’s request, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the
lesser offenses of felonious assault and reckless use of a firearm.
2
CJI2d 25.2b addresses “breaking and entering.”
permission.”
3
CJI2d 25.2d addresses “entering without
The trial court did, however, read defendant’s requested instruction for the lesser offense of larceny in
a building.
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Next, defendant argues that the trial court’s questioning of Reynolds deprived him of a fair trial.
We disagree. We review the entire record to determine if the trial court abused its wide discretion and
power in matters of trial conduct. People v Cole, 349 Mich 175, 199-200; 84 NW2d 711 (1957). A
trial court’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial impartiality where its conduct or comments unduly
influence the jury and thereby deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. People v Paquette,
214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
“A trial court has wide, but not unlimited, discretion and power in the matter of trial conduct.”
Id. “The principal limitation on a trial court’s discretion over matters of trial conduct is that its actions
not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality.” People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50; 549 NW2d 1
(1996). The trial court’s questions must be limited in scope, material to the issues in the case, and
posed in a neutral manner. Id. at 51; People v Piscunere, 26 Mich App 52, 56; 181 NW2d 782
(1970). The fact that testimony elicited by a trial court’s questions damaged a defendant’s case does
not demonstrate that the trial court improperly assumed the role of surrogate prosecutor. Davis, supra
at 51. “As long as the questions would be appropriate if asked by either party and, further, do not give
the appearance of partiality, we believe that a trial court is free to ask questions of witnesses that assist
in the search for truth.” Id. at 52.
Defendant argues that the trial court assumed the role of the prosecutor by eliciting testimony
from Reynolds that had not previously been raised by the parties at trial, and that the testimony formed
the basis for the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for a directed verdict with respect the assault
with intent to commit murder charge. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court should not have
asked Reynolds why he believed that defendant was shooting at him. Reynolds gave the following
response: “The tone of his voice, and then the shots fired. And we found some saplings out there with
holes in them.” We find no error in the trial court’s conduct. A trial court may question witnesses in
order to clarify testimony or elicit additional relevant information. MRE 614(b); People v Conyers,
194 Mich App 395, 404; 487 NW2d 787 (1992). The trial court in the instant case was attempting to
clarify Reynolds’ direct-examination testimony that he was afraid because defendant was shooting at
him.
Moreover, a review of the transcript reveals no indication that the trial court’s questioning of
Reynolds caused the jury to be prejudiced against defendant. The court’s questions were confined to
clearing up ambiguities in the testimony elicited on direct-examination. Specifically, the court asked
Reynolds to explain his basis for testifying that he believed that defendant had shot at him, thereby
eliciting testimony that Reynolds was at the location of the shooting several days later and noticed that
certain saplings had bullet holes in them. Accordingly, the questions regarding Reynolds’ belief that
defendant was shooting at him were relevant to issues in dispute and were intended to clarify those
issues. Furthermore, the transcript indicates that the testimony that formed the basis of the court’s
decision to deny the motion for a directed verdict was elicited by the prosecutor before the court
questioned Reynolds. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not pierce the veil of judicial
impartiality by questioning Reynolds.
III.
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Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence regarding
a prior altercation between defendant and Timar. We disagree. The admissibility of bad acts evidence
is within the trial court’s discretion and will be reversed on appeal only when there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). An abuse of
discretion exists only when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted,
would say that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made. People v Rice (On Remand),
235 Mich App 429, 439; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is excluded, except as allowed by MRE 404(b), to
avoid the danger of conviction based on a defendant’s history of misconduct. People v Starr, 457
Mich 490, 495; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). MRE 404(b)(1) provides that
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme,
plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident
when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are
contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.
To be admissible under MRE 404(b), bad acts evidence must satisfy three requirements: (1)
the proponent of the evidence must offer the evidence for a proper purpose (i.e., a purpose other than
establishing the defendant’s character to show his propensity to commit the offense); (2) the prosecutor
must establish relevance; and (3) the probative value of the bad acts evidence must not be substantially
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. Crawford, supra, 385; Starr, supra, 496; People v
VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), modified 445 Mich 1205; 520 NW2d 338
(1994). Upon request, the trial court must provide a limiting instruction as to the use of the bad acts
evidence regardless of whether the evidence was introduced by the prosecutor or the defendant. Id. at
74-75.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Timar and Bowers to
testify that defendant assaulted Timar with a firearm during an argument on the day before defendant
burglarized Timar’s house and assaulted Wetzel and Reynolds with a firearm. The prosecutor argued,
and the trial court agreed, that the testimony of Timar and Bowers was admissible to show whether
defendant legitimately believed that he had Timar’s consent to enter Timar’s premises or whether
defendant had the intent to commit a felony when he entered the premises. We conclude that the
prosecutor articulated a proper purpose for the evidence.
Defendant further argues that the testimony of Timar and Bowers “lacked relevance to proving
the elements of the charged offenses.” To prove first-degree home invasion, the prosecution was
required to prove that defendant entered Timar’s home with the intent to commit a felony, larceny, or an
assault, or that defendant entered Timar’s home without permission. MCL 750.110a(2); MSA
28.305(a)(2). As already noted, the evidence at issue was relevant to whether defendant legitimately
believed that he had permission to enter Timar’s property and to whether he had the intent to commit a
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felony when he entered the property. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was relevant to proving
the first-degree home invasion charge.
Finally, we must determine whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. “Prejudice inures when marginally probative evidence
would be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” Rice, supra at 441. Here, the trial court
noted that with respect to the first-degree home invasion count, it was unlikely that the jury would
confuse defendant’s intent to steal and his character trait for viciousness. The trial court further stated
the following:
I acknowledge that there is the possibility of unfair prejudice but it is not such that it
outweighs the probative value of the evidence which I consider to be quite strong. In
other words, no reasonable man, if they did what the defendant has claimed to have
done, could honestly believe that he had the right to enter.
We agree and conclude that the probative value of the challenged evidence was not substantially
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the testimony of Timar and Bowers to attack defendant’s theory that he had Timar’s consent
to enter Timar’s premises.
IV.
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of
possession of marijuana. We disagree. To determine whether defendant's conviction for possession of
marijuana was supported by sufficient evidence we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748
(1992), modified 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
The crime of possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(d),
requires the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly or intentionally
possessed marijuana. People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 515; 583 NW2d 199 (1998).
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to justify his conviction for possession of marijuana
because the prosecutor failed to scientifically substantiate that the green, leafy substance that Chief
Michael L. Ochampaugh retrieved from defendant’s pocket was actually marijuana. However, in
addition to the testimony of Trooper Thayer and Chief Ochampaugh that defendant told them the
substance was marijuana, Trooper Thayer testified that, although he did not field test the substance that
Chief Ochampaugh retrieved from defendant while placing defendant in custody, he suspected that the
substance was marijuana based upon the appearance of the substance and his training and experience
as a police officer. Chief Ochampaugh also testified that during his twenty-seven years as a police
officer, he had seen “quite a lot” of marijuana, and that he had identified the previously admitted
substance as marijuana.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational
trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution proved the essential elements of
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possession of marijuana. Therefore, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict
defendant of possession of marijuana.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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