PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT EUGENE COUSINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 25, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 218472
Huron Circuit Court
LC No. 97-003939-FH
ROBERT EUGENE COUSINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Sawyer and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty, but mentally ill, of first-degree home
invasion, MCL 750.110a(2)(b); MSA 28.305(a)(2)(b), assault with intent to commit criminal sexual
conduct involving sexual penetration, MCL 750.520g; MSA 28.788(7), first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(c); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(c), and second-degree criminal sexual conduct,
MCL 750.520c(1)(c); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(c). Defendant was sentenced to ten to twenty years’
imprisonment for the home invasion conviction, five to ten years’ imprisonment for the assault
conviction, fifteen to forty years’ imprisonment for the first-degree CSC conviction, and ten to fifteen
years’ imprisonment for the second-degree CSC conviction. Defendant appeals by leave granted, and
we affirm, but remand to the trial court to vacate defendant’s conviction for assault with intent to commit
criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration.
On April 24, 1997, the victim was at home at 10:30 a.m. when she observed a septic truck
back into her driveway. Defendant got out of the vehicle and came to the door. Defendant stated that
there were reports of gurgling noises in the septic lines. The victim indicated that she had not heard any
noise in the lines. Defendant grabbed the door and forced his way into the victim’s home. Defendant
grabbed the victim and attempted to remove her pants. The two struggled, and defendant began to
strike the victim harder and more frequently. He pulled at her hair and choked her. Defendant forced
the victim to engage in sexual acts. He then asked for hot water and food. When defendant entered the
bathroom, the victim fled from the home. The victim and her daughter were able to describe the vehicle
driven by defendant. Defendant was seen driving from the victim’s home at a high rate of speed. A
neighbor attempted to slow defendant down and followed defendant’s vehicle for a time. Defendant
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ultimately parked his vehicle behind a structure and slept. He was apprehended by police when found
in his truck sleeping.
At trial, defendant asserted that he was insane at the time of the offenses. Family members
reported that he had been previously hospitalized for his erratic behavior and religious interests.
Although defendant was prescribed medication, his family did not believe that he had been taking the
medication as prescribed. Defendant’s ex-wife testified that his behavior was a contributing factor to
their divorce. Additionally, Dr. Kenneth Bertram testified on behalf of defendant. However, he could
not conclusively opine that defendant was insane at the time of the offenses. A forensic evaluation by
Dr. Judith Thompson was also submitted to the court. Dr. Thompson concluded that, despite mental
illness, defendant did not meet the statutory criteria for legal insanity. The trial court found defendant
guilty, but mentally ill, of all charges.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that defendant was criminally
responsible when the evidence demonstrated that defendant was “psychotic and mentally ill” at the time
of the offenses. We disagree. Questions of law and questions of the application of law to the facts
receive de novo review. People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 269 n 7; 547 NW2d 280 (1996).
However, a trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. Review
of the forensic evaluations reveals that Dr. Bertram could not conclude that defendant was insane at the
time that he committed the crimes. Furthermore, Dr. Thompson concluded that defendant did not meet
the criteria for insanity. While the evidence indicated that defendant did suffer from mental illness, his
conduct on the day of the offenses was purposeful. He lied to the victim regarding the condition of her
septic tank, then forced his way into the victim’s home where he sexually assaulted her. Defendant then
left the scene at a high rate of speed, despite being chased by a neighbor, and found a hidden place to
sleep. When apprehended defendant denied that any sexual act had occurred, but later told police that
the victim “wanted” him. We cannot conclude that the trial court’s factual findings were clearly
erroneous. Barrera, supra. Defendant’s contention, that the facts clearly demonstrated insanity, is
without merit.
Defendant next argues that his convictions for assault with intent to commit sexual penetration
and second-degree criminal sexual conduct violate double jeopardy. We agree. The Legislature may
authorize penalties for what otherwise would be the same offense, and cumulative punishment for the
same conduct does not necessarily violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. People v Lugo,
214 Mich App 699, 706; 542 NW2d 921 (1995). The key inquiry is whether the Legislature intended
to impose cumulative punishment for similar crimes. We consider whether the statute prohibits conduct
violative of a social norm district from the norm protected by the other, the amount of punishment
authorized by each statute, whether the statutes are hierarchical or cumulative, and other facts
demonstrating legislative intent. Id. The two statutes in question are hierarchical in structure and take
into account aggravating factors in the commission of sexual assault. People v Campbell, 165 Mich
App 1, 7; 418 NW2d 404 (1987). Therefore, we vacate the assault with intent to commit sexual
penetration conviction. Id.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in scoring OV 7 at five points and that the trial
court’s bias influenced sentencing. We disagree. “Appellate courts are not to interpret the guidelines or
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to score and rescore the variables for offenses and prior record to determine if they were correctly
applied.” People v Raby, 456 Mich 487, 498; 572 NW2d 644 (1998). In any event, we note that the
removal of the five points has no impact on the offense variable scoring. Defendant’s claim of bias
cannot prevail because of his failure to preserve this issue for appellate review by moving for
disqualification as required by MCR 2.003(C)(1). People v Mixon, 170 Mich App 508, 514; 429
NW2d 197 (1988), modified 433 Mich 852 (1989).
Affirmed and remanded to the trial court to vacate defendant’s conviction for assault with intent
to commit criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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