IN RE DEVON CHANCE KIDDON MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DEVON CHANCE KIDDON,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 21, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
DAVID EDWARD KIDDON,
No. 221410
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 81-227043
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LISA GAINES,
Respondent.
Before: White, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from a family court order terminating his parental rights
to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g) and
(j). We affirm.
We initially note that termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) was improper because respondent had nothing to do with the conditions that
led to the original proceedings. The original proceedings involved the mother’s use of drugs during her
pregnancy and the fact that the child tested positive for heroin at birth. Nevertheless, MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) and (j) did apply.
The testimony adduced at trial established that respondent did not comply with the FIA’s
requests to sign the parent/agency agreement, which would have required him to take parenting classes
and obtain a drug assessment and other services. Nor did respondent have a stable home. Respondent
lived with his mother, who filed domestic violence charges against him in 1998. Further, respondent had
an extensive criminal history and did not have stable employment. He worked only six to seven hours a
week, earning $6.00 per hour. Therefore, the court did not clearly err in finding no reasonable
expectation that respondent would be able to provide proper care or custody for the child.
The FIA urges this Court to conclude that respondent never established any parental rights in
the first place and therefore had no rights to terminate. According to the FIA, respondent never
overcame the presumption that the mother’s husband was the child’s legal father and that consequently
we should vacate the lower court’s order. The FIA did not file a cross-appeal in this case. Although a
cross-appeal is not necessary to urge an alternative ground to affirm, it is necessary when the appellee
seeks to reverse or modify the trial court on grounds different from those raised by the appellant. See
Kosmyna v Botsford Community Hosp, 238 Mich App 694, 696; 607 NW2d 134 (1999);
Consumers Power Co v Flint, 195 Mich App 295, 300-301; 489 NW2d 201 (1992). We therefore
do not address this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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