MICHELLE Y POWELL V DEPT OF CORRECTIONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHELLE Y. POWELL,
UNPUBLISHED
July 21, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
No. 218367
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 98-088818-NO
Defendant-Appellant,
and
ROBIN PRATT, a/k/a ROBIN PRATTSTEPHENS, BURNIE STEPHENS, and DARYL
TERRY,
Defendants.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Griffin and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this hostile work environment sexual harassment action, defendant Michigan Department of
Corrections, appeals by leave granted the trial court’s denial of its motion for partial summary
disposition with respect to plaintiff’s economic damage claims of reinstatement and front pay.
Defendant contends that plaintiff’s claims are barred after the date it acquired evidence that she engaged
in misconduct during her employment which would have led to her termination. We reverse and
remand.
Plaintiff began her employment with defendant as a corrections officer on August 20, 1989.
Defendant’s employee handbook contains a work rule prohibiting improper or overly familiar conduct
with prisoners, parolees, or probationers, including cohabitation and sexual contact. The policy also
requires employees to report any unauthorized contacts to the
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administration.1
In compliance with departmental policy, plaintiff submitted a memorandum to the warden dated
March 11, 1997. In the memorandum, plaintiff informed the administration that ten years prior (before
she was hired by defendant) she had a relationship with a recent parolee named Willie Brown and that
they had a son named Oterias together. Approximately three months later, defendant began receiving
anonymous reports that plaintiff and Brown were living together in violation of departmental policy. In
response, defendant conducted an investigation, but was unable to substantiate the allegations. As part
of the investigation, plaintiff completed a questionnaire dated December 15, 1997 in which she stated
that while she had contact with Brown since his release from prison in February 1997, she only saw him
to facilitate the visitation of their son and that she had reported this contact to defendant. Plaintiff also
stated that she and Brown were not living together, and that although she was pregnant with another
child, Brown was not the father. Plaintiff subsequently gave birth to a son named Malik on March 16,
1998.
On June 10, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, two male supervisors, and the
assistant deputy warden for hostile work environment sexual harassment and assault and battery. On or
about July 8, 1998, plaintiff’s employment was terminated because she failed to return to work after
exhausting her worker’s compensation supplemental benefits and her leave entitlement under
defendant’s leave of absence policy. 2 Plaintiff later filed a second amended complaint, alleging hostile
work environment sexual harassment against defendant, and assault and battery and intentional infliction
of emotional distress against the remaining defendants. In support of her sexual harassment claim
against defendant, plaintiff alleged that she “has suffered and continues to suffer damages to include but
not limited to . . . financial hardship [and] and lost earning[s].”
On December 16, 1998, plaintiff testified in a criminal case involving her eldest son that Brown
was Malik’s father and that she and Brown were engaged and had been living together for “roughly a
year.” Defendant obtained this information and on February 1, 1999 filed a motion for partial summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). Defendant argued that plaintiff’s claim for
economic damages, which included reinstatement and front pay, were barred after December 16, 1998
– the date it acquired evidence that plaintiff engaged in misconduct during her employment which would
have led to her dismissal. In response, plaintiff maintained that there was a genuine issue of fact
regarding whether her alleged cohabitation and sexual contact with Brown would have resulted in
dismissal since she had informed defendant, during her employment, that there was a prior relationship
and a child between them. The trial court agreed, noting that defendant knew that plaintiff and Brown
were going to have contact, “and when people have contact, it doesn’t take very long to get pregnant.”
1
Plaintiff received a copy of the handbook in 1989. The relevant policy was later revised in 1996,
before plaintiff’s termination, to include more specific language regarding prohibited conduct. Plaintiff
does not dispute that she received the revised policy, which she submitted and referenced in support of
her position below.
2
Plaintiff was apparently on a leave of absence from April 27, 1997 until her termination.
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Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its motion for partial summary
disposition with respect to reinstatement and front pay based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine.
We agree.
This Court reviews a decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Smith v Globe
Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 565 NW2d 877 (1999). Although the trial court did not state under
which subrule of MCR 2.116(C) summary disposition was denied, it is clear that the court relied upon
MCR 2.116(C)(10) because it looked to materials outside the pleadings. When reviewing a motion
brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the documentary evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.; Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d
314 (1996). Summary disposition is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith, supra at 454-455; Quinto, supra.
This Court has adopted the after-acquired evidence rule set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in McKennon v Nashville Banner Publishing Co, 513 US 352; 115 S Ct 879; 130 L Ed 2d
852 (1995). Wright v Restaurant Concept Management, Inc, 210 Mich App 105, 113; 532 NW2d
889 (1995). The rule was recently summarized by this Court as follows:
. . . [A]n employee discharged in violation of the Civil Rights Act is not barred from all
relief when, after his discharge, the employer discovers evidence of wrongdoing that
would have led to the employee’s termination on lawful and legitimate grounds. Wright
v Restaurant Concept Management, Inc, 210 Mich App 105, 109-110; 532 NW2d
889 (1995) (citing McKennon v Nashville Banner Publishing Co, 513 US 352; 115
S Ct 879; 130 L Ed 2d 952 (1995)), see also Horn v Dep’t of Corrections, 216
Mich App 58; 548 NW2d 660 (1996) . . . . Rather, any wrongdoing on the
employee’s part may be reflected in the relief awarded. Id. at 111-112. Where
evidence of employee misconduct is subsequently discovered in a discriminatory
discharge case, reinstatement and front pay are generally not appropriate remedies.
McKennon, supra; Wright, supra at 111-113. With respect to an award of back pay
in such cases, “[t]he beginning point in the trial court’s formulation of a remedy should
be calculation of back pay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new
information was discovered.” McKennon, supra; Wright, supra at 112. [Smith v
Union Charter Township (On Rehearing), 227 Mich App 358, 362-363; 575
NW2d 290 (1998) (footnote omitted). See also Grow v WA Thomas Co, 236 Mich
App 696, 708-709; 601 NW2d 426 (1999).]
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that the trial court erred in
determining that a factual issue remained regarding whether plaintiff would have been dismissed for
cohabitating and engaging in sexual contact with a parolee. Plaintiff’s sworn testimony in an unrelated
criminal case established that she was cohabitating with parolee Brown and had given birth to his son
while she was still employed with defendant, even though she had denied these facts during defendant’s
internal investigation. There is no dispute that plaintiff received defendant’s employee handbook which
clearly prohibits overly familiar conduct, including cohabitation and sexual contact, between employees
and parolees. Consistent with the handbook’s statement that such conduct would result in disciplinary
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action up to and including termination, defendant’s Special Assistant to the Director submitted an
affidavit stating that plaintiff would have been dismissed had defendant known that she violated the work
rule prohibiting improper relationships. The affidavit further provided that defendant had terminated
fifty-five employees within a twenty-month period for violating the same rule. Although plaintiff argues
that this evidence is untrue, she presented no evidence to raise a genuine factual issue regarding whether
she committed the misconduct or whether defendant would not have dismissed her for the misconduct.
Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations to this effect are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether defendant would have dismissed her for the misconduct. MCR 2.116(G)(4).
Therefore, to the extent defendant is liable for plaintiff’s claim under the Civil Rights Act, MCL
37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement and front pay under
the circumstances of this case, Horn, supra at 68. We further conclude that an award of back pay is
limited to “the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered.” Smith,
supra at 363. Although defendant states that it acquired evidence of plaintiff’s wrongdoing on
December 16, 1998, the date plaintiff’s testimony was taken in the criminal proceeding, it submitted no
documentary evidence in support of this assertion. We therefore remand to the trial court for a
determination regarding the exact date defendant discovered the evidence of misconduct.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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