IN RE MEGAN MAULL MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MEGAN MAULL, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 11, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 220479
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-373529
LETITIA MAULL,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Hood and Saad, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the family court’s dispositional order, directing that the
minor child be placed in the temporary custody of the court in foster care. The court assumed
jurisdiction over the minor child pursuant to respondent’s plea of admission. We affirm.
Respondent claims that her plea of admission was defective because the court did not
adequately advise her of her rights to subpoena or cross-examine witnesses, or the consequences of
entering a plea. She further argues that her testimony at the plea proceeding was insufficient to support
a finding that the child was subject to the court’s jurisdiction as set forth in MCL 712A.2(b); MSA
27.3178(598.2)(b). See MCR 5.971. Because respondent did not move to withdraw her plea of
admission in the family court or request a review of the referee’s recommendations on the basis asserted
on appeal, this issue is not preserved. In re Zelzack, 180 Mich App 117, 126; 446 NW2d 588
(1989); MCR 5.991(B). Regardless, even if we were to address respondent’s claims, we would
conclude that they are without merit.
The record clearly reveals that the family court advised respondent, who was represented by
counsel, that she had the right to a trial and at that trial “witnesses would be brought in to testify,” that
she could call witnesses to testify on her behalf, and that “all [of] those witnesses would be questioned
by [her] attorney.” Respondent was further advised that, during the case, if she failed to comply with
the requirements ordered by the court, “the Court can terminate [her] rights as a parent and place the
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child for adoption.” Respondent specifically acknowledged her understanding of these rights. It is
apparent that respondent understood both the nature of the proceedings and that, by offering her plea,
she was knowingly and voluntarily giving up her right to a trial and the rights incident thereto.
Accordingly, respondent’s plea of admission was an understanding one and, therefore, was not
defective on the basis of inadequate advice of rights. See In re Waite, 188 Mich App 189, 192; 468
NW2d 912 (1991). Further, a careful review of the record shows that sufficient facts were established
through respondent’s testimony to support a conclusion that the child came within the provisions of
MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Henry William Saad
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