REBA SULLIVAN V ACCES MANAGEMENT INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
REBA SULLIVAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 23, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
ACCES MANAGEMENT, INC and UAW-FORD
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
No. 212052
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-644782-NI
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Gage and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant Access Management,
Inc. (ACCES) summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on her age discrimination claim.
Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s previous orders granting, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10),
defendant UAW-Ford Child Development Center (properly UAW-Ford National Education,
Development and Training Center) (NEDTC) summary disposition on grounds that it was not her
employer, and ACCES partial summary disposition on her handicap discrimination, breach of
contract/wrongful termination, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that NEDTC was not her employer
and, therefore, could not be liable for her employment-related claims. We disagree. This Court
reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary disposition. Smith v Globe Life
Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). When reviewing a motion brought pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Id.; Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
Summary disposition is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith, supra at 454-455; Quinto, supra. Similarly, whether
a company is a particular worker’s employer is a question of law for the court to decide if the evidence
on the matter is reasonably susceptible of a single inference. See Derigiotis v J M Feighery Co, 185
-1
Mich App 90, 94; 460 NW2d 235 (1990) (addressing the issue in the context of the workers’
compensation act).
There appears to be some debate regarding the proper standard to be applied in determining
whether an entity constitutes an employer for purposes of determining liability under the Civil Rights Act
(CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq. or the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act
(HCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq.1 See Norris v State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co, 229 Mich App 231; 581 NW2d 746 (1998) (applying the control test to claim of
respondeat superior liability under the HCRA); McCarthy v State Farm Ins Co, 170 Mich App 451;
428 NW2d 692 (1988) (applying the economic reality test to determine liability under the HCRA). See
also Chiles v Machine Shop, Inc, 238 Mich App 462; 606 NW2d 398 (1999) (holding that liability
under the act does not require that an employment relationship exist, but simply that the defendant have
the authority to adversely affect a plaintiff’s employment or potential employment).2 However, we need
not address that issue because under any of the various standards employed, plaintiff’s proofs fail to
establish that NEDTC was her employer or otherwise had the authority to adversely affect her
employment.
On this record, there is no evidence that NEDTC paid plaintiff’s wages, established the terms
and conditions of plaintiff’s employment or position, or had the authority to control or affect ACCES’
employment decisions. To the contrary, the contractual agreement between NEDTC and ACCES
provided that ACCES, in its capacity as independent contractor, would “operate the center, collect all
revenues and assume responsibility for payment of salaries, purchased services and supplies as needed
to operate the center in a manner satisfactory to NEDTC.” The agreement further provided that
ACCES was responsible for designing and managing the center, conducting daily operations, and
procuring and maintaining worker’s compensation insurance. With respect to employees, ACCES was
fully responsible for recruiting, selecting, hiring, training, evaluating, and compensating them, although
NEDTC was to be notified of any potential staff terminations. The president of ACCES, and a
signatory to the agreement, stated that ACCES was not required to involve NEDTC in hiring or firing
decisions, and that NEDTC had no supervisory responsibilities with respect to the employees.
Furthermore, plaintiff’s testimony established that she interviewed with ACCES’ president and
executive director prior to hire, that she was supervised and evaluated by ACCES’ assistant directors,
that she completed an employment application entitled “ACCES Management, Inc. Application for
Employment,” and that the Employee Handbook provided to her by ACCES governed her employment
relationship with ACCES. In light of this evidence, plaintiff’s contention that NEDTC and ACCES
were joint employers is without merit and the trial court properly granted NEDTC’s motion for
summary disposition.
1
After plaintiff filed this action, the HCRA was amended and renamed the “persons with disabilities civil
rights act.” MCL 37.1101; MSA 3.550(101), as amended by 1998 PA 20.
2
Although these cases address HCRA claims, the definition of employer for purposes of the CRA is
virtually identical. Compare MCL 37.1201(b); MSA 3.550(201)(b) with MCL 37.2201; MSA
3.548(201).
-2
Plaintiff’s related claim that dismissal of NEDTC from the suit was premature because discovery
had not been completed is similarly without merit. The record indicates that NEDTC’s
-3
motion for summary disposition was heard three weeks after discovery was scheduled to conclude, and
we are not persuaded that further discovery would h provided plaintiff a reasonable chance of
ave
uncovering factual support for her position that NEDTC was her employer. Hasselbach v TG Canton,
Inc, 209 Mich App 475, 482; 531 NW2d 715 (1994).
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting ACCES summary disposition on
grounds that she failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the HCRA.3 We disagree.
At the time plaintiff filed this suit, the HCRA provided that an employer shall not “[d]ischarge or
otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform
the duties of a particular job or position.” MCL 37.1202(1)(b); MSA 3.550(202)(1)(b). To establish
a prima facie case of discrimination under the statute, the plaintiff must establish that (1) she is
“handicapped” as defined by the statute, (2) the disability is unrelated to her ability to perform the duties
of a particular job, and (3) she has been discriminated against in one of the ways described in the
statute. Collins v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 228 Mich App 560, 568-569; 579 NW2d
435 (1998). The HCRA defines a “handicap,” in part, as:
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may
result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the
characteristic:
(A) For purposes of article 2, substantially limits 1 or more of the major
life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s ability4 to
perform the duties of a particular job or position or substantially limits 1 or more of
the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s qualifications
for employment or promotion. [MCL 37.1103(e)(i)(A); MSA 3.550(103)(e)(i)(A)
(emphasis added).]
Therefore, to fall within the definition of handicap under the plain language of the HCRA, an individual’s
condition must substantially limit at least one of her major life activities. Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc,
220 Mich App 212, 216; 559 NW2d 61 (1996). “Major life activities” include “functions such as
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
learning, and working.” Stevens, supra at 217, citing 29 CFR 630.2(i); see also Chiles, supra at 477.
“Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is determined in light of (1) the nature
3
The 1998 amendments to the provisions cited herein merely replaced the term “handicap” with the
term “disability.”
4
“Unrelated to the individual’s ability” means “with or without accommodation, an individual’s
handicap does not prevent the individual from . . . performing the duties of a particular job or
position.” MCL 37.1103(l)(i); MSA 3.550(103)(l)(i).
-4
and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or expected duration, and (3) its permanent or expected
permanent or long-term effect.” Stevens, supra at 218, citing 29 CFR 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
In the present case, we cannot conclude that plaintiff’s alleged handicap, to wit: “a cancer
survivor [who] suffers from permanent neuropathy [i.e., numbness in the feet and hands] as a result of
chemotherapy” substantially limited one or more of her life’s major activities. Plaintiff presented no
evidence that the alleged neuropathy substantially interfered with caring for herself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working, or walking. Chiles, supra at 477 (the
plaintiff must allege and present evidence that a major life activity was implicated); Stevens, supra at
218. See also Sherrod v American Airlines, Inc, 132 F3d 1112 (CA 5, 1998) (the inability to
perform heavy lifting alone was not sufficient to constitute a substantial limitation under the federal
statute); Dutcher v Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F3d 723 (CA 5, 1995) (the inability to hold objects
tightly did not constitute a substantial limitation under the federal statute). Further, we are not persuaded
by plaintiff’s reliance on the Social Security Administration’s post-termination determination that she
was “disabled” as proof that she was “handicapped” under the HCRA. See Hall v McRea Corp, 238
Mich App 361, 367-369; 605 NW2d 354 (1999); Tranker v Figgie Int’l Inc (On Remand), 231
Mich App 115, 121-122; 585 NW2d 337 (1998) (recognizing that the two acts are designed for
different purposes and utilize different standards). Because plaintiff failed to establish that she was
handicapped under the HCRA, the trial court properly granted ACCES’ motion for summary
disposition.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting ACCES summary disposition on her age
discrimination claim. Again, we disagree.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the CRA, the plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was discharged
from employment, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) she was replaced by a younger person.
Hall, supra at 370; see also Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 172-173; 579 NW2d
906 (1998). The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the
discharge. Hall, supra at 370; Lytle, supra at 153. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted and the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff
to show “that there was a triable issue of fact that the employer’s proffered reasons were not true
reasons, but were a mere pretext for discrimination.” Id., quoting Lytle, supra at 174.
After a through review of the record, we conclude that plaintiff failed to submit evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether she was replaced by a younger person –
the fourth element required to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. At deposition, plaintiff
testified that she “was told” by someone that she was replaced by a younger person and stated in her
affidavit, without further elaboration, that she was so replaced. Furthermore, none of the affidavits
plaintiff submitted in support of this element were notarized, and one was incomplete and did not include
the affiant’s signature. SSC Associates Ltd Partnership v General Retirement System, 192 Mich
App 360, 363-364; 480 NW2d 275 (1991) (the existence of a material fact must be established by
admissible evidence; opinions, conclusions, unsworn averments, and inadmissible hearsay do not satisfy
the court rule).
-5
Even if we were to conclude that plaintiff established a prima facie case, summary disposition
was nonetheless proper. ACCES submitted admissible evidence that plaintiff was not discharged, but
rather, voluntarily resigned after being off work for medical reasons, that she was not replaced by a
younger person, and that it did not engage in the practice of hiring younger employees to replace older
ones. Hall, supra at 370. In response, plaintiff presented no evidence to create a triable issue that
discriminatory animus was a motivating factor underlying her alleged termination. Hall, supra at 371;
Lytle, supra at 175-176. At deposition, plaintiff admitted that her claim was based on her personal
belief that ACCES hired people with “lots of energy” and “systematically got rid of people who had any
age on them.” It is well established that a plaintiff’s mere assertion or subjective belief that she was the
victim of age discrimination is insufficient to survive a motion for summary disposition. Marsh v Dep’t
of Civil Service (After Remand), 173 Mich App 72, 81; 433 NW2d 820 (1988); Cf. Fortier v
Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc, 161 F3d 1106, 1113 (CA 7, 1998) (holding that
employer’s comment that the plaintiff’s younger replacement had a “lot of energy” did not constitute
direct evidence of age discrimination). Consequently, the trial court properly granted ACCES’ motion
for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
-6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.