PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER DALE GREEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 23, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 211906
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 97-001771-FC
CHRISTOPHER DALE GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Neff and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA
28.277, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2). He was sentenced to twenty-four to forty-eight months’ imprisonment for the felonious
assault conviction to be served consecutive to his two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s conviction, but remand to the trial court for the
limited purpose of conducting a hearing to determine whether its sentence was based in part on
erroneous information.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it
omitted from its jury instruction on felonious assault the element of specific intent. We disagree.
Because counsel failed to raise the issue at trial, the error is unpreserved. People v Grant, 445 Mich
535, 553-554; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Where no objection is made to an alleged constitutional error,
we review for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761, 764-766; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The trial court explained specific intent in its instructions for assault with intent to murder and
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The court instructed the jury that for the
final charge, felonious assault, the intent “related to” the previously given instructions. Although the
court did not use the term “specific intent” in its instruction on felonious assault, the jury was well
apprised of the elements of the offense, including intent, and thus, we find no error. The jury was asked
to determine whether defendant intended to either injure William Rogan, Jr.(the victim) or make Rogan
reasonably fear an immediate battery. It is presumed that the jury followed the court’s instructions.
People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Further, we find no prejudice
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because, when viewed as a whole, the court’s instructions protected defendant’s rights. Carines,
supra at 770-771. Thus, defendant forfeited his claim of error by not objecting to the instructions at
trial. Id. at 772.
Defendant next argues that the trial court incorrectly scored the sentencing guideline variables by
finding that Rogan was terrorized. We review the application of the guidelines on appeal only where (1)
a factual predicate is wholly unsupported, (2) a factual predicate is materially false, and (3) the sentence
is disproportionate. People v Raby, 456 Mich 487, 496; 572 NW2d 644 (1998); People v Mitchell,
454 Mich 145, 177; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). Otherwise, we recognize no basis for claims of error
predicated on the trial court’s alleged misinterpretation of the guidelines, instructions regarding how the
guidelines should be applied, or misapplication of guideline variables. Id. at 176-177.
Here, the factual basis for finding that defendant was subjected to terrorism is not wholly
unsupported by the record, nor materially false. There was ample evidence, viewed either subjectively
from Rogan’s viewpoint, or objectively, that Rogan was terrorized by defendant. Rogan testified that
defendant came to the door of defendant’s house and that he waved a gun in Rogan’s face and told him
to leave. Rogan claimed that defendant threatened to kill him if he did not leave. Then, Rogan testified,
he ran away in fear for his life when defendant pointed the gun at him. Moreover, Rogan’s version of
events is not materially false because it was supported by Michelle Hernandez, a disinterested
eyewitness. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in scoring the guidelines.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by considering information in the presentencing
information report (PSIR) that was incorrect and that the corrections that the trial court ordered were
never made. At trial, the court ordered stricken any indication that defendant was “under suspicion for
quite some time for drug dealing.” The trial court also ordered that the PSIR be changed to indicate
that defendant had a pending drug charge after crack cocaine was found in clothing “delivered to the jail
on [defendant’s] behalf.” Apparently, neither change was made. We therefore remand for the trial
court to make the above corrections to the PSIR. People v Newson (After Remand), 187 Mich App
447, 450; 468 NW2d 249, vacated in part on other grounds 437 Mich 1054.
Defendant also argues that the PSIR wrongly identified one of his juvenile offenses and that the
trial court was not apprised of the mistake. Essentially, at sentencing, the probation officer stated that
defendant was charged with entry without permission and assault and battery, but that he pleaded guilty
to larceny under $100. In actuality, defendant was charged with unarmed robbery and “stolen property
$100 or less,” and he later pleaded guilty to larceny over $100. On remand, therefore, the trial court
shall conduct a hearing at which it shall determine whether the misinformation affected its sentencing
decision. People v Tew, 151 Mich App 556, 559-560; 390 NW2d 738 (1986). If so, then defendant
shall be resentenced.
Defendant, in propria persona, raises two additional issues for our consideration. First, he
argues that the prosecutor committed error requiring reversal when, during closing arguments, he
accused eyewitness Kimberly Jones, defendant’s girlfriend, of being an accessory to the crime and
when he attacked her credibility. At trial, defendant failed to object to either of the comments made by
the prosecutor. Appellate review of allegedly improper conduct is precluded where the defendant fails
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to timely and specifically object unless an objection could not have cured the error or a failure to review
the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 638; 588 NW2d
480 (1998).
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided case by case, and the reviewing court must
examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context. People v
Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). In this case, we are mindful of the fact that
the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that the statements and arguments of the attorneys are not
evidence. Generally, juries are presumed to have followed the instructions. Graves, supra at 486.
Prosecutors are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they
relate to the theory of the case. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Jones testified that she asked defendant to intervene on her behalf. The prosecutor’s remarks to this
effect during closing arguments were therefore based on the evidence and not improper. Id.
The prosecutor chastised defendant and Jones, stating that they should have let the courts
contend with Rogan. However, the prosecutor need not use the least prejudicial evidence available to
establish a fact at issue, nor must he state his arguments in the blandest possible terms. People v
Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 452; 537 NW2d 577 (1995); People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 678; 550
NW2d 568 (1996). Finally, the prosecutor cast doubt on Jones’ version of events by stating that the
story did not “fit,” and that if anybody was lying at trial, it was she. The prosecutor did not accuse
Jones of lying. Instead, he merely argued that the jury should reach the conclusion that Jones was not
credible. Again, the prosecutor need not always couch his arguments in the blandest of terms. Id.
Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments
and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial. People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341,
353-355; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). Here, remarks during closing were not improper where the
prosecutor was rebutting charges made by defense counsel that Rogan, not Jones, was not telling the
truth. Otherwise improper prosecutorial remarks might not require reversal if they address issues raised
by defense counsel. People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 16; 260 NW2d 58 (1977).
Finally, defendant argues the he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his defense
counsel failed to challenge defendant’s sentence as disproportionate. We disagree. Because defendant
did not move for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing below, our review is limited to mistakes apparent
from the record. People v Henry, 239 Mich App 140, 146; 607 NW2d 767 (1999), lv pending.
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears the burden of proving
otherwise. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that the defendant was prejudiced such that he was denied a fair trial,
i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. Mitchell, supra at 164; Henry, supra at 145-146.
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On the existing record, defendant has not shown that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel. Defendant was sentenced within the guidelines, yet he believes that the court should have
sentenced him to a lesser term given the surrounding circumstances. Defendant’s sentence was
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime. Rogan was unarmed when defendant chased him with a
loaded gun and fired a shot into his vehicle, narrowly missing Rogan. Counsel is not required to argue a
frivolous or meritless motion. People v Darden, 230 Mich App 597, 605; 585 NW2d 27 (1998). A
motion for resentencing would have been frivolous under these circumstances.
Affirmed. Remanded to the trial court for the limited purposes of correcting the PSIR and
conducting a hearing to determine whether defendant’s sentence was based in part on defendant’s
juvenile record where the trial court was misinformed of that record. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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