IN RE COWART MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CARLOS C. COWART, JAMAR K.
COWART, BRITTANY K. COWART, and
STACEY C. COWART, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 20, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 219126
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-063530-NA
VANESSA WHEAT,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DERRICK COWART,
Respondent.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the termination of her parental rights to her minor children,
Carlos (DOB 4/27/90), Jamar (DOB 4/21/91), Brittany (DOB 1/9/93), and Stacey Cowart (DOB
3/19/94), pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) [parent, without regard to
intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child]. We affirm.
Respondent argues that the family court erred in terminating her parental rights. A two-prong
test applies to a family court’s decision to terminate parental rights. First, the court must find that at
least one of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b; MSA 27.3178(598.19b)
has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d
182 (1993). This Court reviews the findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR
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5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. Jackson, supra at 25.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence, the
parent against whom termination proceedings have been brought has the burden of going forward with
some evidence that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interest. If no such showing is made and
a statutory ground for termination has been established, the family court is without discretion; it must
terminate parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Huisman, 230 Mich
App 372, 384; 584 NW2d 349 (1998).
Petitioner filed a petition to have the court take temporary custody of the children on September
24, 1997. The petition was based on allegations that respondent had neglected the children by failing to
provide a proper home environment and adult supervision. At that time, the children were placed with
petitioner. On October 6, 1997, the petition was amended to add additional allegations of neglect,
including allegations that respondent lived in four different places during the previous month, that the
children had mental and behavioral problems that respondent failed to address, and that the attendance
and school performance of two of her children was terrible. On December 3, 1997, the family court
issued an order taking temporary custody of the children.
On December 17, 1998, and February 4, 1999, the family court held a hearing on petitioner’s
request that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. Barbara Lund, the case worker, testified that
respondent signed a parent-agency agreement that required her to obtain stable employment and
housing, attend regular therapy sessions, attend weekly visits with the children, take domestic violence
classes, get a psychological examination and follow its recommendations, and work with her case
worker. Lund stated that she reviewed the agreement with respondent monthly and on a weekly basis
she spoke with respondent regarding these goals and the consequences of non-compliance.
Lund testified that she made referrals to respondent for domestic violence classes; however,
respondent provided no documentation that she attended those classes. According to Lund, although
respondent obtained employment, she had five jobs since October, 1997, with most lasting only two
months. Furthermore, although Lund helped respondent create a budget to save money for housing and
made several referrals regarding agencies to aid respondent’s housing search, respondent continuously
stated that she had moved and she failed to obtain suitable housing. Lund testified that respondent also
failed to receive regular therapy and follow the recommendations of her psychological examination.
Lund stated that respondent attended the visitations with the children on a fairly regular basis.
However, she testified that respondent did not interact with the children very much. Lund
recommended that parental rights be terminated based on the length of time the children had been in
foster care, respondent’s lack of progress, and the lack of bonding between respondent and the
children. Lund believed that respondent would be unable to care for the children in the foreseeable
future.
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Kay Deloney, Carlos’s foster mother, testified that Carlos had several mental, physical, and
psychological disorders, including psychotic disorder, tics, seizures, dysthymic disorder, and a learning
disorder. She also testified that Carlos was taking several types of medication, attended therapy once a
week, and saw a psychiatrist once a month. She stated that Carlos was in the second grade, although
he should have been in the third grade, and was constantly in trouble at school; however, Carlos was
calmer and doing better in school than when he first went to live with her. According to Deloney,
Carlos was never excited about respondent’s visits, he was only excited about the treats that
respondent brought.
Margie Phinisee, Jamar’s foster mother, testified that Jamar was emotionally impaired, attended
second grade special education classes where he did first grade work, was on medication, and saw a
therapist once a week. According to Phinisee, Jamar was totally out of control, he was disruptive, he
could not concentrate, he did not comprehend a lot, and he talked to himself and acted out what he
said. Phinisee further testified that Jamar had no reaction to respondent’s visits, other than being excited
about the treats she brought, and that he told her that he liked her home and did not want to return to
respondent.
Emma Ivory, Brittany and Stacey’s foster mother, testified that both children attended therapy
once a week and acted excited about their visits with respondent, but spoke mainly of the treats they
would receive. The children told Ivory that they were not going back to respondent and they wanted to
live with her. Ivory further testified that Brittany was behind in school, but Stacey was doing well in her
pre-kindergarten class, and they were well-behaved in school but fought with each other at home.
Carol Beauchamp, Jamar, Brittany, and Stacey’s therapist, testified that she worked with the
children because they were developmentally behind and had trouble with language skills. According to
Beauchamp, Jamar preferred to speak with his back to other people, verbalized what he was thinking,
had attention deficit disorder, and required her to keep her distance from him. She testified that he
would need therapy to help him with basic life skills in the future. Beachamp stated that Brittany was
mentally impaired and had a thought disorder; Stacey had impulse control disorder, a sleeping disorder,
and a thought disorder; and they would need therapy to help them through changes in their lives, but it
would not cure their developmental problems.
Beauchamp witnessed some of respondent’s visits with the children and noted that she was not
in touch with the children and they did not seem to have a strong bond with her. She recommended that
parental rights be terminated because the children needed structure in their daily routines, continuity, and
close monitoring. According to Beauchamp, they had more needs than the average child. Beauchamp
did not think that the circumstances would change in the future because respondent already had several
months to make improvements and had not shown any progress.
Respondent testified that she had been working thirty to forty h
ours per week at Wal-Mart
since September 13, 1998, and she was looking either for a higher paying job or a second job. She
stated that she went to two therapists, making approximately three to four visits to each, and was
attending counseling with her pastor. Respondent further testified that she continuously looked for
appropriate housing; however, it was difficult because there were long waiting lists for most apartments,
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few apartments had three or more bedrooms, and many of the houses were in neighborhoods in which
she did not wish to live. According to respondent, she paid an $850 deposit on a five-bedroom home
in November, 1998, and she owed the landlord, who had agreed to hold the house for respondent,
another $500 and then she would be able to move in. Respondent testified that she used her own
money to pay the deposit and she had not had the rest of the deposit because she had medical and
transportation expenses to pay. According to respondent, the rent for the house would be between
$500 and $750 per month. Respondent further testified that she loved her children and that she thought
she was able to care for them.
The case worker testified that she first learned that respondent found potential housing on
December 17, 1998, while she was testifying at the first half of the termination hearing and respondent’s
attorney showed her a letter regarding the deposit. According to the case worker, respondent then
showed her the letter, which was dated during November, 1998, on February 3, 1999. The case
worker testified that the letter was on OSHA letterhead and stated that the deposit had been paid to the
landlord on behalf of respondent and if respondent was not living in the house in the following sixty days
the deposit would revert back to the agency. The case worker believed that the sixty days had already
expired. Furthermore, even if respondent had obtained housing, it would not have changed the case
worker’s recommendation that parental rights be terminated because there would still be no showing of
consistency by respondent.1
The family court found that until recently, respondent had failed to keep a stable job and in the
past 1½ years she secured no legitimate housing options that would enable the court to believe the
children would have a stable home for a significant period of time. Due to the children’s special needs
and the fact that they did not deal well with change, it was imperative that the children have a stable
living environment, which respondent was not able to provide. Therefore, the court found that
respondent failed to provide adequate care and custody for the children and it was in their best interests
that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.
On these facts, we conclude that the family court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory
grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights had been established. See MCR 5.974(I); Miller,
supra. Because respondent did not present any evidence that termination of her parental rights would
not be in the children’s best interest, the court properly terminated her parental rights. See MCL
712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); Huisman, supra; see also In re Hamlet (After Remand),
225 Mich App 505, 512-513, 523; 571 NW2d 750 (1997).
Affirmed.
1
On February 22, 1998, the date set for the court to decide the mater and after the parties had closed
the proofs and given closing arguments, respondent attempted to submit a lease for the house.
However, the court would not admit the lease because the proofs were closed. Respondent does not
challenge the court’s decision on appeal.
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/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Helene N. White
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