PEOPLE OF MI V HOWARD E MCCLATCHER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 13, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209520
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-002657
HOWARD E. MCCLATCHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and White and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting two children, both of
whom were under the age of thirteen, while they were at home without adult supervision. Defendant
was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520b; MSA
28.788(2), and two counts of second-degree CSC, MCL 750.520c; MSA 28.788(3). He was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of forty to sixty years each for the two first-degree CSC
convictions and ten to fifteen years each for the two second-degree CSC convictions. We affirm.
Defendant's first claim is that the trial court's conduct deprived him of a fair trial. In considering
the issue of trial court misconduct, "[p]ortions of the record should not be taken out of context in order
to show trial court bias against defendant; rather, the record should be reviewed as a whole." People v
Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). Defendant asserts two arguments: (1)
the trial court’s attitude and comments directed toward defense counsel impermissibly biased the jury
against defendant; and (2) general questions and comments by the trial judge relating to the witnesses
and the proofs presented by counsel were intimidating and argumentative and displayed an
impermissible prosecutorial bias.
Defendant did not object to the trial court's conduct. Thus, he must show plain error affecting
his substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); Paquette,
supra at 340. In Carines, the Supreme Court, relying on United States v Olano, 507 US 725; 113 S
Ct 1170; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993), set forth a stringent standard to be applied by this Court before
setting aside a conviction on a claim of unpreserved error:
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To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1)
error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and 3) the plain
error affected substantial rights. The third requirement generally requires a showing of
prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. “It is
the defendant rather than the government who bears the burden of persuasion with
respect to prejudice.” Finally, once a defendant satisfies these three requirements, an
appellate court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is
warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually
innocent defendant or when an error “ ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s innocence.”
[Carines, supra at 763-764 (footnote and citations omitted).]
It is with this stringent standard in mind that we review defendant’s claim of trial court misconduct.
At times during the trial the demeanor of the trial judge could fairly be characterized as abrupt
and inconsiderate. We note, however, that this behavior was not directed exclusively toward defense
counsel. Thus, we cannot find that the trial court’s conduct displayed an attitude of partisanship in favor
of the prosecution.
Similarly, we do not find reversible error arising from the questions posed to the
witnesses and comments regarding the proofs made by the trial judge throughout the trial. A trial judge
may question witnesses in order to clarify or elicit additional relevant information during the course of
trial.
MRE 614(b); People v Pawelczak, 125 Mich App 231, 236; 336 NW2d 453 (1983).
Further, the trial court has the discretion to comment on the proceedings while presiding over the
administration of the trial. While we conclude that the trial court was unusually active in its participation
in this trial, we do not find plain error that affected the substantial rights of defendant. Examining the
record as a whole, we find that the trial court's conduct did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. See
generally People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 480; 549 NW2d 584 (1996); People v Davis, 216
Mich App 47, 51-52; 549 NW2d 1 (1996); see also People v Hampton, 237 Mich App 143, 154
155; 603 NW2d 270 (1999).
Defendant also claims that there was insufficient evidence of sexual penetration to support one
of the first-degree CSC convictions. To determine if evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, a
court must "view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999), quoting People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515-516; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). MCL
750.520a(l); MSA 28.788(1)(l) defines "sexual penetration" as:
sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion,
however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or
anal openings of another person's body . . . . [Emphasis added.]
The prosecution relies upon the following testimony to argue there was evidence of an intrusion,
however slight, in the anal opening of the victim:
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Q.
How did he lick you?
A. On my—with his tongue.
([Prosecutor], continuing): I know this is very hard to answer, when you say his tongue
was on your butt, the area where you go to the bathroom back there, was it near there
or no?
A.
Yes.
THE COURT: She may understand, do you know the—do you know what opening is
where you defecate or whatever, you know what that’s called?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: You don’t. Okay. But you know that in that part of your anatomy
there is such an opening, is that correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
([Prosecutor], continuing): And did his tongue touch that area or no?
A.
Yes.
The prosecutor argues that the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant’s tongue slightly
penetrated the victim’s anal opening. We agree. It was the duty and responsibility of the jury to
observe the demeanor of the witness and the prosecutor during the questioning and to provide meaning
to the questions posed by the prosecutor and the responses provided by the witness. The jury heard
the tone and emphasis of each person’s voice and the manner in which the victim provided each answer.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution we must assume that the jury
understood the ten year old’s affirmative response to the question, “did his tongue touch that area” to
mean that she felt defendant’s tongue touch her anal opening. As a general matter, evidence of
“touching” i not necessarily sufficient to support the conclusion that the touching constituted slight
s
1
penetration. However, given the area of the anatomy at issue in this case, we conclude that the jury
could reasonably infer from the evidence that in touching the opening, defendant must have pierced the
plane of the opening and touched the interior tissue of the anus. This conclusion is supported by the
closing argument of defendant’s counsel, who conceded that the testimony of the victim was sufficient to
sustain the first-degree CSC conviction for anal penetration. Defendant’s counsel argued, however, that
the victim lacked credibility and could not be believed.2 However, the jury disagreed with defense
counsel.
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Defendant next argues that his sentence of 40 to 60 years is disproportionate and based upon
improper considerations by the sentencing judge. We disagree. The sentencing guidelines
recommended minimum sentence range for defendant’s first-degree CSC convictions was 20 to 40
years or life. Defendant’s minimum sentence of forty years for each first-degree CSC conviction is
within the guidelines recommended range for either a term-of-years or life sentence. The parties agreed
at sentencing that the range was accurate, with both the offense and defendant’s prior criminal record
being scored in the severest level. The prior record score reflected that defendant had three prior
felonies and three prior misdemeanor convictions. The presentence report disclosed two prior
convictions for rape. The instant offenses occurred less than one year after being released from
incarceration for his most recent rape conviction.
Under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), a sentence is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion in light of the principle of proportionality. The trial court abuses its discretion when it
imposes a sentence that is not proportionate to the seriousness of the matter. People v Merriweather,
447 Mich 799, 806-807; 527 NW2d 460 (1994). In general, a sentence within the guidelines is
presumed to be neither excessive nor disparate. People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 609; 560
NW2d 354 (1996).
Given the record in this case, defendant has not shown that his guidelines sentences for two
counts of first-degree CSC are disproportionate.
Finally, defendant claims that he was penalized for exercising his right to trial, instead of
tendering a plea. Defendant maintains he is entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness because the
sentence imposed after trial exceeded the sentence offered in a Cobbs3 evaluation. We disagree. The
presumption of vindictiveness discussed in People v Mazzie, 429 Mich 29; 413 NW2d 1 (1987),
arises when a trial court imposes a greater sentence for the same offense at a resentencing hearing
conducted after reconviction. Id. at 34-35. This presumption does not arise where a trial court has
made a preliminary evaluation of a sentence under Cobbs. The preliminary evaluation does not bind the
trial court's sentencing discretion because additional facts may emerge during later proceedings that
affect the sentencing decision. Cobbs, supra at 283. The remedy afforded to a defendant, should he
tender a plea in reliance on the preliminary evaluation, is to withdraw the plea if the trial court exceeds
the preliminary evaluation. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
1
In order for the first degree CSC conviction to be sustained, there must be evidence of an “intrusion
however slight of any part of a person’s body . . . .” MCL 750.520a(l); MSA 28.788(1)(l).
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2
Defense counsel argued during her closing argument:
The first two witnesses, the complainants in this case, very charming young ladies. But
this situation is sad, this is a tragedy any way you slice it. I didn’t cross examine on
licking the anus or tongue in the anus . . . . We submit that they knew that they were
gonna [sic] say that. They had been programmed to say it. Those were the essential
elements. It had to be said and they said i. And saying it, if you believe it, is
t
sufficient. And the judge when he instructs you, that will be one of the instructions, that
you can[,] by their testimony alone[,] convict Mr. McClatcher. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, it was apparent to all present in the courtroom, including defendant’s counsel, that the victim
testified about the defendant’s tongue penetrating, however slight, the victim’s anal opening.
3
People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993).
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