MIKE CONNELLY V COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER OF BRANCH COUNTY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MIKE CONNELLY and RANDY ROTH,
UNPUBLISHED
May 26, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER OF BRANCH
COUNTY,
No. 216551
Branch Circuit Court
LC No. 98-008578 NZ
Defendant-Appellee,
and
BRANCH COUNTY,
Defendant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant-appellee Community
Health Center of Branch County’s (CHC) motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
We reverse and remand for further proceedings. This appeal is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiffs are certified registered nurse anesthetists who, while employed by CHC, reported
illegal activity on the part of other employees. By letter dated April 29, 1998, plaintiffs were informed
that their employment would be terminated effective May 31, 1998. On August 14, 1998 plaintiffs filed
suit alleging that their termination violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), 15.361 et seq.;
MSA 17.428(1) et seq. CHC moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing
that plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred because it was filed beyond the ninety-day statute of limitations.
MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1). The trial court granted the motion.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Harrison v
Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679 (1997).
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The issue of whether a claim has been filed within the limitations period is one of law. Solowy v
Oakwood Hosp Corp, 454 Mich 214, 216; 561 NW2d 843 (1997). We review a question of law de
novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80;
467 NW2d 21 (1991).
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
We agree, reverse the trial court’s order, and remand for further proceedings. In Jacobson v Parda
Federal Credit Union, 457 Mich 318; 577 NW2d 881 (1998), on which defendant relied below, our
Supreme Court held that in a constructive discharge case brought under the WPA, the ninety-day
statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the employee’s resignation, but noted that in limited
circumstances, such as delivery of notice of termination, a constructive discharge could be found to have
occurred prior to resignation. Id., 327 n 20. The Jacobson Court did not make such a finding,
because that issue was not before it. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the Jacobson Court did not
hold that in any discharge case brought under the WPA, the ninety-day statute of limitations begins to
run on the date an employee receives a notice of discharge. Jacobson, supra, did not compel the
granting of defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Pursuant to MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1), a claim under the WPA must be filed “within
90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act.” The Legislature is presumed to have
intended the meaning it plainly expressed in statutory language. Nation v WDE Electric Co, 454 Mich
489, 494; 563 NW2d 233 (1997). In the instant case, the alleged violation of the WPA was plaintiffs’
termination. Plaintiffs were terminated effective May 31, 1998. Their complaint was filed within ninety
days of that date. The trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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