PEOPLE OF MI V MARQUITA ANDERSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 19, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210704
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 97-004573
MARQUITA ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Gage and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was acquitted on charges of assault with intent to commit
murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and carjacking, MCL 750.529a; MSA 28.797(a), but convicted
of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, unlawfully
driving away an automobile (“UDDA”), MCL 750.413; MSA 28.645, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). She was sentenced to
concurrent prison terms of three to ten years for the assault conviction and two to five years for the
UDDA conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. She appeals as
of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. We disagree. In
considering this issue, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rationale trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crimes were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 268-270; 380 NW2d 11
(1985); People v Reddick, 187 Mich App 547, 551; 468 NW2d 278 (1991).
Evidence was presented that defendant Anderson was armed with a gun, that she threatened the
complainant, that the complainant was shot, and that the complainant heard Anderson shout, “Kill the
m----------- and take his truck.” This evidence, viewed most favorably to the prosecution, was
sufficient to enable a rationale trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant assaulted
the complainant with the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and that she possessed a firearm during
the commission of this felony assault. Further, the elements of UDAA may rationally be inferred from
evidence that defendant ordered a codefendant to shoot the complainant and take his truck, that the
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truck had been left running by the complainant as he ran away, that no one else was around, and that the
truck was gone when the police arrived shortly thereafter. See People v Hendricks, 200 Mich App
68, 71; 503 NW2d 689 (1993), aff’d 446 Mich 435; 521 NW2d 546 (1994). The credibility of the
witnesses was a matter for the trier of fact to resolve and this Court will not resolve it anew. People v
Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 380; 465 NW2d 365 (1990).
Defendant next argues that her sentence is disproportionate. We disagree. A trial court’s
sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461
NW2d 1 (1990).
Defendant Anderson’s three-year minimum sentence for the more serious offense of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm is within the sentencing guidelines recommended minimum sentence range
and, therefore, is presumptively proportionate. People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 354-355; 408
NW2d 789 (1987). Although defendant had no prior criminal record, had three children and was
pregnant with a fourth, and committed the offenses in the context of a bad relationship, we cannot agree
that these factors constitute unusual circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption of
proportionality. See People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). The trial court
did not abuse its sentencing discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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