PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES LEE DAVIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 9, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 212348
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 97-082110-FH
CHARLES LEE DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Murphy and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial conviction of delivering less than fifty grams of
cocaine, contrary to MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). Defendant was sentenced
to three to twenty years’ imprisonment. The prosecution in this case alleged that defendant sold crack
cocaine to a man named Michael Smelser while he was observed by an undercover police surveillance
team; Smelser testified against defendant at trial. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict
because the testimony adduced at trial was insufficient to support a conviction for the crime charged.
We review a sufficiency of the evidence claim de novo by viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecutor to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 722-723; 597
NW2d 73 (1999); People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513-514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992).
Defendant cites the testimony of his alibi witnesses in support of his insufficiency of the evidence
argument. Defendant’s alibi witnesses testified that defendant was at their home between the hours of
approximately 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. and so could not have made the alleged drug deal. Mark
Jones, one of defendant’s friends, testified that he was at the house where the alleged transaction took
place from 1:00 p.m. until 10:30 p.m., and that he did not see defendant at the house during that time
period.
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Defendant also cites Officer Brett Stiles’ testimony that he never saw Smelser or defendant
exchange anything. Defendant places considerable emphasis on the fact that Smelser had two prior
felony convictions and would have had a strong incentive to fabricate testimony against defendant in
order to escape prosecution for possession of the cocaine that the police found under the seat in
Smelser’s car. Defendant would have this Court disregard Smelser’s testimony and then conclude that
the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction.
We conclude that, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the
prosecutor provided sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction. Smelser’s credibility was a
question for the jury. People v McFall, 224 Mich App 403, 412; 569 NW2d 828 (1997), citing
Wolfe, supra at 514-515. Although Smelser may have had an incentive to lie about where he obtained
the cocaine in order to protect himself from prosecution, the jury was free to conclude that Smelser
testified truthfully. Furthermore, Officer Stiles testified that two other individuals approached the house
prior to Smelser and only stayed there for approximately five minutes. Officer Stiles testified that in his
experience, crack houses typically receive a high frequency of foot and vehicle traffic from visitors who
usually only stay for short periods of time. Stiles also testified that during a subsequent raid at the house,
he found plastic baggies on the porch of the house and that they contained a white residue. Based on
the foregoing, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Smelser’s testimony was true, that the house
was a crack house, and that defendant was the source of the cocaine found in Smelser’s possession.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court did not comply with MCR 6.419(D) in that it did not
state the reason for denying defendant’s motion. We note that that defendant did not object to the trial
court for the alleged error, and conclude that the issue is unpreserved for our review. People v Grant,
445 Mich 535, 544-547; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). In any event, we note that the trial court stated that
it was denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict because there was adequate evidence presented
for the case to go to the trier of fact for the ultimate determination of witness credibility. We therefore
conclude that the trial court’s statement was sufficient to satisfy MCR 6.419(D).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Helene N. White
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