GRZYWA INC V THOMAS MEAKIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GRZYWA, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
May 5, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 210604
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-606879-NZ
THOMAS MEAKIN and MEAKIN &
ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Hoekstra and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (claim barred by statute of limitations). We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff, which operates a bar in the city of Southgate, purchased liquor liability and general
liability insurance policies from defendants in March 1992. Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that it paid
over $125,000 in premiums to defendant for two to three years; however, in its answers to
interrogatories, plaintiff asserted that it paid defendants $28,993.33 in premiums from March to June
1992. Plaintiff alleged that defendant Meakin represented that he worked with Avalon Insurance
Company, registered in Bermuda, which had a solid history, was pretty good about paying claims, and
was considered the best in the field for providing insurance to bars. In January 1993, Avalon was
instructed to stop writing business and subsequently filed for liquidation. Plaintiff alleged that it paid
more than $150,000 in costs and attorney fees to defend claims that Avalon was supposed to have
insured.
On February 21, 1996, plaintiff filed a five-count complaint alleging fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, innocent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. Defendants
moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that, given the nature of
plaintiff’s allegations, the complaint was time-barred under that the applicable three-year period of
limitation provided in MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). The trial court agreed and summarily
dismissed plaintiff’s case.
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On appeal, plaintiff maintains that the general six-year limitation period set forth in MCL
600.5813; MSA 27A.5813, applies to its claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. We agree.
The question whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations is one of law for the court
to decide in the absence of disputed facts. Solowy v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 454 Mich 214, 230; 561
NW2d 843 (1997). This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998);
Insurance Comm’r v Aageson Thibo Agency, 226 Mich App 336, 340; 573 NW2d 637 (1997).
When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must accept as
true a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, affidavits, or other documentary evidence submitted
and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Guerra v Garratt, 222 Mich App 285, 289; 564 NW2d
121 (1997). If no facts are in dispute and reasonable minds could not differ concerning the legal effect
of those facts, whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a question for the court
as a matter of law. Id. However, if a material factual dispute exists in such a manner that factual
development could provide a basis for recovery, summary disposition is inappropriate. Id.
Chapter 58 of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.5801 et seq.; MSA 27A.5801 et seq.,
governs the times for pursuing various causes of action. Generally, three years is the limit to “recover
damages . . . for injury to a person or property.” MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). However,
MCL 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813 provides a six-year limitation period for all personal actions not
otherwise provided for in the statutes. It is established that the applicable limitations period for fraud or
misrepresentation is six y
ears under the general six-year limitation period. See Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Michigan v Folkema, 174 Mich App 476, 481; 436 NW2d 670 (1988); Fagerberg v
LeBlanc, 164 Mich App 349, 353; 416 NW2d 438 (1987), citing Kwasny v Driessen, 42 Mich App
442; 202 NW2d 443 (1972). The crucial question, however, is whether the general six-year limitation
period applies to the allegations underlying plaintiff’s fraud and misrepresentation counts.
The applicable limitation period is determined by focusing on the nature of the interest allegedly
harmed. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, supra at 480. This determination requires a claim to be read as
a whole to arrive at the gravamen of a plaintiff’s grievance. Id. When a complaint specifically pleads all
of the necessary elements of fraud, the general six-year period of limitation governing fraud actions will
apply to the fraud count. Kuebler v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 219
Mich App 1, 6; 555 NW2d 496 (1996). The burden of establishing the bar imposed by a statute of
limitations is normally on the party asserting the defense. Id.
To establish a cause of action for fraud or misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the
defendant made a material representation; (2) that the representation was false; (3) that when the
defendant made the representation, the defendant knew that it was false, or made it recklessly without
knowledge of its truth or falsity; (4) that the defendant made it with the intent that the plaintiff would act
on it; (5) that the plaintiff acted in reliance on it; and, (6) that the plaintiff suffered injury. Eerdmans v
Maki, 226 Mich App 360, 366; 573 NW2d 329 (1997); Kuebler, supra.
Our review of plaintiff’s complaint reveals that plaintiff specifically pleaded each of the
necessary elements of fraud and misrepresentation. Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the trial court was
required to accept plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true, and construe them in plaintiff’s favor.
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Guerra, supra. Therefore, the general six-year period of limitation, MCL 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813,
applies to plaintiff’s fraud and misrepresentation claims and, accordingly, those claims are timely.
Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claims of fraud and misrepresentation pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(7).
We reject, however, plaintiff’s contention that this Court should reverse the trial court’s ruling
summarily dismissing the case in its entirety and remand for trial. Plaintiff does not challenge the trial
court’s dismissal of its claims for innocent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or conversion on
appeal. Therefore, the dismissal of those claims shall stand. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich
App 700, 718; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). Further, defendants’ motion and the trial court’s ruling were
predicated on MCR 2.116(C)(7) and, thus, the trial court was required to accept all well-pleaded
allegations as true. Guerra, supra. However, defendants are not precluded on remand from testing the
factual support for plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and misrepresentation in an appropriate motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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