IN RE ONTARIO GREGORY MINORS

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS In the Matter of ONTARIO GREGORY, Minor. FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, UNPUBLISHED April 28, 2000 Petitioner-Appellee, v No. 221750 Kalamazoo Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 94-000068-NA ANTHONY GRAY, Respondent-Appellant, and ANDREA GREGORY, Respondent. Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Doctoroff and T.L. Ludington*, JJ. MEMORANDUM. Respondent-appellant Anthony Gray appeals as of right from the family court order terminating his parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(h). We affirm. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). According to the evidence, respondent-appellant was bound to be imprisoned for at least fifteen months from the date the court authorized the petition for termination, and, upon his release, would be residing in a year-long rehabilitation program. The evidence further showed that respondent-appellant had never provided care or custody for the child, and that, beyond good intentions, had neither plans nor the * Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment. -1­ means to do so within reasonable time after his release from prison. Thus the trial court properly concluded that respondent-appellant’s period of imprisonment would deprive the child of a normal home for at least two years. MCL 712A.19b(3)(h); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(h). Further, respondent-appellant does not contest the other elements of § 19b(3)(h)—that he had not provided proper care and custody for the child and was not reasonably likely to do so within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. Because these latter elements by themselves satisfy § 19b(3)(g) as an independent basis for termination, which was expressly alleged in the amended petition, that provision affords an alternative basis for affirming the trial court. See In re Perry, 193 Mich App 648, 650-651; 484 NW2d 678 (1992). Additionally, respondent-appellant does not argue, and the record does not show, that termination of his parental rights was “clearly not” in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, supra at 472-473. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights to the child. Affirmed. /s/ Roman S. Gribbs /s/ Martin M. Doctoroff /s/ Thomas L. Ludington -2­

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