IN RE KYLE ALLEN KIDD; MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KYLE ALLEN KIDD and DAVID
BRIAN KROWL, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 28, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
SANDRA JUNE CASTILLO, a/k/a SANDRA
JUNE KIDD, a/k/a SANDRA JUNE KROWL,
No. 218515
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-362278
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ALVIN KIDD and DAVID BRIAN KROWL, SR.,
Respondents.
In the Matter of KYLE ALLEN KIDD, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 218790
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-362278
ALVIN R. KIDD,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
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SANDRA JUNE CASTILLO, a/k/a SANDRA
JUNE KIDD, a/k/a SANDRA JUNE KROWL, and
DAVID BRIAN KROWL, SR.,
Respondents.
Before: Collins, P.J., and Neff and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondents-appellants Sandra June Krowl and Alvin Kidd appeal as of right the termination of
their parental rights to Kyle Allen Kidd pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.
In Docket No. 218515, the family court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and
(g) were both established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to respondent Krowl. MCR
5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Because only one statutory
ground is required to terminate parental rights, In re Huisman, 230 Mich App 372, 384-385; 584
NW2d 349 (1998), we need not decide whether termination of respondent Krowl’s parental rights was
also warranted under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii) and (j). Because respondent Krowl failed to show that
termination of her parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests, MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5), the family court did not err in terminating her parental rights to the child. In re
Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997).
In Docket No. 218790, the family court did not clearly err in finding that §19b(3)(g) was
established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to respondent Kidd. MCR 5.974(I); In re
Miller, supra. Because only one statutory ground is required in order to terminate parental rights, In re
Huisman, supra, we need not decide whether termination of respondent Kidd’s parental rights was
also warranted under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i) and (j). Because respondent Kidd failed to show that
termination of his parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests, MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5), the family court did not err in terminating his parental rights to the child. In re
Hall-Smith, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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