EST OF JANET T LYONS V KATHERINE ANN DONALDSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES LYONS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of JANET T. LYONS, a/k/a JANET F.
LYONS, a/k/a JANET FAYE LYONS,
UNPUBLISHED
April 28, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
KATHERINE ANN
DONALDSON,
a/k/a
KATHERINE A. DONALDSON, and JAN’S
FLOWER & GIFT SHOP, INC.,
No. 216589
Hillsdale Probate Court
LC No. 98-031933 SE
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Meter and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right a bench trial award of a parcel of real estate on which the
decedent had operated a flower and gift shop. The court after trial awarded the property to the
decedent’s estate. We affirm.
Defendants first contend that the trial court erred in determining that the real estate on which the
flower shop was located did not represent “property used in connection with any trade or business.”
This Court reviews a probate court’s findings of fact to determine whether they were clearly erroneous.
In re Webb H Coe Marital & Residuary Trusts, 233 Mich App 525, 531; 593 NW2d 190 (1999).
“Findings of fact by a probate judge sitting without a jury will not be reversed unless the evidence
clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” In re Kurtz Estate, 113 Mich App 769, 771-772;
318 NW2d 590 (1982).
The court’s primary duty when faced with the task of resolving a disputed testamentary
disposition is to effectuate as nearly as possible the intention of the testator. When no ambiguity exists,
that intention must be gleaned from the four corners of the instrument, and the court must interpret and
enforce the language employed. In re Butterfield Estate, 405 Mich 702, 711; 275 NW2d 262
(1979). The court cannot resort to parol testimony to add to, vary or contradict the language of a will
unambiguous on its face. Detroit Wabeek Bank & Trust Co v City of Adrian, 349 Mich 136, 143;
-1
84 NW2d 441 (1957). If the court cannot ascertain the testator’s intention solely by reference to the
instrument, however, “in other words, if the document evidences a patent or latent ambiguity, there are
two external sources through consideration of which a court may establish the intent of the testator: (1)
surrounding circumstances and (2) rules of construction.” In re Butterfield, supra.
This issue involves the interpretation of one paragraph of the decedent’s last will and testament,
specifically will and testament section II, titled “Tangible Personal Property.” Under this section, the
will provides in relevant part as follows:
I have five children, including Thomas F. Lyons, Jr., James Patrick Lyons,
Melanie Fay Lyons Tibbetts, Katherine Ann Lyons Donaldson, and Sue Lyons. I give
all of my tangible personal property, not including property used in connection
with any business or profession, for which I have made separate disposition, to my
children, if they survive me, in equal shares. My tangible personal property includes,
but is not limited to, my household goods and personal effects, jewelry, automobiles and
boats, together with all policies insuring such property against loss. [Emphasis added.]
Defendants suggest that while section II distributes equally to the decedent’s children the decedent’s
personal property, section II specifically excludes from this distribution all “property used in connection
with” operation of the flower shop, which excluded property includes the real estate on which the flower
shop is located.
This paragraph of section II, however, clearly and unambiguously refers only to the decedent’s
disposition of personal property used in the operation of the flower shop. The paragraph heading and
repeated other references within the paragraph to “tangible personal property” weigh heavily against
defendants’ suggestion that, in mentioning “property used in connection with any business,” the
decedent contemplated real property utilized by the business. We conclude that the trial court properly
interpreted the unspecified term “property” in the context of this paragraph as referencing only tangible
personal property utilized in the business’ operation. In re Butterfield, supra; Detroit Wabeek Bank,
supra.
Defendants also assert that the trial court erroneously ignored many witnesses’ testimony
regarding the decedent’s intent to leave to defendant Donaldson the real estate on which the flower
shop is located. The parties did not dispute at trial that while the flower shop apparently included the
real estate on its balance sheet and income tax returns, the record legal title to the real estate remained in
the decedent’s name, and that the decedent executed no instruments of transfer purporting to convey
title to the flower shop. In the absence of any written instrument purporting to transfer title in the
property to defendants, the trial court correctly concluded that the statute of frauds prohibited its
consideration of oral testimony concerning the decedent’s intent to transfer the real estate. Frosh v
Sportsman’s Showcase, Inc, 4 Mich App 408, 416-417; 145 NW2d 241 (1966) (“The statute of
frauds is express that no interests in lands . . . shall be created or transferred otherwise than by deed.”
“The law does not permit the title to rest in parol, nor does it allow anything which is evidenced by the
deed to be changed on parol testimony of promises, agreements, understandings.”). Because title to the
property remained in the decedent’s name and the decedent’s will did not otherwise specifically dispose
-2
of the real estate, we conclude that the trial court correctly relied on the recorded title to the property in
finding that the real estate belonged to the decedent’s estate, and that the real estate passed in equal
shares to the decedent’s children according to the residuary clause of the decedent’s will. 1
Defendants also argue that the decedent’s estate owes the flower shop $82,609 for a 1991 sale
of the real estate (from the flower shop to the decedent) that was never properly completed. As
evidenced by the deed to the property, however, the decedent in April 1990 obtained legal title to the
real estate from Henry E. and Margaret F. Resseguie. As discussed above, no instruments of transfer
purported to convey title from the decedent to the flower shop. Thus, no instrument existed indicating
any transfer of the real estate from the flower shop back to the decedent. Because the evidence
established no flower shop interest in the real estate, we conclude that defendants’ argument lacks merit.
Lastly, defendant claims that the decedent’s estate owes the flower shop $31,147.49 for
various leasehold improvements that the flower shop funded. Because defendants cite no authority in
support of this contention, however, they have waived our consideration of this issue. Goolsby v
Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 655, n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984).
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Donald S. Owens
1
To the extent that plaintiff suggests that the trial court erred in finding that a van used by the flower
shop passed to defendants under the decedent’s will, we decline to consider this contention because
plaintiff failed to file a cross appeal pursuant to MCR 7.207. Barnell v Taubman Co, Inc, 203 Mich
App 110, 123; 512 NW2d 13 (1993).
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.