PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS EUGENE RUCKER III
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 28, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 208671
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 97-008402-FC
THOMAS EUGENE RUCKER, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Smolenski and Collins, JJ.
HOLBROOK, JR., P.J. (dissenting)
To be proportionate, a sentence must be tailored to reflect the circumstances of the offense and
the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Sentencing
guidelines are used “to insure that sentencing decisions are based on a consistent set of legally relevant
factors and that such factors are assigned equal importance for all offenders.” People v Whitney, 205
Mich App 435, 436; 517 NW2d 814 (1994). Sentences that depart from the sentencing guidelines are
subject to careful scrutiny by a reviewing court. Milbourn, supra at 656-657.
In imposing this Draconian departure from the guidelines recommended range of 96 to 180
months’ imprisonment, the trial court was primarily driven by its view of defendant’s rehabilitative
potential. Given what it considered to be defendant’s low potential for rehabilitation, and having
concluded that defendant’s sentence would not cause others like him to be deterred from engaging in
similar behavior, the trial court concluded that the only goal of punishment that it could actualize in this
case was the goal of protecting society. “It leaves me with the final reason for incarceration,” the court
opined, “and probably the only one that’s valid anymore and that is incapacitation.”
In support of its conclusion that defendant had virtually no chance to be successfully
rehabilitated, the court made the following observations: “I also do not think that our prison system
rehabilitates, perhaps is not capable of rehabilitating—you or people who commit these acts. . . . If I
thought there was any reasonable likelihood that you would be rehabilitated in a short period of time, I
would fashion a sentence to reflect that.” I take these comments to mean that the trial court based its
conclusion respecting rehabilitation on a psychological judgment about the rehabilitative potential of
pedophiles in general. Absent any evidence in the record as to the soundness of such a conclusion, I
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believe this medical judgment is conspicuously outside the professional expertise of the court. It also
does not reflect the rehabilitative potential of this particular offender. The sentences of individuals who
commit this same crime should not be subject to the uncertain, and potentially wide ranging
psychological speculations of the courts, unsupported by the record, on how defendants will respond to
psychiatric treatment.
The court’s comments also reflect a belief about the ability of the Michigan prison system to
rehabilitate criminals like defendant. In essence, the court indicated that our prison system is incapable
of meeting the goal of rehabilitating such criminals. If this observation is based on the court’s beliefs
about pedophiles in general, I have already noted that I do not believe this reasoning supports the
sentence imposed. If this observation serves as a disparaging commentary on the efficacy of our prison
system’s rehabilitative efforts, then I fail to see why this defendant should shoulder those failures through
the imposition of a life sentence. Further, if this observation accurately characterizes the prison system’s
ability to rehabilitate individuals such as defendant, then it would seem logical that all defendant’s
convicted of this crime should be given a mandatory life sentence. This is a political judgment that I
believe is best left in the hands of the legislative branch of government.
Certainly the crimes committed by defendant are heinous, and he deserves a significant and
severe prison sentence. I am not convinced however, that the life sentence imposed by the trial court
reflects the circumstances of this offense and this offender. Milbourn, supra at 635-636; People v
Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 80-81; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Accordingly, I would reverse defendant’s
sentence and remand for resentencing. In a related matter, given the certainty with which the trial court
expressed its feelings on this matter, and in order to preserve the appearance of justice, I would assign
the case to a different judge on remand. People v Evans, 156 Mich App 68, 72; 401 NW2d 312
(1986).
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
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