PEOPLE OF MI V TORONTO GARDETTE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 28, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193519
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-004256-FC
TORONTO GARDETTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Gribbs and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case has been remanded to us for reconsideration in light of Gray v Maryland, 523 US
185; 118 S Ct 1151; 140 L Ed 2d 294 (1998), which addresses the use of a redacted confession
made by a nontestifying codefendant in a joint trial. Originally, we held that it was not error requiring
reversal for the trial court in the case at hand to admit into evidence the redacted statement of
defendant’s codefendant. People v Gardette, unpublished opinion per curium of the Court of Appeals,
issued September 11, 1998 (Docket No. 193519), slip op at 2. Finding nothing in Gray that warrants
reversing that decision, we again affirm.
In Bruton v United States, 391 US 123, 135-137; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968),
the United States Supreme Court concluded that a defendant’s constitutionally protected right to
confront the witnesses against him1 is violated by the introduction at trial of an unredacted confession by
a nontestifying codefendant that facially implicates the defendant in the crimes charged. In Richardson
v Marsh, 481 US 200, 211; 107 S Ct 1702; 95 L Ed 2d 176 (1987), the Court held that a confession
“redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence,” fell
outside of the protection offered by Bruton. The issue under review in Gray was “whether redaction
that replaces a defendant’s name with an obvious indication of deletion, such as a blank space, the word
‘deleted,’ or a similar symbol, still falls with Bruton’s protective rule.” Gray, supra at 192. The Gray
Court concluded that such redactions “are similar enough to Bruton’s unredacted confessions as to
warrant the same legal results.” Id. at 195.
The confession in Gray had been redacted by leaving a blank space whenever the defendant’s
name appeared. “Consequently, the police detective who read the confession into evidence said the
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word ‘deleted’ or ‘deletion’ whenever” the defendant’s name appeared. Gray, supra at 188. The
Gray Court observed that a jury faced with a confession in which a defendant’s name is replaced with
those, or conceptually similar redactions, will likely just assume that the redaction refers to the
defendant. Id. at 193. Further, the Court was concerned that such conspicuous editing will only serve
to draw a jury’s attention, thereby actually encouraging the jury to speculate on the identity of “Mr.
Blank.” Id. Finally, the Gray Court concluded that because such alterations are directly accusatory,
they facially incriminate the defendant in the precise manner forbidden by Bruton. Id. at 194-196.
The redactions in the case now before us are not analogous and do not implicate the same
concerns. Here, defendant’s name was replaced with the reference, “the other guy.”2 This does not
unduly invite the jury to speculate about “the other guy’s” identity, nor does it facially incriminate the
defendant. Other than the reference’s indication that “the other guy” is male, it offers no description that
would necessarily point an accusatory finger at the defendant. See Harrington v California, 395 US
250, 253; 89 S Ct 1726; 23 L Ed 2d 284 (1969). It also does not focus the jury’s attention on the
existence of the editing in the same way a blank space or the verbally repeated “deleted” would.
The Gray Court did not indicate that all forms of redaction would compromise a defendant’s
right of confrontation. Indeed, it offered the following example as an acceptable redacted statement.
“Question: Who was in the group that beat Stacy?
“Answer: Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys.” App. 11
Why could the witness not, instead, have said:
“Question: Who was in the group that beat Stacy?
“Answer: Me and a few other guys.” [Id. at 196 (emphasis added).]
The redaction in the case at hand is in the same class as the approved of example offered by the Gray
Court.
Furthermore, if the phrase “the other guy” were to be found constitutionally objectionable, this
would invariably lead to a situation where the existence of any person other than the person who made
the statement would have to be removed from the statement before it could be introduced at a joint trial.
Such editing could improperly lead a jury into believing that the codefendant had acted alone when he
had not. This type of redaction could also undermine the usefulness of the statement against the person
who made it. For example, in the description of the crime offered by the codefendant in this case, it
was “the other two guys” who forced the two victims from the car at gun point and ultimately shot the
fleeing male victim while the codefendant stood several feet distant. If the existence of “the other two
guys” is eliminated from the account, then the statement becomes nonsensical. Even if the existence of
only defendant is removed from the statement, the narrative would become unintelligible unless
erroneous facts were added. For example, how could the other man have been on both sides of the car
forcing the occupants out at the same time? You would have to alter the statement to indicate that the
man on the driver’s side of the car forced the passenger out while still on the driver’s side of the car.
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This then would not match the testimony of the female victim who stated that she was ordered out of the
car by one man while the other two forced her companion out of the car. While a defendant’s right to
confront the witnesses against him should not be undermined by allowing facially incriminating statements
like the ones in Bruton and Gray into evidence, neither should a jury be purposefully mislead by the
judicially approved alteration of evidence. The integrity of the judicial system is compromised by both
occurrences.
Accordingly, in light of the cautionary instructions given regarding the proper use of the
statement, we conclude that defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the introduction
of the redacted statement of his codefendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Jane E. Markey
1
US Const, Am XI.
2
There are actually three perpetrators identified in the codefendant’s statement. The other two men are
identified collectively as “the two guys,” and individually as “the one guy” and “the other guy.”
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