OAKLAND COUNTY PROSECUTOR V JOEL D PIETRANGELO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
OAKLAND COUNTY PROSECUTOR,
UNPUBLISHED
April 21, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 222422
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-010246-AP
JOEL D. PIETRANGELO,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and J.B. Sullivan*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by leave granted from an order of the circuit court vacating the parole
board’s grant of parole. We reverse.
On March 29, 1993, respondent pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a), for engaging in several incidents of oral sex
with his girlfriend’s nine-year old daughter in 1988. Respondent was sentenced to concurrent terms of
seven to twenty years’ imprisonment.1 On September 16, 1998, the Michigan Parole Board granted
respondent parole, effective December 1, 1998, for a two-year term. The prosecution appealed the
parole board’s decision to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the parole board and vacated
respondent’s parole.
On appeal, respondent argues that the circuit court erred in concluding the parole board abused
its discretion in granting parole. We agree. A prisoner’s release on parole is within the discretion of the
parole board. MCL 791.234(8); MSA 28.2304(8); In re Parole of Johnson, 235 Mich App 21, 24;
596 NW2d 202 (1999). The parole board’s decision whether to grant parole is reviewed for a clear
abuse of discretion. MCR 7.104(D)(5)(b); Killebrew v Dep’t of Corrections, 237 Mich App 650;
___ NW2d ___ (1999). An abuse of discretion will be found if an unprejudiced person, considering
the facts on which the decision maker acted, would say that there was no justification or excuse for the
ruling made. Id. The parole board’s discretion is limited by statutory guidelines. Hopkins v Michigan
Parole Bd, 237 Mich App 629; ___ NW2d ___ (1999). The foremost guideline being:
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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A prisoner shall not be given liberty on parole until the board has reasonable assurance,
after consideration of all of the facts and circumstances, including the prisoner’s mental
and social attitude, that the prisoner will not become a menace to society or to the
public safety. [MCL 791.233(1)(a); MSA 28.2303(1)(a); see Hopkins, supra at 643,
n 7; Killebrew, supra at 653.]
A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the parole board. Killebrew,
supra at 653. The parole board is required to utilize parole guidelines to assist it in making release
decisions. MCL 791.233e(2); MSA 28.2303(6)(2) sets forth factors that should be considered in a
parole decision, providing:
In developing the parole guidelines, the department shall consider factors including, but
not limited to, the following:
(a) The offense for which the prisoner is incarcerated at the time of parole
consideration.
(b) The prisoner's institutional program performance.
(c) The prisoner's institutional conduct.
(d) The prisoner's prior criminal record. As used in this subdivision, "prior
criminal record" means the recorded criminal history of a prisoner, including all
misdemeanor and felony convictions, probation violations, juvenile adjudications for acts
that would have been crimes if committed by an adult, parole failures, and delayed
sentences.
(e) Other relevant factors as determined by the department, if not otherwise
prohibited by law.
In the present case, the record indicates respondent completed sex offender group therapy,
having attended all thirty-six weekly sessions. Psychologist Mark Skinner indicated in his first report,
completed after respondent participated in two months of group therapy, that respondent was an active
group member, who accepted responsibility for engaging in oral sex with the victim on several occasions
and was willing to discuss the incidents. Skinner’s second report, completed after respondent
underwent one year of therapy, indicated respondent continued to acknowledge two separate sexual
assaults upon the victim, but denied the frequency of his contact with the victim as expressed in the
presentence investigation. Skinner reported that respondent identified the thoughts, feelings and
behaviors that caused him to commit the offenses and demonstrated remorse for the damage he caused
the victim. Skinner’s final report indicated respondent accepted responsibility for his actions and no
longer justified his actions.2 Respondent recognized that his actions were due to sexually deviant
fantasies, not educational motivations.3 Skinner indicated respondent completed a Relapse Prevention
Plan, which, if implemented, would reduce the likelihood that respondent would re-offend. Skinner did
not mandate further therapy, but stated the decision to continue treatment should most properly be left
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to respondent. Skinner recommended that standard procedure for parole of sex offenders be
implemented in respondent’s case.
In granting parole, the parole board placed several conditions on respondent designed to
prevent him from contacting children and from possessing sexually stimulating material. The parole
board determined respondent accepted full responsibility for his offenses, demonstrated satisfactory
conduct while incarcerated, met his therapeutic goals, adequately involved himself in the prison work
program and showed suitable arrangements for work. Overall, the parole board determined
respondent’s parole guideline score fell within the “high probability of parole” range.
The circuit court ruled that the parole board abused its discretion because it did not adequately
consider respondent’s prior conviction in 1988 for malicious use of telephone-offensive and vulgar4 and
because the psychiatric reports did not provide reasonable assurance respondent would not become a
menace to society. We conclude, however, that the record indicates the contrary and the circuit court
improperly substituted its judgment for that of the parole board. Killebrew, supra at 2. Skinner’s first
report indicated he was aware of respondent’s prior convictions for OUIL and malicious use of
telephone-offensive and vulgar. The parole board also stated in its January 21, 1999, letter to the
circuit court that it was aware of respondent’s criminal history at the time it made its decision to grant
parole. Although petitioner contends respondent’s acknowledgment during therapy that dating women
with underage daughters was a “high risk factor” and respondent’s admission that he has an attraction
for teenage girls, is proof respondent would present a danger to society, Skinner opined that respondent
accomplished the goals of therapy and was eligible for implementation of parole procedures without
further mandated therapy. We recognize that respondent disputes the frequency of his contact with the
victim as set forth in the presentence report. However, respondent has never disputed engaging in the
acts to which he pleaded guilty. Overall, the circumstances do not indicate there was no justification or
excuse for the parole board’s decision. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in granting petitioner’s
motion to vacate parole because the parole board’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.
Reversed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
1
Oakland Circuit Court case nos. 92-116950-FC and 92-116951-FC.
2
At the time of his sentencing and at the beginning of his incarceration, respondent claimed that he
engaged in the incidents of sexual contact with the victim in order to educate her and to satisfy the
victim’s own curiosities about sex.
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3
We recognize that Skinner indicated at one point in his final report that respondent attempted to
intellectualize his actions and “through a great deal of coaching from the group” acknowledged that he
acted due to sexual deviant fantasies. However, we also note that Skinner indicated later in that final
report that respondent was able to acknowledge his deviant behavior without qualification, after re
completing several assignments.
4
That conviction was based on respondent’s conduct of proposing to a woman on a party-line that her
thirteen-year-old son come to his apartment, watch pornographic movies and perform sex acts for
money.
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