PEOPLE OF MI V ANDREW SCOTT TACKEBURY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 21, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 213985
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 97-014075-FC
ANDREW SCOTT TACKEBURY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Cavanagh and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2); MSA 28.305(a)(2), kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581, two counts of felonious
assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, MCL
750.226; MSA 28.423, assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and killing or
torture of animals, MCL 750.50b; MSA 28.245(b). Defendant was sentenced as a second habitual
offender, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to concurrent terms of thirteen to twenty years for the home
invasion conviction, twenty-five to fifty years for the kidnapping conviction, two to four years for the
felonious assault convictions, three to five years for the carrying a dangerous weapon with an unlawful
intent conviction, twenty-five to fifty years for the assault with intent to murder conviction, and two to
four years for the killing an animal conviction. Defendant appeals by right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues his conviction for kidnapping should be vacated because plaintiff
presented insufficient evidence of secret confinement, an essential element of the kidnapping charge.
We disagree. When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court reviews the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime charged were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jolly, 442
Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993). Michigan’s kidnapping statute, MCL 750.349; MSA
28.581, makes it unlawful to secretly confine a person against his will. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich
287, 296-297; 519 NW2d 108 (1994). “[A] kidnapping conviction may be premised on a showing of
confinement that in fact is secret or upon a showing of forcible seizure or confinement with intent to
secretly confine, whether or not the confinement remains a secret.” Id. at 300-301. The term “secret
-1
confinement” is not defined by statute. However, the Supreme Court defined “secret confinement” in
Jaffray, supra at 309:
[T]he essence of “secret confinement” as contemplated by the statute is deprivation of
the assistance of others by virtue of the victim’s inability to communicate his
predicament. “Secret confinement” is not predicated solely on the existence or
nonexistence of a single factor. Rather, consideration of the totality of the circumstances
is required when determining whether the confinement itself or the location of
confinement was secret, thereby depriving the victim of the assistance of others. That
others may be suspicious or aware of the confinement is relevant to the determination,
but is not always dispositive.
When looking at the totality of the circumstances in this case, we find sufficient evidence of
secret confinement to sustain defendant’s conviction for kidnapping. Ann Sells testified that she was in
her bedroom at night when defendant confronted her with a knife. Defendant ordered her out of her
bed and stated that he was going to kill her daughter, Jennifer Sells, who had recently broke-off a
relationship with defendant. Defendant told Ann that she was going to watch as he killed Jennifer and
that he would then kill her. Defendant forced Ann downstairs and cut the telephone lines throughout the
house. When Ann asked to use the bathroom, defendant insisted that she leave the door open and
stood in the doorway, so she would not escape. Defendant held the knife at all times during the
incident, sometimes becoming agitated and kicking and stabbing furniture. Although Ann wanted to
leave, she felt frightened and believed it was not safe to try to escape. Defendant eventually ordered
Ann to the sun porch at the rear of the house, where he ordered her to close the window blinds.
Defendant told her he was going to kill Jennifer’s pet rabbit. As he knelt to remove the rabbit from its
cage, Ann ran to a neighbor’s house and contacted the police.
That evidence was sufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude that defendant forcibly confined
Ann Sells with an intent to keep her secretly confined. Jaffray, supra at 300-301. Despite the fact
that Ann Sells was in her own home and there was testimony that her daughter had spoken with her
earlier and believed that she was home, there is no evidence anyone was suspicious or aware of Ann’s
confinement. Id. at 309. No one knew of her confinement until she escaped. Viewing this evidence in
a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence of secret confinement to find the
elements of kidnapping were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. People v McNeal, 152 Mich
App 404, 412; 393 NW2d 907 (1986); See People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 343-345; 578
NW2d 692 (1998); People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 112; 570 NW2d 146 (1997).
Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of first
degree home invasion because he had permission to enter the house uninvited and unannounced. We
disagree. The elements of a home invasion are: (1) the entering without permission; (2) of an occupied
dwelling; (3) with felonious intent. Warren, supra at 348; see People v Brownfield, (After Remand)
216 Mich App 429, 431; 548 NW2d 248 (1996). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, particularly the testimony of Ann Sells, we find that there was sufficient evidence
presented for the jury to determine that defendant did not have permission to enter the house on the
night in question. While defendant may have been allowed to enter the house on prior occasions while
-2
he was dating Jennifer, the couple had broken up. Defendant did not have permission to enter the
house without knocking once he was no longer dating Jennifer, and he never had permission to enter
with a weapon. Given the threats defendant made to Ann and Jennifer, his extreme assaultive behavior
and his conduct of gutting the pet rabbit, there is sufficient evidence defendant entered the home with a
felonious intent. Id.
Defendant next contends his conviction for assault with intent to murder must also be reversed
due to insufficient evidence. Again, we disagree. The elements of assault with intent to commit murder
are (1) assault; (2) with actual intent to murder; (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.
People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 674; 528 NW2d 842 (1995). Here, defendant contends that
the second element, intent to murder, was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Intent may be proven by facts and circumstances that surround the case. People v Safiedine,
163 Mich App 25, 29; 414 NW2d 143 (1987); People v Daniels, 163 Mich App 703, 706; 415
NW2d 282 (1987). Because a defendant’s state of mind is difficult to prove, minimal circumstantial
evidence is sufficient. People v Bowers, 136 Mich App 284, 297; 356 NW2d 618 (1984). An intent
to kill may be inferred from the evidence. People v Warren (After Remand), 200 Mich App 586,
588; 504 NW2d 907 (1993).
We find the evidence of defendant’s intent to kill sufficient to sustain his conviction. Once
Jennifer Sells returned home, defendant held a knife to her throat and threatened to kill her. The use of
a lethal weapon is the kind of evidence that will support an inference of an intent to kill. People v Ray,
56 Mich App 610, 615; 224 NW2d 735 (1974). Defendant also told the police repeatedly that he
wanted to kill Jennifer. We therefore find defendant’s argument without merit.
Finally, defendant argues his sentences for assault with intent to murder and kidnapping were
disproportionately long. This Court reviews a trial court’s sentence imposed on an habitual offender for
abuse of discretion. People v Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich 320, 323-324; 562 NW2d 460
(1997). A given sentence can be said to constitute an abuse of discretion if that sentence violates the
principle of proportionality, which requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to
the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435
Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). If it is shown that a defendant has an inability to conform his
conduct to the laws of society, sentencing the defendant as an habitual offender is not an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. Hansford, supra at 326. Here, the crimes were of a violent nature and
defendant displayed a propensity to terrorize his victims. Defendant kept Ann Sells confined at knife
point. He told her he wanted her to watch him kill her daughter and that he would then kill her.
Defendant gutted a pet rabbit. He then waited for Jennifer Sells to return home, grabbed her by the hair
and shirt and held the knife to her neck. When Jennifer’s friend, Sam Restifo, attempted to intervene,
defendant swung the knife and threatened to kill him and Jennifer. Defendant had a criminal history and
was a potential threat to Jennifer and Ann Sells. Such circumstances demonstrated that defendant was
unable to control his anger or conform his conduct to the laws of society. We therefore find no abuse of
discretion arising from the sentence imposed upon defendant.
-3
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.