MILTON H GOLDRATH V PATRICK L BEACH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MILTON H. GOLDRATH, HENRY WHITING,
JR., CLARA G. WHITING, SEYMOUR
GORDON, MARILYN GORDON, ROBERT W.
APPLEFORD, MARY M. WHITING,
MACAULEY WHITING, JR., SARA WHITING,
D. EUGENE THOMPSON, ANNE A.
THOMPSON, MARVIN D. SIEGEL, GLORIA J.
SIEGEL, BRUCE A. KRESGE, PEGGY KRESGE,
STUART K. JESKE, BARBARA H. JESKE,
JAMES B. JACKSON, ROSEMARY JACKSON,
JOSEPH L. HARDIG, JR., D. LARRY SHERMAN,
JANE F. SHERMAN, PILGRIM INVESTMENT
CO., VINCENT C. SECONTINE, HALPERIN
FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, MARVIN GORDON
and SYLVIA A. GORDON,
UNPUBLISHED
April 21, 2000
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 212009
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 93-000963-CK
PATRICK L. BEACH,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., Murphy, and R. B. Burns*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal by right from the trial court’s order issued on remand dismissing plaintiffs’
complaint with prejudice and granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. Review of the trial
court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is de novo. Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc., 215
Mich App 198, 202; 544 NW2d 727 (1996). We affirm.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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This case arises out of a dispute over responsibility for the payment of a mortgage debt. The
trial court on remand believed that it could not address the merits of plaintiffs’ statutory indemnity claim
because of our earlier opinion in this case.1 The trial court’s belief was based on the following section of
our opinion:
At oral argument in this Court, the parties agreed that there is no viable theory of
implied indemnity. Accordingly, we need only address the issue whether there was a
valid assignment (or at least a genuine issue of material fact concerning the assignment).
We agree with defendant that there was not.
An assignment is valid only if, at the time of the assignment, the assignor
possessed the rights which he is assigning. [Citations omitted.] The bank had
discharged the mortgage on April 16. Therefore, it had nothing to assign on April 17.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is clear that we did not address plaintiffs’ statutory indemnity claim. It is also clear that the lower
court, before remand, granted summary disposition for plaintiffs based at least in part on the statutory
indemnity claim: “[w]hile Plaintiffs in the instant case have borne the loss, Michigan statutory law
provides for payment by Defendant. The Court is of the Opinion the Plaintiffs are entitled to
indemnification by Defendant.” Therefore, on this appeal, we must review the issue of whether the trial
court was correct in finding that plaintiffs were entitled to summary disposition under a theory of
statutory indemnity. Only by reviewing this issue can we determine whether after remand the trial court
correctly granted defendant summary disposition.
Plaintiffs’ claim that defendant is liable to them for the sums they paid to Comerica under the
mortgage note is based on MCL 449.18(b); MSA 20.18(b), which states:
The partnership shall indemnify every partner in respect of payments made and personal
liabilities reasonably incurred by him or her in the ordinary and proper conduct of its
business, or for the preservation of its business or property.
Plaintiffs claim that they incurred personal liability as guarantors of the loan from Comerica in the
ordinary and proper course of CCPLP’s business. Thus, plaintiffs believe that defendant, who was a
general partner of CCPLP at the time of the loan, is obligated to indemnify them according to
§ 449.18(b) of the Uniform Partnership Act (hereinafter “UPA”). We find this argument to be without
merit.
The articles of CCPLP state that “[t]he liability of each Limited Partner for the losses, debts,
liabilities and obligations of the Partnership shall, so long as the [sic] such Partner complies with the
provisions of Section 5.1B, be limited to such Partner’s Capital Contribution, such Partner’s share of
any undistributed profits of the Partnership, and such Partner’s liability under a Guaranty of secondary
financing.” The agreement also states that the general partner “shall, except as otherwise provided in
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this Agreement, have all the rights and powers to be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a
partner in a partnership without limited partners.”
Plaintiffs, who were limited partners in CCPLP, became guarantors of the Comerica loan in the
ordinary and proper course of CCPLP’s business. The partnership was apparently formed for the sole
purpose of purchasing the City Center building. Comerica required plaintiffs to personally guarantee the
loan for the purchase of the building. Thus, plaintiffs reasonably incurred secondary liability under the
mortgage note in the ordinary course of the partnership’s business. Accordingly, the partnership was
obligated to indemnify them for their payments to Comerica under § 449.18(b) of the UPA.
Because CCPLP was obligated by statute to indemnify plaintiffs for their payments to
Comerica, the sums paid by plaintiffs became a debt of the partnership based on statutory indemnity.
Also, because plaintiffs, as guarantors, became personally and primarily liable on the Comerica loan
when CCPLP defaulted, that is the point in time that the partnership became bound to indemnify
plaintiffs under §449.18(b) of the UPA. However, it is clear from the record that defendant had no
interest in the partnership, and therefore was not personally liable for the debts of the partnership, when
CCPLP defaulted on the loan from Comerica. Thus, we conclude that the trial court on remand did not
err in granting summary disposition for defendant.
CCPLP did not become obligated to indemnify plaintiffs until more than a year after defendant
had assigned his partnership interest to another. On July 20, 1990, defendant assigned his general
partnership interest in CCPLP to BRG Management, Incorporated. At that time, the partnership
recognized that defendant would have no liability for partnership obligations arising after the date of the
assignment. CCPLP made its last payment on the Comerica loan in August 1991. Therefore,
defendant was not personally liable for the partnership’s obligation to indemnify plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs appear to believe that the partnership’s statutory obligation to indemnify plaintiffs arose
when Comerica granted the loan to CCPLP because it was at that point that plaintiffs reasonably
incurred personal liability. Because defendant was a general partner at the time the loan was made,
plaintiffs claim that defendant is obligated to indemnify them for the payments they made to Comerica
pursuant to the loan agreement. However, an action for indemnity is intended to make whole a party
held vicariously liable to another through no fault of his or her own. Cutter v Massey-Ferguson, Inc,
114 Mich App 28, 33; 318 NW2d 554 (1982). The partnership’s obligation to indemnify plaintiffs did
not arise in this case until the partnership defaulted and Comerica held plaintiffs personally liable for the
debt. If plaintiffs had been held personally liable on the debt while defendant still had a general
partnership interest in CCPLP, then defendant would have been obligated to indemnify plaintiffs
pursuant to § 449.18(b) of the UPA. However, because the partnership’s statutory obligation to
indemnify plaintiffs did not arise until after defendant had assigned his general partnership interest,
defendant is not personally liable to plaintiffs for the sums they paid to Comerica.
There is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether defendant is liable to plaintiffs
under a theory of statutory indemnity. Defendant has no duty to indemnify plaintiffs under § 449.18(b)
of the UPA.
Furthermore, as our previous opinion indicates, defendant is not
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liable to plaintiffs under the mortgage note, or under a theory of implied indemnity. Therefore, the trial
court correctly granted summary disposition in favor of defendant.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Robert B. Burns
1
Goldrath v Beach, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 31, 1997
(Docket No. 185562).
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