IN RE MITCHELL MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SHERRI LE’ANN MITCHELL,
CORY DENNIS MITCHELL, MELINDA D.
MITCHELL, KEVIN RAYSHON MITCHELL and
DANIEL MARTEZ MITCHELL, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 18, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 218749
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 94-320939
LINDA FAY MITCHELL,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
TERRY DENNIS PORTER a/k/a TERRY
DENNIS PARKER, FRED TUCKER
and RAYMOND WILLIAMS,
Respondents.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 220437
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 94-320939
TERRY DENNIS PORTER a/k/a TERRY
DENNIS PARKER,
Respondent-Appellant,
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and
LINDA FAYE MITCHELL,
Respondent,
and
FRED TUCKER and RAYMOND WILLIAMS,
Respondents-Not Participating.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Sawyer and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 218749, respondent Linda Mitchell appeals as of right the termination of her
parental rights to her minor children, Melinda, Corey, Kevin, Sherri, and Daniel, pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) [conditions that led to adjudication continue to
exist and are not likely to be rectified within a reasonable time], (g) [parent, without regard to intent, fails
to provide proper care or custody for the children], and (j) [reasonable likelihood of harm if children are
returned to parent’s home]. In Docket No. 220437, respondent Terry Parker appeals as of right the
termination of his parental rights to Melinda and Corey pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).1 We affirm in both cases.
I
Both respondents argue that the family court erred in terminating their parental rights. A two
prong test applies to a family court’s decision to terminate parental rights. First, the court must find that
at least one of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b; MSA
27.3178(598.19b) has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22,
25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). This Court reviews the findings of fact under the clearly erroneous
standard. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). A finding of fact
is clearly erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. Jackson, supra at 25.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence, the
parent against whom termination proceedings have been brought has the burden of going forward with
some evidence that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interest. If no such showing is made and
a statutory ground for termination has been established, the family court is without discretion; it must
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terminate parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Huisman, 230 Mich
App 372, 384; 584 NW2d 349 (1998).
The children were removed from the home of respondent Parker’s grandfather in May 1997.
When the police entered the home, they found soiled diapers on the table, rat poison lying all around the
house, garbage covering the floors, no food in the refrigerator, and no sink in the bathroom. The
children stated that they had witnessed both respondents and their uncle smoking crack cocaine.
On October 1, 1997, respondents each signed a parent-agency agreement. Respondent
Mitchell was required to attend weekly visitation, complete parenting classes, maintain weekly contact
with the agency, attend all court hearings, obtain and maintain suitable housing, undergo a drug
assessment, and submit to weekly drug screens. Gina Petitti, the caseworker, testified that Mitchell did
not miss any visits in 1997; however, in 1998, there was an eighty-three day period during which she
did not visit the children or maintain contact with the agency. She completed the parenting classes. She
had missed two court hearings. Mitchell underwent the drug assessment; however, she twice failed to
complete the drug treatment program that was ordered as a result. She did not consistently comply with
the requirement to provide weekly drug screens, and two of the drug screens that she submitted tested
positive for cocaine. She had not obtained suitable housing for herself and the children.
Respondent Parker was required to attend weekly visitation, complete eight hours of parenting
classes, attend all court hearings, participate in two Narcotics Anonymous/Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings weekly, obtain and maintain suitable housing, undergo a drug assessment, and submit to
random drug screens. Petitti testified that Parker attended one parenting class, never underwent the
drug assessment, and submitted to only two drug screens out of eighteen. He had attended only nine
out of a possible twenty-three visits in 1997 and only twenty-eight out of a possible forty-three visits in
1998; however, Petitti conceded that in 1998 Parker had suffered from medical problems that
accounted for his failure to attend a number of visits. He had attended all court hearings. Petitti had not
received any verification of his attendance at Narcotics Anonymous/Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
Parker testified that he was currently living with his grandfather in the home from which the children had
been removed.
Petitti testified that both Melinda and Corey have special needs. Both intellectually and
academically, Melinda functions at a level well below average. She has emotional issues and exhibits
disruptive behaviors. Corey is of average intelligence, but has attention deficiencies and has displayed
problems both in school and at home. He has demonstrated aggressive behavior and is currently in
therapy. Petitti testified that Corey had been discharged from two different treatment programs because
neither parent would come in and sign a consent form so that he could be placed on the recommended
medication.
Furthermore, Petitti stated that respondent Parker understandably had difficulty in disciplining
Corey; however, he had not followed up on her recommendation that he contact Family Roads
regarding classes in disciplining difficult children. Petitti testified that Parker had not shown any interest
in personally planning for his children; rather, he wanted his mother to plan for them. However,
petitioner had not considered this to be a suitable option.
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On these facts, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory
grounds for terminating respondents’ parental rights had been established. See MCR 5.974(I); Miller,
supra. Because neither respondent presented any evidence that termination of his or her parental rights
would not be in the children’s best interest, the family court properly terminated respondents’ parental
rights. See MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); Huisman, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
At the same time, the family court terminated the parental rights of Raymond Williams, Kevin’s father,
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii) [abandonment for ninety-one
or more days]. The court also stated that David Goddard’s parental rights were being terminated on
the same basis; however, at a previous hearing both Goddard and respondent Mitchell had stated that
testing had established that Goddard is not Sherri’s father. Sherri’s father is apparently Fred Tucker,
who is deceased. Petitioner did not seek to terminate the parental rights of Melvin Dunlop, Daniel’s
father.
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