PEOPLE OF MI V GREGORY ARTHUR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 14, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210005
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 97-501605
GREGORY ARTHUR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Gage and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317;
MSA 28.549.1 He was sentenced to life imprisonment and appeals as of right. We affirm.
On March 6, 1997, Saudah Favors was residing in a Highland Park home with her relative,
Stephanie Cheeks, and four of Cheeks’ five children. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Favors awoke to
the sound of Stephanie screaming. Favors attempted to enter Stephanie’s bedroom, but the door was
pushed closed. Favors heard a man say “[i]f she come in I’m going to kill her.” Favors went to the
children to try and calm them down, then returned to her room. Back in her room, Favors heard the
man tell the twins, Ramon and Demetrius, to “go in the room and lay down.” Favors heard “banging
and hitting” as Stephanie continued to scream for Favors. She also heard Stephanie say “Charles,
stop.” Favors heard the man leave the home, but did not see him. Favors locked the door and
entered Stephanie’s bedroom where she lay on the floor in a puddle of blood. Favors tried to pull the
telephone cord only to learn that it had been wrapped around Stephanie’s neck. A steak knife was
discovered under Stephanie’s arm, and it was later determined that she had been stabbed twenty-two
times, including one four-inch wide “big slicing” on the neck, fourteen stab wounds to the chest, three
stab wounds to the back, three to the left forearm, and one to the left upper arm. Favors left the home
and ran to the home of her guardian, Erma Scott, to call 911. When the two arrived back at the home,
police were present on the scene. Favors was not allowed to re-enter the home, and the children were
brought out by police. Prior to leaving the scene, Scott asked Ramon who had done this to Stephanie.
He responded that “Greg” had pushed his mother into the room.
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Defendant, Stephanie’s former neighbor, awoke later in the morning on March 6, 1997. He
told friends and relatives that he had “dreamed” that he had killed his “friend Stephanie.” However,
based on the cuts on his hands, defendant stated that it “must not have been a dream.” Defendant also
recalled taking off his bloody clothes and placing them in a dumpster behind the Bargain Basket
Supermarket. Defendant directed relatives to the home in Highland Park where Stephanie lived, but
relatives found that no one was home. Defendant was taken to Detroit Receiving Hospital where he
again gave details about his “dream.” Defendant was taken into police custody and once again
repeated the circumstances surrounding his “dream.” Defendant also told police that he had walked to
Stephanie’s home where they talked and got into a shoving match. Officers were able to recover
clothing stained with Stephanie’s blood from the dumpster behind the supermarket.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statement by Ramon that
identified “Greg” as the man who pushed his mother into the room. We disagree. The decision
regarding admission of evidence rests within the trial court’s discretion and will only be reversed where
there is a clear abuse of discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). An
abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision is so grossly violative of fact and logic that it
evidences perversity of will, defiance of judgment, and the exercise of passion or bias. People v
Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 33; 592 NW2d 75 (1998). Furthermore, close questions arising from
the trial court’s discretionary evidentiary ruling should not be reversed simply because the reviewing
court would have ruled differently. People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998).
Ordinarily, a decision regarding a close evidentiary question cannot be an abuse of discretion. Id.
In the present case, the trial court admitted the statement pursuant to MRE 803(2) as an
“excited utterance.” MRE 803(2) allows for the admission of statements “relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.” This exception “allows hearsay testimony that would otherwise be excluded because it is
perceived that a person who is still under the ‘sway of excitement precipitated by an external startling
event will not have the reflective capacity essential for fabrication so that any utterance will be
spontaneous and trustworthy.’” Smith, supra at 550, quoting 5 Weinstein, Evidence (2d ed),
§ 803.03[1], pp 803-819. A statement is admissible under MRE 803(2) if there was (1) a startling
event and (2) the resulting statement was made while the declarant was under the excitement caused by
that event. Smith, supra at 550.
Defendant contends that Ramon’s statement was inadmissible under the excited utterance
exception because there was no evidence, other than the hearsay statement itself, that Ramon was in a
position to observe the startling event. That is, the prosecution cannot “bootstrap” by using the
statement itself to prove that Ramon observed the startling event. In People v Henrickson, 459 Mich
229, 237-238; 586 NW2d 906 (1998) (Opinions of Kelly, J. and Brickley, J.), the Supreme Court
held that corroboration of a hearsay statement admitted under the present sense impression or excited
utterance exception should be required. The sufficiency of the corroboration depends on the particular
circumstances of each case. Id. Under the facts of this case, ample evidence was presented to
establish, independent of Ramon’s statement, that the murder of his mother took place. Favors testified
that she awoke in the middle of the night when she heard Stephanie screaming. Favors tried to enter the
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room to render assistance, but the door was pushed closed. Favors could hear “banging and hitting,”
and the children were crying. Favors heard the perpetrator instruct the twins, Ramon and Demetrius, to
go in the room and lay down. When police arrived on the scene in response to the 911 call, Ramon
was present in the home. Based on this evidence, it appeared that Ramon had the opportunity to
personally observe the matter of which he spoke. People v DeWitt, 173 Mich App 261, 267; 433
NW2d 325 (1988) citing People v Kent, 157 Mich App 780, 788; 404 NW2d 668 (1987). Because
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ramon’s statement pursuant to MRE
803(2), we need not decide whether the statement was also admissible under MRE 803(24).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the prosecutor had exercised
due diligence in its efforts to locate witness Bradford Mallory and in admitting Mallory’s testimony from
the preliminary examination at trial. We disagree. The trial court’s determination regarding due
diligence will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. People v Bean,
457 Mich 677, 684; 580 NW2d 390 (1998).
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and § 20 of article 1 of the Michigan
Constitution of 1963 grant an accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”2 The
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to provide for a face-to-face confrontation between a defendant
and his accusers at trial. Bean, supra at 682; People v Dye, 431 Mich 58, 64; 427 NW2d 501
(1988). The right of confrontation is an important right because it enables the trier of fact to judge the
witnesses' demeanors. Bean, supra at 682; Dye, supra at 64.
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
requires a showing that the declarant is unavailable, as w as that the declarant’s statement bears
ell
satisfactory indicia of reliability. People v Meredith, 459 Mich 62, 67-68; 586 NW2d 538 (1998). In
the instant case, the prosecution contended that Mallory was unavailable, and that his preliminary
examination testimony should be admitted as evidence pursuant to MRE 804(b)(1) which provides for
admissibility, when the declarant is unavailable, of:
[t]estimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding,
if the party against whom the testimony is now offered . . . had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
The Confrontation Clause is not violated by the use of preliminary examination testimony as
substantive evidence at trial only if the prosecution exercised due diligence to produce the absent
witness.3 Bean, supra at 682-683. Whether the prosecution made a diligent, good-faith effort4 to
produce a missing witness is an evaluation that depends on the particular facts and circumstances of
each case. Id. at 684. The test is one of reasonableness, and the focus is whether diligent good faith
efforts were made to procure the testimony, not whether more stringent efforts would have produced it.
Id.
In People v Briseno, 211 Mich App 11, 12; 535 NW2d 559 (1995), a drug courier, Ernesto
Gonzalez, was caught following a traffic stop with marijuana. Gonzalez, acting in cooperation with law
enforcement officers, called Tim Miller to notify him of the delivery of marijuana. Gonzalez and Miller
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made arrangements to store the vehicle that had the marijuana concealed in a special bumper. The
defendant was the third man involved in the drug conspiracy. Following his conviction for conspiracy to
deliver marijuana, the defendant asserted that his right to confrontation was violated where the
prosecutor failed to make diligent efforts to secure the production of Gonzalez as a witness at trial. Id.
at 14.
Police testified regarding the efforts to locate Gonzalez. A personal visit was made to the last
known address. There, police spoke to Gonzalez’ mother. She told them that she had not seen her son
since the start of the trial. While Gonzalez had told his mother that he was going to California, he had
not left a telephone number or address. A new address could not be located. Additionally, there was
no indication that Gonzalez had received a California driver’s license. While Gonzalez had left a
telephone number with authorities and assured them that he could be reached, attempts to contact him
at that number were fruitless. Gonzalez had also assured the court that he would remain in contact with
his attorney, but Gonzalez failed to do so. In response, the defendant gave numerous examples of
possible methods of locating Gonzalez. However, this Court held that the trial court’s finding that the
prosecution had exercised due diligence was not clearly erroneous and admission of the preliminary
examination testimony at trial was proper. Id. at 15-16.5 Furthermore, we held that authorities were
not required to exhaust all avenues for locating a witness, but had a duty only to exercise a reasonable,
good-faith effort in locating him. Id. at 16.
The present case is factually similar to Briseno. Here, Mallory was personally served with the
subpoena requiring his presence at trial. Mallory indicated to police that he would appear and that he
only required a telephone call. Prior to trial, the prosecutor tried to telephone Mallory, but was unable
to reach him. The prosecutor, coupled with police assistance, attempted to call Mallory twenty times
since trial began on November 5, 1997. When it was apparent that Mallory could not be reached, a
bench warrant was issued for his arrest on November 10, 1997. On November 10, 1997, police
officers were sent to Mallory’s last known address, but did not get a response. On November 11,
1997, a court holiday, the prosecutor personally went to Mallory’s address and observed a vehicle
believed to be Mallory’s. He reported his findings to police. Police arrived on the scene and were able
to make contact with Paul Johnson, who was in the house. While Johnson denied officers entry into the
home, he reported that Mallory was out of town with his son. Based on these facts, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the preliminary examination testimony of
Mallory at trial. Briseno, supra.
We note that decisions by our Supreme Court have reversed convictions based on the
prosecution’s failure to exercise due diligence. However, those cases have involved disparate facts. In
Bean, supra at 685-686, police attempted to locate Martex Pryor, a res gestae witness, by placing
unsuccessful phone calls. Ultimately, Pryor’s relative, Carolyn Brown, provided police the name of
Pryor’s mother and reported that he had moved with his mother to Washington, D.C. for government
employment. The police did not attempt to confirm this information with Washington, D.C. authorities
and ended their local search after being told of the move.
Furthermore, in Dye, supra at 62-63, three witnesses, fellow members of a motorcycle club,
provided the only evidence that the defendant had murdered the victims. Although it was alleged that
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the defendant was the killer of the victims, the three witnesses helped the defendant cleanup the
clubhouse after the killings. The three witnesses testified under a limited grant of immunity, and all three
left the state after the killings. The witnesses were difficult to produce for the first trial because each had
gone into hiding. While awaiting the first trial, they were in protective custody for fear of reprisal from
other “bikers.” The threats continued after their release from protective custody. Furthermore, the
witnesses may have feared prosecution because they were only given limited immunity although all three
were admitted accomplices after the fact to the murders. Id. at 67.
In Dye, a mistrial was declared on March 17, 1983. On May 13, 1983, the court set the
defendant’s retrial for August 22, 1983. As of May 13, the prosecution had not made any efforts to
contact the witnesses. No efforts were undertaken although the prosecution knew that the witnesses
intended on leaving the state and had incentives to go into hiding. Id. at 67-68. Review of our Supreme
Court authority reveals that it addressed res gestae witnesses who had incentives to avoid testifying at
trial in order to elude repercussions for their testimony.
Unlike the above cited cases, here, Mallory was not an eyewitness to Stephanie’s murder.
Rather, he was present with other members of defendant’s family when defendant began to recall
details of his “dream.” There was no indication that Mallory posed a flight risk. There is no
indication that his testimony at the preliminary examination was compelled. He acknowledged personal
service and expressed a willingness to testify when notified by telephone. There was no indication that
the prosecutor needed to maintain contact with Mallory between the time of the preliminary examination
on April 29, 1997, and the commencement of trial on November 5, 1997. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the use of Mallory’s preliminary
examination testimony. In any event, we note that the vast majority of Mallory’s preliminary
examination testimony was cumulative to the testimony provided by other witnesses. Therefore, any
arguable error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 18;
507 NW2d 763 (1993).
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
Defendant was charged with one count of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a);
MSA 28.548(1)(a) and one count of first-degree felony-murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); MSA
28.548(1)(b). The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the felony-murder count prior
to trial. The jury convicted defendant of the lesser offense of second-degree murder.
2
The Sixth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v Texas,
380 US 400, 406; 85 S Ct 1065; 13 L Ed 2d 923 (1965).
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3
Because MRE 804(b)(1) is a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,” the reliability requirement with
respect to preliminary examination testimony is satisfied “without more.” Meredith, supra at 69-71;
People v Adams, 233 Mich App 652, 659-660; 592 NW2d 794 (1999).
4
Michigan courts have interchangeably used the terms “due diligence” and “good faith” in this context,
but the difference is a matter of semantics and either form may be used. Bean, supra at 682-683 n 11.
5
In Briseno, supra, we held that a finding of due diligence is a finding of fact such that it will not be set
aside absent clear error. Briseno, supra at 14. However, the court also noted that the ultimate
decision to admit evidence was reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. In the present case, the trial
court did not make express findings regarding the credibility of witnesses. Furthermore, the due
diligence “hearing” was limited to sworn testimony from Detective Howard regarding fruitless attempts
by police to contact Mallory. The remaining information regarding due diligence came from the
prosecutor who was not duly sworn prior to making the statements. Defense counsel did not object to
the manner in which the due diligence “hearing” was conducted and does not take issue with the
credibility or truthfulness of the statements made in support of attempted contact. Rather, defendant’s
argument is limited to whether the actions taken were sufficient to meet the due diligence standard.
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