PEOPLE OF MI V TAMIKA M RAMSEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 11, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210720
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 97-501517
TAMIKA M. RAMSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Saad and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from her bench trial conviction of negligent homicide, MCL
750.324; MSA 28.556, for which the court sentenced defendant to two years’ probation. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because defendant
did not request a new trial or an evidentiary hearing with respect to her allegations of ineffective
assistance, our review of this issue is limited to the existing record. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436,
443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed. To overcome this
presumption, a defendant must establish that his counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable
and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s defective performance. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145,
156, 164; 560 NW2d 600 (1997).
In this case, the available trial court record amply demonstrates that defense counsel’s actions
qualify as unreasonable under prevailing professional standards. The record reveals that on the first day
of trial defense counsel had not yet picked up from the Dearborn Police Department a discovery packet
prepared for him, but instead assumed that the prosecutor should and would simply mail him these
discovery materials. See Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 US 365, 369, 385-387; 106 S Ct 2574; 91 L
Ed 2d 305 (1986) (Defense counsel’s performance was unreasonable where counsel failed to conduct
any discovery regarding the state’s case, insisting that it was the prosecutor’s duty to provide the
discovery material even though defense counsel had not requested it.).
Defense counsel’s opening statement theorized that a defective guardrail was the reason for the
victim’s death, but counsel failed to file any witness list and, thus, did not list a road commission
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representative on his witness list. Although the trial court allowed defense counsel to present this
witness, the witness did not support counsel’s theory. Counsel also suggested that the traffic light
located at the intersection where the accident occurred was malfunctioning, but again presented no
witnesses to that effect because he had none listed on a witness list and did not in advance of trial
subpoena anyone from the “lighting commission.” On the third day of trial, defense counsel then
suggested that the victim died of a heart attack and not a broken neck as the autopsy report concluded,
but was precluded from presenting any witnesses to this effect on the basis of his failure to list any on a
witness list. The court ruled that any probative value of a proposed medical expert’s testimony was
substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the prosecutor arising from the tardy addition of a
defense witness on the third day of trial.
To establish that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, however, defendant must also
show that she was prejudiced by this unreasonable performance. Mitchell, supra, at 164; People v
Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 312; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). On the record before this Court, evidence of
prejudice is lacking due to the strength of the prosecutor’s case. With respect to the suggested defense
that a defective guardrail caused the victim’s death, we reiterate that the trial court did allow defense
counsel to call a witness from the road commission who testified that the guardrail was not defective.
Regarding defense counsel’s suggestion that the intersection traffic light was malfunctioning at the time of
the accident, an eyewitnesses to the accident and an investigating police officer who reported to the
scene within minutes of the accident testified that the light was functioning properly. With regard to
counsel’s last theory that the victim died of a heart attack unrelated to the accident, the trial court’s
factual finding that defendant’s collision with the victim’s Lincoln, which the evidence showed sent the
victim’s vehicle out of control and caused it to fall top-down fourteen feet from the overpass onto the
avenue below, represented a substantial cause of the victim’s death rendered irrelevant the purported
issue whether subsequent to the collision the victim ultimately died from a heart attack or a broken neck.
Accordingly, while we find that defense counsel’s performance was unreasonable and did not
meet prevailing professional standards, we conclude that defendant was not denied effective assistance
of counsel because she suffered no prejudice arising from defense counsel’s performance.1 No
reasonable probability exists that absent defense counsel’s errors, the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting defendant’s guilt. Pickens, supra at 312.
Defendant next argues that insufficient evidence supported her conviction of negligent homicide.
In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720,
722-723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
To be found guilty of negligent homicide, a defendant must have (1) operated a vehicle at an
immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner (2) that was a substantial cause
of injuries resulting in another’s death. MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556; People v Lardie, 452 Mich 231,
247-248, n 25; 551 NW2d 656 (1996). To convict a defendant of a criminal negligence offense, the
prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was a factual cause of
the fatal accident. In cases where the defendant’s conduct was remote, the jury must decide whether
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the defendant’s conduct was the proximate or legal cause of the decedent’s death. People v Tims, 449
Mich 83, 94-95; 534 NW2d 675 (1995).
The instant record reflects that defendant admitted driving a vehicle on March 26, 1997, that
during a left turn she collided with the victim’s Lincoln, and that she later saw the Lincoln travel off the
overpass. At the time of the accident, defendant was driving with a suspended license. Despite
defendant’s suggestion that the Lincoln ran a red light, the testimony of two eyewitnesses, who were
driving immediately behind the victim’s Lincoln, indicated that the Lincoln proceeded through a green
light. One eyewitness explained that it appeared that defendant in making her left turn was attempting to
beat the traffic light. The investigating officer concluded that due to the impact with defendant’s car, the
victim’s Lincoln lost traction on the roadway “then went out of control, went to the right lane, and then
basically yawed across all lanes of traffic up and over the turnaround barrier and up onto the sidewalk,
finally going through the guardrail and landing on its roof fourteen feet below.” The medical examiner
testified that the victim died almost instantaneously from neck injuries.
We conclude that viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution a
reasonable factfinder could have found the elements of negligent homicide. Johnson, supra; Lardie,
supra.
Defendant maintains that i sufficient evidence proved that her negligence was the cause of the
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victim’s death and that the death was so remote that it would be unjust to permit her conviction to stand.
Even accepting as defendant suggests, however, that the slight impact initiated by defendant was not the
cause of the victim’s death and that the possibility exists that the victim had a heart attack that caused
him to lose control of his vehicle and travel over a defective guardrail, all these possibilities represent, at
best, joint and equal causes of the victim’s death. But for defendant’s contact with the victim’s Lincoln
these other events would not have occurred and the Lincoln would not have gone over the rail. The
Supreme Court has explained that a defendant’s suggestion of an additional cause of death does not
constitute a complete defense to negligent homicide, and that “joint equal causes do not excuse culpable
behavior.” Tims, supra at 96-97.
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contention that insufficient evidence supported the trial
court’s finding that defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in the victim’s death. Tims, supra at
95.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
1
To the extent that defendant argues on appeal that defense counsel failed to present a valid defense,
we note that defense counsel called defendant to the stand and elicited her testimony that she had
commenced her left turn only on the appearance of a green arrow signal, thus implying that the victim
must have improperly proceeded through the light and caused the collision.
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